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MINUTES 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Annual Meeting - 1986 
The fifty-sixth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Associa-
tion convened at Francis Marion College, Florence, South Carolina, March . 
l, 1986. An estimated ninety members and guests of the SCHA attended the 
gathering. After registration and an official welcome in the McNair Science 
Building from SCHA President Joseph T. Stukes, Francis Marion College, 
the membership dispersed to one of three 10 AM sessions. 
Alice Henderson of USC-Spartanburg chaired the session, "South 
Carolina Women in Education and Politics." Diane Neal, Central State 
(Okla.) University, presented a paper, "What Have They Done for Our 
Women?: The Impact of the Tillman Movement Upon Higher Education 
for Women in South Carolina." Joanne V. Hawks, University of Mississip-
pi, offered "Ladies in the .Gentlemen's Club: South Carolina Women 
Legislators, 1928-84.'' Carlanna Hendrick, Francis Marion College, com-
mented on these papers. 
A session on "Artisans and Mercenaries in Revolution and /'War" was 
chaired by Jeffrey Willis of Converse College. Ralph C. Canevali, The 
Citadel, presented "Artisans and the Revolution of 1848 in Germany," 
while William S. Brockington of USC-Aiken discussed "Scottish 
Mercenaries in the Thirty Years' War." Don McKale, Clemson University, 
added some observations on these two topics. 
Robert Simpson, Coker College, presided over a session titled "Con-
gressional Careers." Edward Lee, USC-Columbia, spoke on "America 
Comes First With Me: The Early Political Career of Congressman James P. 
Richards", and Roger P. Leemhuis, Clemson University, contributed 
··otin D. Johnston Runs for the Senate, 1938-62." Daniel W. Hollis, USC-
Columbia, offered his comments on these two presentations. 
After a brief breather, the membership moved on to one of three 11 :30 
panels. 
Robert Moore of Columbia College chaired a session examining "Two 
Crises in Charleston." Kenneth E. Peters, USC-Columbia, presented his 
findings on the "Economic Consequences of the Charleston Earthquake," 
and Stephen O'Neill of the University of Virginia analyzed a second crisis, 
"The Charleston Medical College and County Hospital Strike of 1969." 
George Hopkins, The College of Charleston, and John R. Wunder, Clem-
son University, contributed their comments on these crises. 
A second session, "Theatre and Religion in the French Revolution" was 
chaired by Lorraine de Montluzin, Francis Marion College. Jesse L. Scott, 
Newberry College, presented "Marie-Joseph Blaise Chenier (1764-1811): 
The Staging of Charles IX," and Fred Hembree, USC-Columbia, discussed 
"Revolutionary Ideology and Dechristianization, 1789 to l' an 11." John 
Newell, College of Charleston, commented. 
"Africa in the Twentieth Century" was the theme for the third session, 
chaired by James Brown, USC-Spartanburg. Ken Mufuka, Lander College, 
spoke on "World Hunger and African Development Policies/' and April 
Gordon, Coker College, discussed "Agricultural Policy and Development 
in Cameroon." Don Gordon, Furman University, and panel Chair James 
Brown added their comments. 
At 1 PM a famished but wiser membership gathered for a splendid bouf-
fet luncheon at the Smith College Center. President Thomas M. Stanton 
welcomed the SCHA membership to the impressive campus and facilities of 
Francis Marion College. After the luncheon a sated group of historians 
strolled to the Cauthen Educational Media Center for the business meeting, . 
which was to be followed by the featured speaker and the final, afternoon 
session. 
President Joseph T. Stukes convened the annual business meeting at 2 
PM. First on the agenda was an announcement by Dan Hollis regarding the 
John Porter Hollis Prize Fund. He expressed his hopes that the Association 
could begin making awards as early as 1988. Although the details of the 
award were still to be worked out, a monetary prize of as high as perhaps 
$400 would be awarded regularly to an outstanding paper on South 
Carolina History since 1876. 
Secretary-Treasurer Val Lumans, USC-Aiken, presented the financial 
statement. The statement disclosed a checking account balance on 2/24/86 
of $3,073.03; general savings account, $1,435.12; Proceedings Publication 
Endowment Fund, $2,582.67; Hollis Prize account, $1,167.11. He noted 
that the general savings account and the Hollis Prize account had not been 
updated to the exact balance at present, and would therefore amount to 
slightly more than indicated. 
The next item on the agenda was the approval of revisions in the consti-
tution of the SCHA, as proposed by the executive council. After the reading 
of the revisions John Edmunds moved to adopt the revised text, Robert 
Herzstein seconded the motion. The revised constitution was overwhelm-
ingly approved. The following is the the text of the revised and approved 
constitution. Since the constitution (article VII) requires the publishing of 
the constitution in The Proceedings every five years, the following text, 
when it appears in the next issue as a part of the minutes, will serve that pur-
pose: 
CONSTITUTION 
I· The name of this organization shall be the South Carolina Historical 
Association. 
11. The objects of this Association shall be to promote historical studies in 
the state of South Carolina: to bring about a closer relationship among per-
sons living in this state who are interested in history; and to encourage the 
preservation of historical records. 
111. Membership shall be open to anyone interested in the objects of the 
Association. Annual dues shall be determined by the Executive Committee. 
After having been a member of the Association for ten years, and upon 
reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying the Secretary-
Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus member by the Executive 
Committee. Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of member-
ship without being required to pay the annual dues. 
Members in student status shall pay annual dues at half-rates. 
IV. The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary-
treasurer; these shall be elected at each annual meeting. The vice president 
shall be an automatic nominee for president. The Executive Committee 
shall normally nominate at least two persons for each of the offices of vice 
president and Executive Committee Member. The Executive Committee 
shall appoint a secretary-treasurer subject to confirmation by the member-
ship. Nominations from the floor may be made for any office. 
Officers shall have the duties and perform the functions customarily at-
tached to their respective offices with such others as may from time to time 
be prescribed. 
V. The Executive Committee shall be composed of the officers, the editor 
of The Proceedings, and three other members elected for a term of three 
years. The duties of the Executive Committee shall be to fix the date and 
place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of The Proceedings 
of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, to prepare 
a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided in Arti-
cle IV, to supervise expenditures of the Association's funds, and such other 
duties as may be from time to time assigned to them by the Association. 
There shall be such other committees as the president may appoint, or be in-
structed to appoint, by resolutions of the Association. 
VI. There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and 
place appointed by the Executive Committee. 
VI I. A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be 
known as The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. It 
shall contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers 
and documents selected by the Executive Committee. Each fifth year, The 
Proceedings shall include a copy of the constitution of the Association. At 
least every five years, The Proceedings shall include a current list of the 
membership. 
B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the property 
of the Association except as otherwise may be approved by the Executivc 
Committee. 
C. The Executive Committee shall annually elect an editor of The 
Proceedings who shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and 
shall be a member of the Executive Committee. 
VIII. In the event of dissolution, the remaining assets of the association, if 
any, shall be donated by the Executive Committee to another organization 
which share the objects and aims of the Association. 
IX. This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the 
members present at the annual meeting. 
Following the approval of the constitution revisions the next item on the 
agenda was the nomination and election of officers and Executive Commit-
tee members for 1986-1987. The following were nominated: Jeff Willis, 
Converse College, president; Robert Moore, Columbia College, vice-
president; Val Lumans, USC-Aiken, secretary-treasurer; Rodger Stroup, 
South _Carolina Museum Commission, Alice Henderson, USC-
Spartanburg, and Clara Gandy, Coker College. Executive Commi1tec. 
Since there were no further nomination from the floor, the proposed slate 
was elected by acclamation. 
Newly elected president Jeff Willis reminded the membership that next 
year's meeting would convene on March 7, 1987, at Columbia College. The 
business meeting was adjourned. 
Following the business meeting the featured guest speaker, Professor 
Stephen E. Ambrose, University of New Orleans, appealed tot he rcsean:hcr 
and writer in all of us through his talk, .. On Writing History." A lively and 
stimulating question and answer exchange followed. 
After a brief interlude the membership gathered at 3 PM for the final 
session of the day, "Movietone News Covers the Fascist Era: A Source for 
Teachers and Reseachers." Robert E. Herzstein, USC-Columbia, directed a 
presentation of Movietone News selections dealing with Nazism and 
Fascism. A panel of experts on the subject, consisiting of Michael Barrett, 
The Citadel; Peter Becker, USC-Columbia; and Don Mc Kale, Clemson 
University, commented on the film clips and the use of such films in the 
classroom and for research purposes. An enlightening exchange of ques-
tions, answers and comments between the panel and the rest of the member-
ship ensued. 
Following the last session a weary but intellectually stimulated member-
ship retired to the lovely on-campus home of President Thomas C. Stanton 
for a post-meeting reception. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Valdis 0. Lumans 
Secretary-Treasurer, SCHA 
March 1, 1986 
"WHAT HAVE THEY DONE FOR OUR WOMEN?" 
THE IMPACT OF THE TILLMAN MOVEMENT UPON PUBLIC 
HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Diane Neal 
During the antebellum period, South . Carolina took great pride in the 
South Carolina College in Columbia which offered a brilliant classical 
education under the guidance of renowned scholars such as Thomas 
Cooper, John and Joseph Leconte, and James Tho~nwell. Students who 
wished an education with a military orientation chose the Citadel in 
Charleston or the Arsenal in Columbia. In addition to these state supported 
facilities, South Carolina boasted of a number of fine denominational col~ 
leges including Erskine, Furman, and Wofford, as well as the municipally 
owned College of Charleston. These institutions adequately met the needs 
of the state's white male citizens who wished to train for the professions, ex-
pecially law and the ministry. 
However, as slaves, South Carolina blacks were excluded from aU but 
secretive educational opportunities. Like blacks, the state's female popula-
tion derived no direct benefit from the higher education facilities. Instead, 
girls usually found that their education ended with graduation from female 
academies which emphasized social graces with a smattering of the three r's. 
Nonetheless, a very few fortunate women were able to avail themselves of 
the opportunities which Columbia College and the Greenville Women's 
College offered. 1 
The Civil War and Reconstruction brought massive political and social 
changes in South Carolina. Along with the ending of slavery and suffrage 
for black men, Congressional reconstruction of the state resulted in the 
South Carolina College being reorganized as the University of South 
Carolina and the facility being opened to black male students. This innova-
tion spawned white hostility, and most white South Carolinians withdrew in 
protest. However, with the election of Redeemer Wade Hampton to the 
governor's post in 1876, the University again limited its student body as well 
as its faculty to white males. 2 
Public higher education in post-Reconstruction South Carolina con-
tinued to experience upheaval. In an effort to serve the needs of the state's 
economically distressed farming population in the 1870's and 1880's, both 
the Citadel and the reorganized South Carolina College gave free tuition to 
a small number of students. The South Carolina College also broadened its 
offerings to include practical and theoretical training in agriculture. 3 
In the post-Reconstruction period, black students found themselves con-
fined to facilities such as the Baker Biblical Institute in Charleston and 
8 
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Benedict Institute in Columbia. These institutes slowly evolved into col-
leges. By 1871 the Baker Institute had moved to Orangeburg and had merg-
ed with Claflin College founded in 1869. Benedict gained collegiate status in 
1895. Claflin received assistance in 1872 when the state legislature establish-
ed the South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Institute as an affiliate 
of Claflin. The arrangement lasted until 1896 when South Carolina State 
College was chartered. 4 
The white women of the state also benefited from the establishment of 
several private colleges in the post-bellum era. In 1872 Columbia College 
reopened. The same year the Reverend Samuel Lander founded the 
Williamston Female College. Influential Spartanburg citizens, including 
Dexter Converse, whose daughter was near college age, in 1889 established 
Converse College for women. 5 
Although religious groups and public spirited citizens tried to fill the gap 
in female higher education, many women could not afford the tuition at 
private colleges or felt that the liberal arts courses of study they offered 
were impractical in rural South Carolina. Clearly, there was a need for prac-
tical training to enable young women to become self-supporting or to 
manage households more economically. Moreover, expansion of the state's 
public school system was creating a demand for professionally trained 
teachers. 6 
Among those South Carolinians who recognized the vacuum in the 
state's higher education system was Benjamin Ryan Tillman of Edgefield. A 
progressive farmer who had won praise from his neighbors for his in-
novative methods, Tillman in 1885 emerged as the champion of the state's 
agrarian masses who found themselves crushed by declining crop and land 
values, the crop lien system, and a state government which seemed oblivious 
to their problems. Angrily, Tillman, in the next few years, demanded the 
repeal of the lien law, reorganization of the fertilizer industry, and the of-
fering of inexpensive, practical education in scientific farming methods. In-
dignantly, he labled the agricultural annex of the South Carolina College a 
"mere sop" or "bribe" to maintain the support of farmers in the state 
legislature. Upon reflection he called for a separate agriculture college 
rather than a reorganization of the South Carolina College's agricultural 
wing. 7 
In April, 1886, in his address to the Farmers' Convention in Columbia, 
Tillman broadened his demand for educational reforms and suggested that 
the Citadel which he derisively stigmatized as "a military dude factory" be 
closed and its funds transfered to the South Carolina College in order to 
transform the latter into a "first class institution" for instructing young 
men in literature and the professions. He urged that the General Assembly 
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follow the example of other states and establish a school for women which 
would offer a traditional liberal arts education as well as practical training 
to enable its graduates to earn a living. As an economy measure, the Citadel 
campus at Charleston should be the site for the new school. After toning 
down his resolutions by removing the reference to the Citadel as a ''military 
dude factory," the convention adopted his program. However, no action 
was forthcoming to implement it. 8 
Meanwhile, the educational needs of the state's females had attracted 
additional support from two other influential citizens: Dr. David Bancroft 
Johnson, superintendent of the Columbia City Schools, and Dr. .Edward S. 
Joynes, a member of the Columbia City School Board and Professor of An-
cient and Modern Languages at the South Carolina College. Recognizing 
the need to provide trained teachers to staff the state's public schools, 
Johnson in his 1884-1885 report to the school board, recommended that a 
training school for teachers be established in connection with the city's high 
school. At Joynes' instigation, the board approved the recommendat~on 
and authorized Johnson to request a grant from the Peabody Board which 
administered the legacy of George Peabody for the improvement of educa-
tion in the South. Johnson's visit with RobertCharles Winthrop, president 
of the Peabody Board, resulted in an annual appropriation of $1500 for the 
proposed institution, which was gratefully named the Winthrop Training 
School. 9 
Under Johnson's supervision, the Winthrop Training School opened in 
a one-room building belonging to the Columbia Theological Seminary on 
November 15, 1886. The new institution prospered and received favorable 
· mention in the reports of Governor John Peter Richardson, who advocated 
that the legislature consider the possibility of providing greater facilities for 
training teachers. The legislature proved responsive and provided a $150 
scholarship from each -county for a student to attend the Winthrop Training 
School. 10 
Practical, inexpensive education was on the verge of becoming a reality 
in South Carolina. This goal received much needed assistance with the death 
in April, 1888, of renowned Southern agriculturalist, Thomas Green Clem-
son. A son-in-law of John C. Calhoun, Clemson bequeathed the old 
Calhoun estate at Fort Hill and an $80,000 endowment for the establish-
ment of an agricultural college in South Carolina. He chose seven trustees, 
including Ben Tillman, to serve for life, in addition to six others to be 
elected by the state legislature. After bitter opposition from some members 
of the Calhoun family and friends of the University of South Carolina 
(formerly the South Carolina College), the Citadel, and various denomina-
tional colleges, the state accepted the bequest, and the General Assembly· 
"What Have They Done for Our Women?" I I 
The Impact of the Tillman Movement Upon Public 
Higher Education for Women in South Carolina 
passed an act signed by Governor Richardson authorizing the establishment 
and maintenance of the Clemson Agricultural College. 11 
Despite the realization of his aim of a separate agricultural college, Ben 
Tillman continued his drive for additional political reforms to benefit the 
state's agrarian majority. Disgusted and frustrated by candidates who ap-
pealed to farmers for votes, but ignored their needs once in office, Tillman 
decided to enter the governor's race in 1890. After a hard fought race for 
the Democratic nomination and a campaign against Conservative indepen-
dent _ Alexander C. Haskell in the general election, Tillman emerged vic-
torious. 
The election of Tillman to the gubernatorial post proved felicitous for 
South Carolina women. In an address to the Teachers' Institute at Florence 
in July, 1890, Edward S. Joynes advocated transferring the Winthrop 
Training School to state control and transforming it into a college which 
could offer industrial and normal education for women. He sent a copy of 
his speech to Governor-elect Tillman who invited him to a conference to 
discuss the matter. Tillman favored the establishment of such a college, but 
felt that the public would not accept another state-supported college so soon 
after the founding of Clemson. However, he did agree to Joynes' suggestion 
that a committee be appointed to investigate the organization and cost of 
such an institution. 12 
Tillman followed up by including in his December, 1890, inaugural ad-
dress a statement emphasizing the need for an industrial school for women 
and condemning the state for neglecting their education. The South 
Carolina system of educating women, according to the governor, was 
geared to "giving them accomplishments for the adornment of society. But 
reverse of fortune or death often brings the necessity of bread-winning, and 
the tender mother left a widow, or a daughter left an orphan, finds how lit-
tle worth in dollars and cents are the music, drawing and painting etc. upon 
which money and time had been lavished in her so-called education." To 
right this deficiency, he resurrected his previous proposal of abolishing the 
Citadel and establishing a normal and industrial school for girls in its place. 
He requested authorization to appoint a commission to investigate the cost 
and possible location of such an institution. As an afterthought, he com-
mended the Winthrop Training School for its work and voiced his belief 
that the funds appropriated for its scholarships had been well spent. Aside 
from his reference to abolishing the Citadel, Tillman's comments on a 
women's college aroused propitious comments throughout the state. 13 
Against this favorable backdrop, David Bancroft Johnson reported to 
Tillman that he had consulted with the Peabody Board about the prospect 
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of merging the Winthrop Training School with a state industrial college. 
According to Johnson, The Board approved the proposed merger and pro-
mised to continue its financial support on the condition that teacher train-
ing be emphasized at the new institution. 14 
Shortly after Johnson's report, the commission which had been in-
vestigating the possibility of combining industrial and normal education in 
one institution completed its work. After sending out questionnaires to 
educators both in the United States and abroad and visiting numerous in"'." 
dustrial training facilities, the commission advised that normal and in-
dustrial education could be combined effectively. 15 
Bolstered by this conclusion, upon Johnson's recommendation, the Col-
umbia School Board formally transferred the Winthrop Training School to 
the state and asked that the state administer and maintain it. Tillman com-
municated the action to the legislature and suggested that an act be passed 
establishing an industrial and normal college for women with the Winthrop 
Training School as its nucleus. The proposal received favorable action and 
on December 23, 1891, the General Assembly approved a bill establishing a 
normal and industrial college for the white women of South Carolina. The 
same day, the legislature elected a board of trustees and specified that the 
governor would chair the board. The trustees were to select the highest bid-
ding town as the site for the new institution. 16 
The high bidder proved to be Rock Hill, in the Piedmont, which offered 
$60,000 in bonds, 30 acres of land valued aty $75,000, bricks, and $700 in 
cash. In addition, to financial support, Tillman later recalled that the peo-
ple of Rock Hill had impressed him as earnestly desiring to have the school 
in their city. 11 
Construction proceded rapidly on a classroom building, and proceeds 
from the state liquor dispensary financed construction of a dormitory to 
house 400 or 500 girls. In order to ~conomize on construction costs the 
legislature authorized the use of convict laborers. 18 ' 
· The laying of the cornerstone of the classroom building of the Winthrop 
Normal and Industrial College for Women in May, 1894, drew praise from 
all over the state. In the spirit of the occasion, even political antagonisms 
wer~ forgotten as the editor of the Columbia State, a newspaper long hostile 
~o ~illman, rejoiced that the South Carolina girls no longer had to grow up 
m ~gnorance because they were poor. The Rock Hill Herald wildly pro-
claimed the event as the "most glorious ... in the history of the state." 19 
As chairman of the board of trustees, Tillman relished the opportunity 
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to deliver the opening address. He declared that the words "normal and in-
dustrial" would serve as "lodestars" to guide the people of South Carolina 
"out of the bog of poverty, ignorance, and stagnation." Concluding his 
remarks, the governor sought to allay fears of some citizens that Winthrop 
would "unsex" the students, instead he claimed that the college would 
teach girls to be good wives and mothers. 20 
In October, 1895, with David Bancroft Johnson as president, Winthrop 
opened in Rock Hill. Although Tillman had left the governor's office to 
assume a seat in the United States Senate, he retained a deep affection for 
both Winthrop and Clemson, which he regarded as the most lasting legacy 
of his administration. Viewing them almost as his children, he lavished love 
and concern upon them in his capacity as trustee of both institutions. For 
Winthrop his activities included running interference between the college 
and the legislature and municipal authorities when the college's well-being 
seemed in jeopardy. Of particular significance was his effort in 1914 to pre-
vent the establishment of a second state-supported .college for women. A 
bill had been introduced in the General Assembly to have the state assume 
control of the College for Women in Columbia and make it an affiliate of 
the University of South Carolina. Believing that Winthrop was doing an ex-
cellent job and that the state could not support another facility which would 
virtually duplicate Winthop's mission, Tillman successfully lobbied against 
the measure. On a more personal level, he delighted in selecting trees and 
flowers for the campus and in helping procure government documents for 
the library. He also used his influence to persuade philanthropist Andrew 
Carnegie to donate funds for a separate library building at Winthrop. His 
regard extended to individual students, and he occasionally made loans to 
those who evinced ability and determination as well as financial necessity. 21 
Tillman's central concern was that Winthrop provide the poor women 
of South Carolina with practical education and thus prepare them to earn a 
living. In this respect, he was well pleased with the progress Winthrop had 
made in the direction of ''elevating the poor girls ... and giving them a start 
in life." To prevent poor students from feeling inferior to those who could 
afford expensive clothes, Tillman insisted that the girls wear uniforms as a 
means of eliminating distinctions based on wealth. 22 
Not only did Ben Tillman enthusiastically support a separate industrial 
and normal college for women, he also became an advocate of co-
education. In 1893, he proposed admitting women to the South Carolina 
College stressing that it was a "matter of justice and common sense, in 
keeping with the spirit of the age." Tillman believed that women were en-
titled to a liberal arts education which was not available at Winthrop. 
Several priv.ate fem ale colleges in the state offered liberal arts instruction, · 
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however he dismissed the education offered in these institutions as "at best, 
imperfect" since their graduates were not really college graduates in a true 
sense, but only qualified to enter the junior class at the South Carolina Col-
lege. Also, high tuition and other fees could deter poor students from 
attending the private women's colleges. Moreover, he added, admitting 
women would increase enrollment which had been in decline since the se-
cond University had been dissolved and the institution reconstituted as the 
South Carolina College in 1891. Reflecting the dominant view in the state, 
the College's administration and faculty resisted the change arguing that 
coeducation was not desirable in South Carolina. Undaunted by opposi-
tion, Tillman employed his influence to persuade the legislature to include a 
provision authorizing the admission of qualified women at or above the 
junior level in the 1893 appropriation bill. 23 
Although the measure passed, no women entered the 1894 classes. 
However, Tillman's interest in coeducation was shared by his successor, 
Governor John Gary Evans. At Evans' instigation in December, 1894, the 
legislature dropped the junior class restriction and instructed the trustees to 
admit qualified women to any class. Following up on this policy, the 
trustees in June, 1895, also admitted women to special and irregularilasses. 
With the lifting of all restrictions, several women enrolled in special courses 
in the fall, 1895 t~rm, however, none of this first group enerolled in a degree 
program. The first woman to· receive the A.B. degree was Mattie Jean 
Adams who graduated in 1898. Although small numbers of women enrolled 
in either special classes or degree programs, they constituted only a tiny por-
tion of the student body until after World War I. In large part, they were 
deterred by the unfriendliness of both faculty and male students and by the 
failure of the institution to provide dormitory facilities for them. 24 
Ben Tillman's death on July 3, 1918, marked the end of an era in the 
history of higher education for women in South Carolina. When he first ar-
ticulated the desire for an industrial college for women in the spring of 
1886, his was one of a few voices crying in the wilderness. However, by in-
corporating such an institution into his program of political and educa-
tional reform, Tillman gave life to the concept and helped to make it reality. 
Not content with segregating women in a normal and industrial institution, 
he boldly championed admitting them to the South Carolina College at a 
time when coeducation was decidely unpopular in the state. Tillman certain-
ly was no feminist as his opposition to women's suffrage indicates, but he 
did believe that women as well as men should have access to liberal arts and 
practical education programs. He never wavered in this commitment. As his 
contemporaries eulogized at memorial services for him, Winthrop and 
Clemson stand as monuments to his determination to make higher educa-
tion available to South Carolinians regardless of wealth or sex. 
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LADIES IN THE GENTLEMEN'S CLUB: SOUTH CAROLINA 
WOMEN LEGISLATORS, 1928-1984 
M. Carolyn Ellis and Joanne V. Hawks 
The South Carolina General Assembly has historically been composed 
of select and powerful men. V .0. Key characterized its upper chamber as a 
"gentlemen's club" which wielded enormous influence on state politics. 1 
This exclusive bastion of male power existed intact until the eve of the third 
decade of the twentieth century·. With the ratification of the 19th Amend- . 
ment in 1920 the way was paved for women to enter politics. However, it 
was 1928 before a woman was elected to the General Assembly, and female 
participation was slow in developing. By mid-century only one other 
woman had served. Not until the mid-1970's did women enter the legislature 
in any significant number. These later women, like their male colleagues, 
were also select and capable of wielding power. 
This paper describes the women who have served in the South Carolina 
General Assembly and seeks to determine what variations, if any, exist in 
their profile in the 50-odd years since the beginning of their legislative ex-
perience. Their motivations, goals, tactics, styles, successes, and public im-
age will be considered. 
Despite great diversity among the legislative women, there are notable 
similarities. For instance, thirteen of the _total twenty-seven who served in 
the legislature attended women's colleges. Practically all of the women were 
active in public affairs prior to elective office through club work and 
volunteer projects. Club work and service projects were for South 
Carolina's women politicians, as well as for women in other Southern 
states, an important preparatory background. 2 .In later years, particularly, 
the legislative women played active roles in party politics. As might be ex-
pected in a traditionally one-party state, most of the women were 
Democrats. 3 Ten of the group were involved for some part of their pre-
legislative careers in education, either as teachers or administrators. 4 Four 
were lawyers. s The remainder worked in a variety of areas, including 
business, writing, and banking. Five described themselves as homemakers." 
The women also represented a variety of religious affiliations. While most 
of the women have been Protestants, Catholic or Jewish women have also 
been elected. Only three of the women have been black. 7 
The first woman in the South Carolina General Assembly was Mary 
Gordon Ellis, elected in 1928 as Senator from Jasper County. After 
teaching in one-room schools, Ellis was elected County Superintendent of 
Education in 1924. As a result of some political maneuvers during her term, 
the position was legally changed from an elective to an appointive office," 
and Ellis decided to run in the next election for the state senate. Her 
17 
18 The South Carolina Historical Association 
legislative concerns focused primarily on education and Jasper County in-
terests.9 
Seventeen years after Ellis' election, a second woman was elected to the 
. General Assembly. Harriet Johnson served during 1945-46, filling an unex-
pired term and thus becoming the first woman to sit in the House of 
Representatives. Johnson, a World War I widow, had been a teacher, a 
home demonstration agent and a 4-H Club leader. She ran for public office 
at the urging of her women friends and a woman even served as her cam-
paign manager. 1 0 An article written shortly before her death depicts her as 
politically naive but sincere: 
She had to learn how men transacted their business and 
sometimes she learned the hard way. When the 
Democratic Convention came along in the spring, a 
woman delegate and she rode to Columbia together. 
·Mrs. Johnson confided, 'I have accepted an invitation 
to speak to a women's group at the same time as the 
convention's luncheon meeting. I understand now that 
it is at this meeting that all decisions are made. Now I 
have to solve this problem.' 11 
Johnson's legislative career is typical in several respects of other 
Southern women politicians. Like many women of the time she was sym-
pathetic to the black child's lack of educational and vocational oppor-
tunities. This sympathy was probably an outgrowth of her general interest 
in education. Also typical was her animosity to the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. In 1946, she was a sponsor of a resolution calling on Congress to vote 
against the Equal Rights Amendment. 12 The women politicians of the 
1930' s and 1940' s were a far cry from the more feminist-oriented politicians 
of later years. 
The 1950's brought four women to the General Assembly, only one of 
whom served an appreciable period of time. 13 Martha Thomas Fitzgerald 
was elected to the House of Representatives in 1950, thus becoming the first 
woman to be elected to a full-term in that body. 
Typical of the initial entry of women into male enclaves was the 
legislature's ado over how to address Fitzgerald during the session. The 
uncertainty over etiquette went so far that two of her colleagues introduced 
a resolution calling for the creation of a committee to determine the proper 
way to address a woman legislator .14 
Fitzgerald retained her seat for twelve years. During that time, she 
developed into an active legislator, sponsoring. legislation and making 
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speeches from the floor of the House. In her second term, she became the 
2nd Vice-Chairman of the Education and Public Works Committee. Such a 
committee assignment was a natural place for Fitzgerald; she had spent 
years teaching, and most of her career was spent working with the State 
Department of Education. 1s 
Her own characterization of her legislative career is demure. As reported 
by one journalist, she claimed: 
... 'I learned early that I could do more good by sup-
porting or rejecting proposed state legislation with my 
vote, rather than by being a proponent of it .... I have 
never been a militantly aggressive person, so I was more 
interested in accomplishing what I wanted than in get-
ting credit for it.' 16 
Her claims for modesty and her passive method of legislation are 
characteristic of the behavior of other women politicians in the South at 
that time. 
Although she was a woman of some substance, she was apparently 
highly concerned with form. Managing a perfect attendance record in the 
legislature became a source of inordinate pride to her. When speaking of 
her attendance record, she lost her usual shyness and became quite 
boastful. 11 It was as if there were some things for which women could 
rightfully take credit such as attendance records, and other activities about 
which they could not boast, such as legislative activities. 
Despite her modesty about her political activities, her legislative ex-
perience apparently whetted her political appetite. She twice ran for Con-
gress, first in a special election in 1962 to fill the vacancy caused by the 
death of Representative John Riley and again in 1965. On both occasions 
she was defeated. The race in the 1962 special election was unusual for the 
time because it pitted one woman candidate against another. She lost to 
Riley's widow, who did not in any way actively campaign. The voters' 
preference for the incumbent's passive widow over a more active and ex-
perienced female politician may be an indication of their perception about 
gender roles. Congress was viewed as a man's world; for them a woman's 
role was limited to caretaker of the seat. 18 
Fitzgerald, like many of the early women politicians in the South, did 
not view herself as a feminist: "Just because I am a woman is no legislative 
virtue in itself, just as some men are not qualified to meet the problems we 
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face her." 19 Nonetheless, she was extremely proud of her continual spon-
sorship of a bill to allow women to serve on juries: "My Jury Resolution 
was perhaps the only statewide issue I hammered on patiently throughout 
my tenure. " 20 Though she remained unsuccessful in pushing the bill for-
ward, the legislation was eventually passed after Fitzgerald left office. It is 
interesting to note that jury bills of this sort often become the rallying point 
for women in Southern legislatures, women who otherwise rejected a 
feminist label. 21 
Martha Fitzgerald's tenure in office occurred at a point when a Southern 
woman in politics was caught between fulfilling the traditional ideal of 
Southern lady and the non-traditional role of politician. The balance was dif-
ficult to maintain and generally in such cases the woman's effectiveness as a 
politician suffered. In many ways Fitzgerald, who tried to walk that line, 
was enough of a politician to pave the way for more assertive women politi-
cians. She served as a precursor for a remarkably dynamic legislator, 
Carolyn Frederick. 
Frederick, who served in the House from 1967 to 1976, was a transi-
tional figure in the history of women in South Carolina politics. She stood 
between the early "lady politicians" and the later "professional 
politicians.'' For the women who came to politics after her she served as a 
role model and a mentor. As a female representative said in 1983, "Carolyn 
Frederick was the mother of us all.'' 
Frederick entered politics out of an intense desire to bring two-party 
politics to South Carolina. Her initial entry appears to have stemmed from 
a wish to see the Republicans field a full county slate of candidates for the 
legislature. 22 She was also motivated to enter politics by frustration. As a 
member of the American Association of University Women, she had lob-
bied for education reforms. She quickly learned that politicians would 
sometimes display sympathy for a piece of legislation yet not exert 
themselves on behalf of the bill. She reached the realization that if she cared 
enough to lobby passionately and to confront legislators, she should care 
enough to become an agent for change herself. 23 
In Frederick we see a prototype of the later female politician, the 
woman who is challenged by the unresponsiveness of some male legislators 
and the ineptitude of others. Although by Southern standards she was clear-
ly a lady, she made a clean break with her forerunners who tried to balance 
"ladyhood" with politics. She astutely noted in 1969: 
'From the time you were a little girl, you were taught to 
be sweet and to look pretty and to kiss Uncle Herbert 
and say thank you to Aunt Susie. 
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'The first thing that hits you in politics is that you can't 
please everyone. Whereas the average man will shrug 
and move on to the next issue, the average woman will 
mull it over and worry.' 24 
21 
While in the legislature she combined her interest in women's equality with 
what she perceived as women's special int~rests: "education, work laws, 
and juvenile delinquency." 25 She was an early and avid supporter of the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Her support for the ERA was in sharp contrast 
to the anti-ERA stance . of a young female legislator during that same 
period, Sherry Shealy Martschink. Martschink was elected when she was a 
twenty-one year old student. At that time Martschink was single and a rising 
young star in Republican politics. Martschink's and Frederick's opposing 
stances on the ERA are particularly interesting because it was the younger 
woman who was locked into a traditional way of thinking whereas the older 
woman showed flexibility and imagination . . 
Frederick was interested in a wide range of programs. She championed 
her causes enthusiastically, and she was tireless in her efforts to advance the 
stature of women and the status of South Carolina. 
Frederick's legislative demeanor had much appeal. Her age, dignity, 
background in clubwork, and her Southern graciousness mingled with a 
vivid ent,i.usiasm for politics made her a kind of elder stateswoman. She ad-
vocated in the 1960's that women get involved in politics. She believed that 
a great influx of women into political office could shape South Carolina in a 
more positive, creative, and compassionate way than was then being ac-
complished. 26 She told women that their political horizons were unlimited 
and a new generation of women heard and saw her and heeded her words 
and her example. 21 
The women who followed Frederick in the General Assembly were 
diverse in their interests and their styles. The great common thread running 
among them was their sense of professionalism. They were legislators; they 
no longer concentrated on balancing an antiquated notion of femininity 
with their political role in the male-dominated legislative arena. They were 
too concerned. with lawmaking and political maneuvering to cater to form; 
the substance of the political world was mm;e the focus. 
Jean Toal exemplified this professionalism. Born in 1943, she was 
educated at the University of South Carolina Law School shortly before the 
influx of women law-students in the 1970's. Her school peers, although not 
accustomed to seeing many fem ale students, accepted her. Together with 
other members of her school circle, she plotted her political future. 21 Her 
legal education provided her two important edges: a legal framework and a 
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perspective from which to view legislation and the political process as well 
as numerous valuable contacts. Law school in the mid-1960's was very 
much a male domain. Toal, one of four women in her class, was aware that 
women had to be a "cut above" the male students to be successful. 29 
Her education in this male-dominated world stood her in good stead 
when she entered the legislature. Her ability to work well with ambitious 
men and to work .harder than most of them paid off. Toal's legislative ap-
proach was to grapple with the more complex and demanding work and to 
gain expertise in the intricacies of the body's rules. For instance, she was the 
floor leader for a successful major rules change in the House. She was 
generally recognized for her mastery in parliamentary procedure, and 
because of that ability she was considered capable of sophisticated political 
maneuvering. 30 Toal chaired the House Rules Committee. 
Toal was either floor-leader of or a significant participant in court-
reform legislation, consumer credit legislation, home rule, and ethics 
measures. In addition to chairing the Rules Committee, she was the first 
woman to sit on the House Judiciary Committee. 31 .While tackling pro-
cedural and economic legislation, Toal remained one of the staunchest ERA 
supporters in the House. Toal's effectiveness in the House was indisputable. 
After only eight years in the General .Assembly a politician was moved to 
say about her: 
If you asked every member . . . to list . . . the five 
leaders in the House, she'd be on everyone's list ... 32 
Harriet Keyserling, one of Toal's legislative contemporaries, ex-
emplified a different, albeit effective style. Keyserling devoted most of her 
adult life to the roles traditionally performed by women. When she entered 
the General Assembly, she was 55 years old. Married to a Beaufort physi-
cian, she had reared four children and devoted years to civic work. Like 
many of the political women of her generation, her political maturation was 
a product of club work. 33 However, unlike most of her legislative counter-
parts, she herslef was born and reared outside the South. Keyserling, with a 
new B.A. degree in Economics from Barnard College, married and moved 
to her husband's South Carolina home in 1940's. 34 By the time of her elec-
tion to the legislature, she had spent three decades in the South and any 
adverse·p~litical effect of being a non-South Carolinian had disappeared. 
Keyserling's interest in being a legislator developed late. She was urged 
by a retiring incumbent to run for his seat. 35 In deciding to campaign, she 
had a vague sense that she wanted to find solutions to problems, but she had 
no agenda. Once elected she quietly began to study and observe;· she quickly 
gained a reputation for "doing her homework. " 36 She shied away from a 
dominant speaking role in the House, but she poured her energies into, 
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writing articulate and convincing position papers for the local newspaper. 
The observation that fem ale politicians are likely to communicate more 
often and better in writing than in legislative debate was true of 
Keyserling. 37 
Keyserling's legislative interests were myriad. She worked with Toal on 
modernizing the house rules. Aggressively she worked for passage of 
numerous bills she sponsored, including gun registration, consumer ad-
vocacy, living wills, educational reform, and the ERA. She was the first 
non-lawyer to be appointed to the House Judiciary Committee. In her 
steady way Ke,yserling seized several important issues and became the 
spearhead for them. In a quiet, deliberate, and thorough way, she became 
one of South Carolina's chief spokespersons against nuclear waste. 
While Keyserling came late to politics, Elizabeth Patterson was born to 
it. Patterson's father, Olin Johnston, was one of South Carolina's most im-
portant twentieth-century political figures. Patterson was born in 1939 be-
tween her father's two terms as governor. Her girl~ood was largely spent in 
Washington, D.C., where Johnson served as Senator for twenty years. 
Patterson was the third woman elected to the state senate. At the time 
of her election she was the only woman senator. While her first political ex-
perience was campaigning for her father, Patterson's first active political 
role in her own right was a member of a county council. Despite the fact 
that she ran for county council, an active political role was not what she 
originally sought. She had been groomed to be a politician's wife and 
waited for her husband to run for elective office. When her husband an-
nounced finally that he had no interest in leaving his law practice, Patterson 
herself ran. Patterson typified the woman who, having been a keen observer 
of politics, yearns for a more active role. Her attitude seemed to be, "Why, 
I can do this better than it is currently being done. " 38 
Her initial interest in politics was general. Like many women who 
entered politics belatedly, she had no special issues or favorite topics. To the 
extent that she expressed legislative interests, she did so vaguely. Her chief 
interests appeared to be education and mental health. Patterson was essen-
tially constituent-oriented, a characteristic quite probably learned from her 
father. 39 
A supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment, she nonetheless shunned 
the label of "woman legislator." Patterson stated, "I don't think of people 
as male and female, but rather just as good citizens working together. " 40 
While she was probably astute to reject the label in an attempt to broaden 
her base, the legislature did not always accommodate her. Patterson noted 
that when a study committee assignment came along with the word 
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"woman" or "child" in it, she was automatically put on it.4' 
When Elizabeth Patters~n arrived at the Senate, she was· greeted by 
Nancy Stevenson. Stevenson, then Lieutenant Governor, presided over the 
Senate. She had served in the General Assembly for four years as a 
representative from Charleston. During her time in the House, she focused 
on education, health care, the ERA, child abuse, and housing legislation. 42 
The House served as a stepping-stone to higher office; in 1978 she was the 
first woman elected lieutenant governor in South Carolina. 
Toal, Keyserling, Patterson, and Stevenson were all Democrats, as in-
deed most of the women legislators have been. By 1984 there had been 
twenty-two Democratic and five Republican women in the General 
Assembly. While the Republican numbers were small, two women, Joyce 
Hearn and Norma Russell, showed that diversity nevertheless existed on the 
Republican side of the aisle. 
Hearn described herself as a "Progressive Conservative. " 43 Her in-
terest in Republican politics seemed to have a practical as well as ideological 
basis. Philosophically she felt comfortable with conservative Republican 
doctrine. Additionally, at the time she became involved in party politics, the 
emerging Republican Party may have offered her political opportunities 
that the Democrats could or would not. 44 
Before becoming politically active, Hearn had taught school. It was 
there that she developed an awareness of women's problems when she 
discovered that women were not paid equally for equal work. 45 Despite this, 
she was not an active supporter of the ERA. Her stand on the ERA may 
have been constituent-oriented as was reflected in her remark that she 
would adhere to "what the majority of my constituents want. " 46 
Her legislative interests showed some variety, but tended to fall into 
categories to which women have traditionally related. She was the chief 
author of a new sexual assault law. She also worked on adoption laws, 
medical research, drug abuse legislation, and judicial merit selection. 
Norma· Russell represented a different kind of Republicanism. Russell, 
a Senator, fell on the extreme right of the political spectrum. A former 
court reporter, she described herself as ultra-conservative. 47 She considered 
herself an independent who for politically expedient reasons ran on the 
ticket whose ideology more nearly reflected her own. 48 An ambitious 
woman who was defeated for lieutenant governor in 1982, she was largely 
ineffective in passing legislation. She was characterized as uncompromising 
and as a "spitfire with a quick temper and scorching tongue. " 0 Russell 
launched a one-woman crusade designed to ferret out abuse, notably sexual 
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favors, in government. Consequently, many of her colleagues shied away 
from either professional or personal contact with her. Her extremism in 
philosophy and style put distance between her and other female legislators. 
She was largely viewed by them as a detriment to the enhancement of the 
political woman. 
While these six women exemplified various types, they shared certain 
similarities. All were motivated, ambitious, and hard-working. All were 
vocal and influential. 
Although all the women who have been profiled are white, there have 
been black female legislators in the General Assembly. The first black 
woman to gain a seat in the legislature was Juanita Goggins, elected in 
1974. 50 A former school teacher, Goggins listed herself in the South 
Carolina legislative manual as a "creative homemaker." Goggins was 
mqtivated to run for office after years of campaigning for Democratic can-
didates. Like Frederick before her, she noticed the officeholder's dilatory 
behavior: "After they're elected, they often forget .... So.I decided it was 
time to do it myself." 51 
Goggins realized that she was subject to the so-called _double whammy, 
but she wanted to deflate the image of herself as black and female. 52 She 
claimed, "I want to be good enough that people forget I'm black and forget 
I'm a woman and no, I don't want to be pushed because I'm black or 
because I'm a woman. " 53 Nonetheless, she recognized that her womanhood 
was advantageous:. "I feel women have a very special place in govern-
ment .... We have a special sensitivity to many issues that you just don't 
get from men. " 54 
Goggins did not complete her first term. Citing exhaustion and medical 
reasons, she resigned from the General Assembly in 1975. 55 Her last two 
years in office were notable for her frequent absences, a factor which 
limited her opportunity to be an effective representative. Her significance 
rested rather in paving the way for other blac~ women to follow. 
No matter what type these women were, it is important to remember 
.that they were from one of the most traditional Southern states. The idea of 
"h1dyhood" was a particularly strong notion in South Carolina. The 
motivations that impelled them to walk to the beat of a different drummer 
have a consistent theme and involve several steps. Most often, through club 
work, they began a quasi-academic study of government. The study set the 
stage for the second level of involvement, promoting and following a piece 
of legislation, _usually one with a strong public interest orientation. The 
third step was intensive lobbying and the developing of a certain political 
acumen. This intense participation was often frustrated when the favored 
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project failed to be enacted. This disappointment then frequently spurred 
the individual to_ seek public office herself in the hopes of achieving the 
goals for which she had previously campaigned. 
For some women the motivation came not from clubwork but from an 
earlier experience of political involvement, often beginning in high school. 
For instance, Virginia Crocker's motivation was first stimulated in high 
school. Although her high school days paralleled the birth of the second 
women's movement, that movement had not caught on in South Carolina at 
the time. Weighing her ambition in the South Carolina world of the late six-
ties, she envisioned that her political career woµld be spent as a political 
aide. But the women's movement ultimately had its effect for as C~ocker 
noted, '' As I continued through school I realized the emerging power of 
women in the process and decided to run myself." 56 
Regardless of the time of awakening of the desire to seek office, vir-
tually all the women claim that their basic" reason was to serve the public. 
Many, if not most, did not have specific legislative interests; they had only a 
notion of the public good. Only a handful like Stevenson, Fitzgerald, and 
Toal tried to build on their legislative experience for higher office. For most 
the legislature itself was the final goal. 
In pursuing their legislative goals, the female legislators brought a 
variety of styles. Some were reticent. It was said of Mary Ellis, for instance, 
she "served her county quietly and seldom made a speech. " 57 The legislative 
journals indicate that Ellis spoke on the floor of the Senate only on four oc-
casions in four years. 58 Ellis' reluctance to speak was shared by Harriet 
Johnson. In her two years of service, Johnson spoke only four times. 5-9 Har-
riet Keyser ling, a much later representative, also pref erred to work quietly; 
much of her effective work was done in committees rather than on the 
floor. While Keyserling did not often use the house chamber as her forum, 
she was known as a thoughtful and decisive person who worked tirelessly on 
issues that interested her. 60 
If the reticent speaker was at one end of the spectrum, the forceful 
speaker was at the other. Frederick is probably the first real example, but in 
general the later women showed less reluctance to take strong stands. Jean 
Toal and Norma Russell were later examples. Russell's style was so strong 
that often it appeared more strident than forceful. Toal's style, on the other 
hand, was more complex. As reported in a feature article about her, she was 
described as enormously bright, articulate, a consum-
mate politician and a skilled parliamentarian by her sup-
porters and as brash, hot-tempered, overly agressive 
and fickle on issues by her detractors . . . 61 
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In the same article, Toal described her success in the General Assembly in 
this manner: "The way I made it in the legislature was to be very good and 
very tough. That gave me a very arid, tough image that is probably greatly 
at variance with how I am. " 62 
Toal earned a reputation as a skillful debater and an effective user of 
parliamentary rules. 63 Her accomplishments were such that a colleague was 
moved to say of her: "Even on one of her bad days ... she's one of the best 
legislators here.' ' 6 ' Several of the effective legislators, such as Patterson and 
Hearn, fell in the middle of the spectrum. 
To be one of the boys or not to be one of the boys was a continual 
dilemma over the years. When there were fewer women in the legislature 
and when the emphasis on traditionalism reigned, women often avoided 
valuable contact with male legislators and lobbyists after legislative hours 
for the sake of appearance. As Martschink noted, much legislative business 
was "accomplished over a 'few drinks at a bar' during 'unofficial' 
legislative sessions in the evenings. I was not a part of that, · and certainly 
would have tarnished my political image had I been a part of that as a single 
young woman in the early 70's. " 65 Sometimes their styles may have affected 
their colleagues' acceptance of them; other times it was irrelevant. Certainly 
over the 60 years covered by this study, the male legislators' view of women 
. in the General Assembly changed. Carolyn Frederick remarked on the 
changes in acceptance and attributed it to the dramatic increase in the 
number of women legislators in the mid-70's. 66 For Virginia Crocker, ac-
ceptance was problematic because the 27-year-old solon was· mistaken for a 
page and sent on errands by male legislators on a couple of occasions. 67 
Several of the women reported that acceptance came slowly only after they 
had "proven" themselves in the legislative arena. 68 The decision to refrain 
from the establishment of a women's caucus in part was a result of the 
females' concern not to alienate their male colleagues. 69 
The feminist orientation of some women legislators did not enhance 
· their status. a~ong the men. Even though some ·women steadily pursued 
feminist concerns, they realized the importance of working quietly. Sylvia 
Dreyfus, Toal, Keyserling and Patterson, among others, supported the 
Equal Rights Amendment, but none were by any means one-issue politi-
cians. As the women who could be considered feminists in the General 
Assembly might claim, the idea of what is a true feminist issue has expanded 
over the years· to include broader issues, such as the economy, education, 
· nuclear waste and governmental accountability. · 
Just as their colleagues' attitudes toward them changed over a period of 
time, so did the media's. The press' reaction to the women was to treat them 
as novelties or to emphasize their feminine characteristics. While women 
28, The South Carolina Historical Association 
have gotten publicity, often a substantive story was mixed with phrases 
describing their pulchritude and charm. Such descriptions prevailed until 
the late 1970's. In 1964 the Columbia paper in recording Ruth Williams 
[Cupp's] defeat for re-election said: 
Miss Ruth's unfailingly cheerful disposition and her 
smile, so explosively sunny and yet so feminine, 
brightened the day of many a State House inhabitant in 
that dour world of males in sessions past. 70 
The same article ref erred to her presence in the House of Represen-
tatives as "the rustle of silk and the faint scent of perfume. " 71 
As late as 1984, when Norma Russell was defeated for re-election, the 
Columbia newspaper said this ab~ut her: 
The frosty blonde with the icy blue eyes, the bright red 
dresses, the noisy crusader and the tirades against 'good 
ol' boy' politics isn't coming back to the General 
Assembly .... 12 
Much of the publicity surrounding Russell in general was negative. 
This depiction of Russell was the last in a long line of descriptions which 
characterized her as a strident fire-brand. Jean Toal was another legislator 
who received a great deal of publicity. Toal~ however, had the ability to use 
the press to her advantage. As a result she received generally positive 
coverage. Virtually all of it focused on her legislative positions and her suc-
cess in the House. 
Martschink was also the recipient of much publicity, most of it focused 
on her youth. For instance, an entire news story was devoted to her 
presiding in the House for 45 minutes during one afternoon session. In the 
article about this "first" for women in South Carolina, she was described as 
a ''shapely blond and form~r beauty queen,'' and her wielding of the gavel 
was met with "good-natured" chuckles. 73 
Conclusion 
Women who served prior to the mid-1960's juggled roles. They had the 
aritbition to be political figures, but both society and their own non-
assertiveness were factors mitigating against any real success. Carolyn 
Frederick, elected first in 1966, brought a new style to the legislature. While 
maintaining South Carolinian graciousness she hammered away at issues, 
often took controversial stands, spoke publicly and forthrightly about the 
topics of the day, and, in so doing, served as a model for future female 
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legislators. She proved that the dominant culture's ideal of femininity could 
be successfully combined with a healthy dose of assertiveness and open am-
bition. 
The women who succeeded her in the General Assembly were more in-
clined to be issue-oriented than those who preceded her. The 1970' s saw a 
blossoming among the women legislators; they grappled with a fervor 
previously reserved only for constituent issues. Because of the ERA and the 
general emphasis on women's concerns during this period, they were com-
pelled to align themselves with projects and proposals their predecessors 
had avoided. Many of them, though shunning the feminist label, were in-
deed feminists~ Feminism as such was not something to which they paid 
much attention. However, the substance of feminism was familiar ground 
for them, for most belonged to the "l'm-not-a-feminist-but-1-believe-in-
equal-pay-for:women" school of thought. No matter what degree of 
feminism different individuals professed, they all assiduously eschewed the 
feminist tag. To the extent that this avoidance ~as conscious, it was done 
primarily for pragmatic reasons. An avowed feminist in the mid-1970's 
might have been considered a pariah in the General Assembly. The women 
who wanted to promote the causes of women also wished to advance other 
concerns. They perceived, and perhaps rightly so, that aligning themselves 
with a feminist camp would have placed them outside the mainstream of 
legislative politics. Pragmatic concerns such as these prevented the forma-
tion of a women's caucus, even when some felt that a caucus would have 
been beneficial. 74 The dilemma was solved by an informal network of 
women. 
Although by 1984 a caucus had not been formed, women continued to 
assert themselves on both narrowly-defined women's issues and broader 
issues. During the period from the early 1970's to the early 1980's, as a 
result of this assertion, women became more interested in expanding their 
power than ever before. A new sense of confidence was pervasive; women 
no longer took a back seat:or walked on the proverbial egg shells. Rather 
they acquired a degree of power ,._,and they were not afraid to use it. 75 
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MASTER ARTISANS AND THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1848 
Ralph C. Canevali 
The master artisan has had an uncertain place in German 
historiography. This is readily apparent in the way the craftsman's role in 
the Revolution of 1848 has been portrayed. Over the last thirty years 
western historians have gone to great lengths to demonstrate, that in the 
absence of a genuine proletariat in Germany, independent craftsmen were 
the group with the greatest revolutionary potential. Study after study seems 
to have confirmed this conclusion. Research done, for example, on the 
casualties of the street-fighting in Berlin, on the membership of democratic 
political associations in Saxony, and on the composition of revolutionary 
militia in Cologne, bears witness to the extent of artisan participation in the 
Revolution of 1848. 1 
But traditional explanations for artisan activism during the Revolution 
have, in my view, clouded as much as clarified the reasons behind this sup-
port. By relying excessively on economic determinants, historians have ig-
nored political and cultural influences which also had a bearing on artisan 
behavior. Most often the revolutionary stance of the artisans in 1848 is at-
tributed to the critical state of the handicrafts in Germany during the first 
half of the nineteenth century. The origins of this crisis are complex, having 
to do with the problem of economic stagnation and with the decay of the 
guild system. Far from declining, the number of independent artisans in 
Germany was actually rising during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
at rates far in excess of those for the population at large. 2 Excessive com-
petition, shortages of capital, and a low level of technology meant that 
many small masters were reduced to an existence hardly superior to that of 
the wage labor they employed. The time of reckoning for these fledgling ar-
tisan enterprises came in the 1840s, when a series of disastrous harvests, 
followed by a slowdown in industry, left thousands of tradesmen ruined 
and bankrupt. At a time when one's reputation as a burgher and head of a 
household was intimately bound up with economic independence, this sud-
den confrontation with poverty was a hard blow indeed. With the loss of 
one's estate came the loss of one's standing in the community, and in most 
places, one's citizenship rights as well. Historians have argued that the 
pauperization of so many formerly independent masters spawned in Ger-
many a large group resentful of wealth and distrustful of authority. The 
masters' independence and strong corporate identity ensured, furthermore, 
that their grievances would find effective political expression. In sum, the 
artisans' support for the Revolution of 1848 is seen as a defensive reaction 
to industrial capitalism, and a desperate attempt to restore a vanishing way 
of life. 
Western historians who have written on the subject of 1848, most 
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notably Theodore S. Hamerow, . P.H. Noyes, Edward Shorter, and 
Barrington Moore, all emphasize the pivotal role played by craftsmen dur-
ing the Revolution. 1 The eventual .failure of the Revolution in Germany, in 
fact, they attribute to the artisans' defection from the revolutionary move-
ment. This alleged volte face occurred not, as Marxist historians still main-
tain, because of the intrinsic timidity and unreliability of the petty 
bourgeois masters, but rather, say Hamerow and the others, because of the 
obduracy of their political, allies, the liberal middle classes. Specifically, it 
was the unwillingness of the middle classes to support policies which would 
have sheltered the mastel" artisans from economic competition that promp-
ted the artisanate as a whole to desert the revolutionary coalition. If guild 
controls were not to be resurrected in their entirety, then at least some legal 
protection was necessary from what was commonly regarded as the 
unregulated anarchy of the · marketplace. Otherwise, artisans feared, the 
handicrafts would be overwhelmed by intruders who refused to adhere to 
the strict esthetic and moral standards concomitant with the status of 
master craftman. By prohibiting such riff-raff from entering the trades, the 
well-being of respectable craftsmen would be preserved. True, such an or-
dinance must infringe on the right of an individual to follow his particular 
calling in life, but in the eyes of most guildsmen, freedom of occupation had 
to be subordinated to the interests of society at large. Not only would the 
unrestricted freedom of occupation hasten moral decline, but as more and 
more honorable tradesmen were displaced by unfair competition, it would 
also result in social upheaval. In the words of one master, "occupational 
freedom means anarchy in the trades, which must also lead to political anar-
chy.' ' 4 Such conservative attitudes on social and economic question were in-
deed typical for German artisans at the time. The need to preserve in Ger-
many a stable core of small property owners, in their view, took precedence 
over "progress" or economic growth. Without the independent master to 
serve as a buffer between the capitalist on the one hand, and the worker on 
the other, society was destined to break apart into mutually hostile groups 
of rich and poor. Without the so-called "Mittelstand" to serve as ballast, 
the ship of state too was likely to run aground. To prevent these things from 
occurring, over one hundred master artisans, representing all of the larger 
and most of the smaller German principalities, assembled in the city of 
Frankfurt in the summer of 1848. Their purpose was to draw up for Ger-
many an industrial ordinance which would uphold the traditional 
prerogatives of the guilds, by restricing competition and by closing off the 
handicrafts to outsiders. Special trade councils composed of masters would 
be established to set standards for admission into the guilds, thereby cir-
cumscribing the activities of capitalists, middlemen, and rural artisans.' 
But the masters' nostalgic vision of society in no way diminished their 
support for the Revolution. Far from it. In the words of Edward Shorter, 
the artisans were ''fanatical reactionaries, and in this way a revolutionary 
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class."' In 1848, according to Shorter, the masters had forged a tactical 
alliance with the liberal elements who had spearheaded the Revolution. 
When it became clear, however, that the German National Assembly was 
not about to ratify the program of the Masters' Congress, this revolutionary 
coalition began to fall apart. It had been for such economic reforms, after 
all, that the masters had backed the Revolution in the first place. Their only 
alternative at this point, said Shorter, was to abandon a movement which 
no longer seemed to have their interests at heart. When in 1849, the last re-
maining edifice of the Revolution, the Frankfurt Parliament, was itself torn 
down, most masters looked on with indifference, some even joining in the 
demolition. "Any revolutionary elite," writes Shorter, "which so carelessly 
alienates a major body of supporters is bound to fail." 1 In his view, then, it 
was not, as Marx and Engels had it, the artisan who betrayed the Revolu-
tion, but rather, the Revolution which betrayed the artisan. 
Despite Shorter's and the other's attempts to distance themselves from 
the Marxists, their arguments in fact share with the latter's a number of 
similarities. For just as Marx and Engels attributed the political unreliability 
of the small tradesman to his intermediary position between labor and 
capital, so also do Shorter and the others link the revolutionary stance of 
the masters to their loss of status and economic privation. Above all, both 
groups see economic factors as decisive in determining the political align-
ment of artisans in 1848. The direction of their argumentation may be dif-
ferent, but the assumptions on which it is based are not. 
Unfortunately, too much about the artisan and the Revolution of 1848 
has simply been assumed and not adequately demonstrated. Three presup-
positions in particular require closer scrutiny. First of all, did the National 
Assembly, as Shorter and the others maintain, really spurn the advances of 
the craftsmen? Second, was the result an exodus of artisans from the liberal 
party? And finally, were the artisans, as the evidence seems to indicate, 
truly a revolutionary group? Time does not permit me to address in any 
detail the first two questions. Suffice it to say, however, that the economic 
views of German liberals at the middle of the nineteenth century differed 
hardly at all from the prevailing sentiments of the masters. Both groups, for 
example, recognized the importance of a stable "Mittelstand" to the well-
being of Germany, and shared the belief that laissez-faire policies were not 
in the best interest of the nation. The failure of the National Assembly to 
act upon the proposals of the Masters' Congress did not reflect a contempt 
for the craftsmen and their point of view, but stemmed instead from the 
Assembly's preoccui- .ion at the time with more pressing political matters. 8 
On the other question, the alleged swing to the right on the part of master 
artisans, one can only say here that such a phenomenon has never been 
established definitively. The armed uprisings which broke out in many parts 
of Germany on behalf of the National Assembly in 1849 suggest that the 
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Revolution failed, not due to inadequate support from artisans or anyone 
else, but rather because of the overwhelming military superiority of those 
governments opposed to it. 9 One of the most distinctive features in fact of 
the broad coalition of social groups which backed the Revolution was its 
tenacity and durability, even on the very brink of defeat. 
The question to which I would like to devote the remainder of this 
presentation is the last one: namely, did German artisans (and by extension 
artisans in other parts of Europe who were facing similar conditions in 
1848) constitute a group especially predisposed to revolutionary activity. 
Without a doubt, artisans had to play an important role in the Revolution 
of 1848, if only by virtue of their preponderance within the population at 
large. But even if most revolutionaries were artisans, it does not therefore 
follow that most artisans were revolutionaries. Early in the course of the 
Revolution, before any hint of a "bourgeois betrayal" was evident, ex-
amples can be found of craftsmen whose relation to the democratic move-
ment was highly ambiguous, if not downright hostile. The complexity and 
relative indeterminacy of artisan politics are revealed in what is an especially 
important source of material on the artisan and 1848, namely the petitions 
to the German National Assembly drafted by artisans in support of the pro-
posed industrial ordinance. Although these petitions concentrated on 
economic issues, they often addressed political questions as well, providing 
insight into how the two areas of thought were related in the minds of the 
master craftsmen. Despite their fundamental agreement on matters pertain-
ing to society and the economy, artisans could and did differ dramatically 
on questions of politics. One might be tempted to attribute these political 
differences to differences in economic position. But there is little indication 
of a close correlation between political allegiances and material cir-
cumstances. The over · one thousand petitions to the German National 
Assembly in 1848 represent artisans from a wide variety of trades, rich and 
poor. What does seem to hold true, however, is this: the political views of 
the masters normally conformed to the prevailing attitudes and sentiments 
of the communities, districts, and regions in which they resided. 
This is clearly the case for the thirty petitions from the Grand Duchy of 
Baden. Baden was one of th~ most politically advanced of the German 
states, and an important center of revolutionary activity in 1848. Despite 
the overall liberal, even radical. tone of most of the Badenese petitions, 
there were some which assumed ., 1-:onservative stance. These originated ex-
lusively in politically conservative parts of the country, most notably the 
capital city of Karlsruhe. 1° For the masters of Karlsruhe·, as for almost all of 
the artisans who addressed the National Assembly, economic and political 
questions were closely interconnected and linked with the artisan's overall 
world-view. The masters of Karlsruhe, for instance, were staunch monar-
chists opposed to radical elements in the revolutionary movement. Occupa.., 
tional freedom they regarded as an unwholesome consequence of the same 
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libertarian impulses which had conjured up the Revolution in the first place. 
They likened the guild to the monarchy, for both were agents of order and 
stability, and thus antidotes to the political con fusion and social unrest of 
their times. The right of the individual to select his own occupation was 
much like the right of the citizen to choose his own government; the in-
evitable consequence of both would be "a desperate struggle ... which will 
have as its result general destruction.'' The conservative political views of 
the master artisans of Karlsruhe clearly transcended any economic ties they 
might have had enjoyed with the court or the administration, and reflected 
instead the general conservatism of the capital and the surrounding 
districts. For centuries this part of the country had ':Jeen under the control 
of the present ruling family, now the Grand Dukes, of Baden. A tradition 
of uninterrupted dynastic rule, together with an enlightened agrarian 
policy, had generated on the part of the common people a strong sense of 
national identity and an attachment to the crown. ~aden as a whole in 1848 
·would gain notoriety for its revolutionary zeal, but Karlsruhe and vicinity 
would remain throughout a loyalist stronghold. 11 
. In the southern half of Baden things were different. This region had on-
ly recently been incorporated into the Grand Duchy, and its people iden-
tified more with the freedom-loving Swiss to the south than with the conser-
vative burghers of Karlsruhe. The continued presence here :tlso of a power-
ful nobility and the relative remoteness of this region helped to reinforce a 
sense of isolation from the capital. In 1848 the South would surpass the rest 
of Baden in its support for the democratic cause and its oppostion to the 
government. Artisan petitions from this region reflect such sentiments. 12 
The masters of southern Baden, for instance, accused the authorities in 
their petitions of doing too little to alleviate the economic plight of the ar-
tisan. Too long, they said, had regulation of the handicrafts been the "foot-
ball of the bureaucracy." What these craftsmen found most appealing 
about the proposed industrial ordinance was the autonomy it granted them 
in the handling of their own affairs. Even the clock makers of the Black 
Forest, who were rather less sympathetic than most craftsmen to guild 
controls, subscribed to the view that it was bureaucratic "regimentation of 
commerce and industry which had brought Germany to the brink of ruin." 
In the petition from the southern town of Constance the masters went so far 
as to blame the depressed state of the economy on the continued presence of 
troops in their district, a leftover from an unsuccessful republican uprising 
earlier that year, in which large numbers of craftsmen had taken part. 11 For 
the master artisans of southern Baden, as for their counterparts in 
Karlsruhe, politics and economics were closely linked, but not in any reflex-
ive or predetermined way. 
One of the most telling of these pet1t1ons to the German National 
Assembly came from Weinheim in the north of Baden. 14 It opened, like all 
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the others, bemoaning the chaotic state of the handicrafts in Germany. It 
then went on to compare the situation in Germany with that of the United 
States. The overall prosperity of America, the artisans of Weinheim pointed 
out, was intimately tied to her democratic system of government, just as 
Germany's economic malaise could only be understood in light of the inade-
quacies of her political institutions. The masters concluded from this that 
an American-style economic system, with its emphasis on an absence of 
regulation would, "only result in harm for the German people, so long as it 
remains impossible to recreate American conditions in Germany in their en-
tirety.'' In other words, until Germany, like America, was able to enjoy the 
benefits of free expression and democratic government, then the hardships 
associated with the free enterprise system would be intolerable. What the 
masters were suggesting was that the solution to · Germany's social and 
economic problems was to be found not in social, but in constitutional 
reform. 15 This rather naive tendency to look to politics for answers to the 
"social question" was characteristic of German political and social thought 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. It helps explain why political 
issues took precedence over social issues in the minds of most revolu-
tionaries in 1848. Want and depriyation on their own did not compel craft-
smen or anyone else to defend the Revolution. Neither did their continued 
support hinge on the implementation of this or that economic reform. 
Disappointed, as many masters certainly were, by the National Assembly's 
failure to enact the proposed industrial ordinance, this by itself was not like-
ly to alter their feelings about the Revolution. 
The abundant literature on the involvement of master artisans in the 
German Revolution of 1848 has provided us with considerable information 
about the organizational activity of craftsmen, but has been . rather less 
helpful in accounting for their political beliefs. The attempt by Western 
historians to rehabilitate the master craftsman in light of a century or more 
of Marxist invective is understandable. But in · doing so they have only 
repeated the mistakes of their predecessors. Relying upon a strict class 
analysis, and ignoring other intermediary factors, they have succumbed to 
making sweeping and entirely unwarranted generalizations. For all their ef-
forts, Western historians have merely substituted one revolutionary class 
for another .1 6 Artisans, no less than other elements of the population, were 
susceptible to influences which had little to do with their economic situa-
tion. Not the least of these, and one whose importance for our understan-
ding of the Revolution of 1848 cannot be overestimated, was that of com-
munity and region. The petitions from Baden, as we have seen, divided 
themselves according to the political sentiments of the areas from which 
they originated. Regional and local loyalties were and are largely 
autonomous factors, on which economic conditions exerted a partial in-
fluence at best. It is not my intention of course to substitute a determinism 
based on location for one based on material forces. To do so would only 
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serve to exclude from consideration the host of contingencies which af-
fected both the direction into which artisans' activism was channelled, and 
their potential for violent confrontation with the authorities. What I am 
suggesting, however, is this: that in our preo~cupation with national 
history, the importance of regional diversity is often overlooked. A greater 
emphasis on regional studies in a European context would have a salutary 
effect on historical inquiry in general. 11 Not only would it serve as a correc-
tive to often facile generalizations about the behavior of certain social 
groups, but for students of the German past especially, it would help foster 
a fond appreciation for an historical tradition whose richness and complexi-
ty are its prime attractions. 
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SCOTTISH MERCENARIES IN THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR 
William S. Brockington, Jr. 
While the story of Scottish mercenaries during the era of the Thirty 
Years' War in Germany (1618-1648) is an interesting one, time and space 
preclude any lengthy discussion of the particulars of their service on the 
Continent. Also fascinating, and an integral part of their story, would be a 
study of the Thirty Years' War itself, of the evolution of a new style of war-
fare during that era, and of the religious struggles that existed not only on 
the Continent but also in England and Scotland at the time. These, too, are 
beyond the scope of this paper. Of necessity, this paper will concern itself 
primarily with the impact, if any, of those Scots who served on the Conti-
nent during the Thirty Years's War on the war itself and/or on Scotland.1 
Prior to the Thirty Years' War, Scotland had had a long history· of pro-
viding troops for Continental armies. Scottish soldiers were often found in 
the armies of France, the Habsburgs, various German states, Poland, the 
Low Countries, Denmark, and Sweden. During the period of the Thirty 
Years' War approximately 40,000 Scots left their homeland to join the 
various armies on the Continent. 2 For some, religious motives encouraged a 
desire to serve Protestant armies on the Continent. For others, the desire to 
serve under a great leader and to attain military glory was the primary 
reason for leaving Scotland. But for most, the underlying cause of the ex-
odus was the abject poverty of their country, a condition which can be at-
tributed to factors ranging from geography and climate to poor farming 
techniques to socio-political problems. The main consideration for most 
Scotsmen was survival, and serving abroad as a mercenary seemed to off er a 
chance for this. Sadly, this was but an illusion. Of the Scots who left their 
native land to serve in armies abroad, few returned. 3 
Scottish mercenaries were viewed ambivalently by their foreign masters. 
They were often accused of being incapable of accepting discipline and were 
believed to be unwilling to do menial tasks such as digging trenches. As a 
group, they were considered to be the smelliest, filthiest, and most difficult 
nationality with whom military entrepreneurs and leaders had to deal. Yet 
they were sought after because of their abilities on the battlefield. They were 
considered by many to be the best assault troops available at the time. For 
that reason, in virtually every military activity where Scottish units took 
part, they were considered to be indispensible. They were either in the van 
on a march, in the forefront of an assault, or were placed at a crucial point 
in the line. And for that reason, Scottish units were sought after by all com-
batants. 4 
The peak period for using Scottish mercenaries during the Thirty Years ' 
War occurred during the Danish (1625-1630) and Swedish (1630-1635) 
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phases: of that war. There had been some Scottish ·mercenaries serving. on 
the continent pnor- to 16-25, but most of the British mercenary troops raised 
had been recruited in England or Ireland and. had. served in either. the 
Palatinate or in the Low Countries. When the Scandinavian kings~ first 
Christian IV of Denmark and then Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, became 
involved in the war, Scots began appearing in ever greater numbers. This 
was per-haps due to the. closer ties of Scots with Scandinavian areas or 
perhaps because the Scandinavian kings paid better and more promptly. 
Whatever the reason,. by 1627, they had become an important segment, 
albeit a relatively small proportion, of the army of each king. 
During. the Danish phase Scottish units arrived after most of the German 
states were under the control of Imperial troops, but they quiclcly·establish-
ed a reputation for hard fighting~ 5 Their primary role was to slow the ad-
vance of the Imperial army under Tilly and to cover the retreat of the army 
of Christian IV. At Boizenbm:~ in August 1627, four companies of 
Highlanders (800 men) under Major Dunbar·held off 10,000'Soldiers while 
the rest of the Danish king's army escaped. A month later, at the Battle·of 
otdenburg~ a Scottish regiment under Sir Donald Mackay blocked the ad-
vance of Imperial troops and pr-cvented the annihilation of the last major 
Protestant force .in the north of Ger,many. At the siege of Stralsund {1628), 
Scottish units successfully held the Frankentor, the weakest section of the 
defenses, against repeated assaults by Imperial troops. Yet these actions 
merely postponed the end for Christian IV and his allies. For all practical 
purposes the Protestant forces had been driven from the German states. Im-
perial troops occupied or controlled most of the territory south of the Baltic 
Sea. This the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, ~ould not permit; he 
prepared to attack the Imperial. forces. The most significant era for Scottish 
mercenaries was about to occur. 
Of the mercenaries serving in the Swedish army in 1630, approximately 
12,000, or one-sixth of the total manpower of the Swedish army, was Scot-
tish. Gustavus Adolphus considered them to be, next to his own Swedish 
and Finnish troops, the best soldiers in his army. This was obvious because, 
over the next two years, he used the Scottish troops extensively in key roles. 
At Neu Brandenburg (1631) the Scots played a major role in the capture of 
the city, and over 500 were left behind as part Qf the garrison. Unfortunate-
ly, when the city was recaptured by Imperial troops, most of the Scots were 
killed. At Frankfurt on the Oder, on Palm Sunday 1631, revenge was ex-
tracted by their countrymen. As usual, a Scottish brigade was in the 
'vanguard of the assault. It refused Imperial efforts for a parley and 
slaughtered 1700 of the defenders. 
At Breitenfeld, during the Rhine and Bavarian campaigns, and at 
Nuremberg (where Scots under Gustavus Adolphus fought Scots under 
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Wallenstein), Scottish units continued to be in the forefront. The most 
famous unit, the Green, or Scots, Brigade had performed its task so well 
that by October of 1632 its strength had diminished from nearly 4500 to less 
than 800. As a result, the King, after first thanking them before the rest of 
the army, left the unit in garrison while he moved northward to Luetzen 
where he was to die in battle. Following his death the Swedish army declined 
in both quantity and quality. At Noerdlingen (1634) the Swedish forces were 
completely overwhelmed by a superior Imperial force. Thus, the Scots 
Brigade, which had been reconstituted by new mercenary forces, was so 
crippled that it was never to act again as a separate unit. Indeed, the number 
of Scots in continental wars was to decline dramatically for many reasons, 
not the least of which was the religious controversy that erupted in Scotland 
in the late - 1630's. 
The religious policy of Charles I of England had effected a revolution in 
Scotland, and an army was being raised there to resist the King. The leaders 
of the Scottish Kirk issued a "Circular Letter from the Committee" which 
called for the raising of regiments under the command of 
a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a sergeant-major 
who, being prime officers, ought to be men of skill, and 
must be sent for out of Germany . . . The captain and 
ensign may be noblemen or gentlemen, the lieutenants 
and sergeants must be sent for out of Germany ... 6 
As a result of this plea, many Scottish officers hurried home. Note that only 
the officers, not the enlisted men were called home. Most who left wanted 
only to obtain a leave of absence, but were forced to resign because of possi-
ble international complications. As these officers were leaving the Swedish 
service to take part in a rel,,ellion against their lawful ruler, Sweden would 
not openly support a revolt against a king. Also, some of the officers re-
quested artillery and muskets in lieu of back pay. This too could have led to 
international complications. Therefore, weapons were given to the men as 
rewards for their services, not as part of their wages. In this manner several 
thousand muskets, several artillery pieces, gunpowder, and other weapons 
were bought home by the officers. 
With these men in command, Scotland soon bad an army that was far 
superior to the army of Charles. The soldiers were raw recruits but " ... 
they were an army and not an armed mob."' During the English Civil War 
itself, Scottish units served with distinction on the Parliamentary side. At 
Marsto1' Moor (1644) the units which had been trained in the style of 
Gustavus Adolphus acted with well-
1
trained, disciplined precision, and 
prevented a Royalist victory. However, following the execution of Charles I 
(1649), most Scots refused to work further with Parliament. Cromwell in-
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vaded Scotland (1651) in order to suppress the Covenanter Movement. Sad-
ly for the Scottish cause, just before the decisive battle of Dunbar, a purge 
of the army was conducted by the Scottish Kirk: and over one-eighth of the 
army was dismissed because of their lack of theological perception · and 
devotion. Moreover, at the battle itself, a committee of ministers forced the 
Scottish generals to abandon their favorable position - these tactics having 
been " ... revealed to them by the Lord of Hosts" - and to move forward 
against Cromwell. A disaster followed. Most of the skilled officers who had 
served in the Thirty Years' War were either killed in that battle or served 
long prison terms for their part in the Scottish insurrection against Parlia-
ment. 8 
Militarily then, the Scottish mercenaries who returned home to Scotland 
affected the military policies and strategy for over a decade after their 
return. However, their long-term success was not great because recruits 
were unwilling to drill and train as was necessary, preferring instead the 
"auld style" of a quick, shock-attack with claymores [Scottish 
broadswords] to the new style. In addition to this, the Scottish officers and 
non-commissioned officers who. did return to help Scotland found that their 
efforts were hindered by clan politics and by the ministers of the Scottish 
Kirk. Moreover, the disasters on the battlefield against Cromwell decimated 
the officer corps as well as sent many other officers into exile. Therefore, it 
may be concluded that there was little noticeable influence by these soldiers 
on the military customs and tactics as practiced by the Scots for hundreds of 
years prior to 1618. Indeed, it was not until after the Union of 1707, and the 
formation of new Scottish regiments to serve in the English armies, that the 
old style of fighting completely died out. 
Given all of the above, one might ask whether this large group had much 
of any impact other than the manuring of the fields of Europe with its 
bodies. The answer is, "probably not," unless one counts a "glorious 
military tradition" as a legacy. Scottish mercenaries played a small, but 
significant role in the middle phases of the Thirty Years' War. However, 
this role was primarily that of combat. Scottish troops were valued as 
fighters, and as has been noted, were more often than not in the forefront. 
That, as well as the high death from disease rate, meant that most of the 
Scots who served in the Thirty Years' War never left Germany. Indeed, they 
would probably not have been welcom·ed home as they would have simply 
been another group of mouths to feed. As noted above, the enlisted men 
were not asked to come home; only the officers and non-commissioned of-
ficers were. The common soldier had little hope of leaving the army after 
enlisting. This was especially true with regard to those men who had been 
forced to enlist for if they deserted their regiment, they were subject to a 
death penalty. Since the common soldier was not allowed to resign, the 
Scottish soldier generally remained in an army until he was killed or 
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rendered incapable of actively engaging in combat. Indeed, the very reputa-
tion of Scottish soldiers caused their casualty rates to be very high. 
However, their reward was small, for most of these soldiers now lie in un-
marked graves at the sites of the battles and of their camps. Their impact on 
anyone or any place was negligible. 9 
The officer class was somewhat more fortunate even though death was 
the common reward for most of them as well. A survey of the officers with 
the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above (of those whose fate is known) 
shows that sixty per cent were either killed in action or died as a result of 
wounds or disease. As the lower ranking officers led a more dangerous life 
and lived under more squalid conditions, it may be assumed that their mor-
tality rate was higher. Scottish officers who survived battle and disease were 
occasionally able to attain high rank, albeit at a very slow rate; e.g. two 
~cots attained the rank of Field-Marshal in the Swedish service, but only 
after each had served Sweden for almost thirty years. The obvious reason 
for the slowness of promotion for Scots was that during the time of the 
Thirty Years' War, high rank was usually reserved for men of noble birth; 
few of the Scots who sought service abroad fit into that catagory. Thus, 
Scottish officers served primarily in subordinate command roles, and were 
rarely given the opportunity for independent command. In the one real 
chance they had for independent command, they found their opportunities 
blocked by the power structure -at home. Of those officers who were for-
tunate enough to survive the rigors of combat and· camplif e, few were able 
to profit from their long years abroad. Full and regular payment of the 
soldiers was a rare occurence, e~pecially in losing campaigns. It was not un-
common for grants of land to be the only remuneration available, but these 
land grants were usually in newly conquored territory. If that land were 
reoccupied, and it frequently was, then all that had been worked for was 
: gone, unless a government felt that there was an obligation to those who 
had fought for them. This rarely happened to the dispensible Scots. With 
but a few exceptions, indebtedness and an uncertain old age waited the 
Scottish mercenary who served· abroad. 
Did the Scottish mercenaries have much impact on matters such as 
religion, social and political advancement, the exchange of ideas, or 
economic development? The· influence on religious ideas would certainly 
have been an important area of impact as the mercenaries would have been 
in contact with other creeds and doctrines for many years. Yet no such im-
pact is evident. To the contrary, the Scottish Kirk of that era made change 
virtually impossible for it was supreme in spiritual matters and took serious-
ly its charge " ... to punish he,resy, to enforce discipline, and to suppress 
any church which threatened rivalry." 10 If the returning Scots were in-
terested in promulgating new ideas about religion, and it is doubtful that 
they were, they would certainly have had a most difficult time doing so. 
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Another area of possible influence would have been social advancement 
due to wealth obtained or glory won. There were some high-ranking officers 
who returned home and received titles of nobility which would seem to en-
sure the men a place of distinction. The evidence indicates otherwise for 
these men, returning to Scotland at a time of trouble, never had a chance to 
assert their new power. Most of them had either landed in prison or had fled 
to the Continent within ten years of returning home. Also, the nobles who 
had been the leaders of Scotland before the return of the mercenaries re-
mained the leaders after their return and delegated authority to the 
returnees only when necessary. Thus, there is little indication of any im-
mediate effect on the social and political structure in Scotland following the 
return of the officers. 
The outflow of such a large number of men should have had a dramatic 
economic impact, but it did not. Those men were considered to be surplus 
population, and an economic drain, not an economic asset. Interestingly 
enough, they may have had a reverse economic impact because Scottish 
trade with the Baltic region did increase. "At the bases where these 
regiments were equipped, solid merchant houses [were] established." 11 
Clearing houses were then established abroad, and traders were sent abroad 
- Scandinavia, the Low Countries, the Germanies - where Scottish troops 
were located. ''Scottish trade was concentrated mainly in those areas and at 
those towns where Scottish merchants [and other Scots] settled down." 12 
In summation, then, it must be stated that the Scottish mercenary had 
very little effect on his native land or on the Continent. If there was any ac-
tual impact, it was felt by the military leaders of the day who recognized the 
fighting qualities of the Scots and their value as shock troops. There were 
few Scots who were able to rise to positions of high command, but there 
were many Scots who served as junior-grade officers, as non-commissioned 
officers, and as foot soldiers. The Scottish mercenary who did return home 
rarely brought anything of value with him; and his social, political, intellec-
tual, and economic impact on Scotland was small. The Scot who returned 
home was little more than an alien in a changed world. 
1For a more complete discussion of these topics, see William S. Brockington, Jr., "The 
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published Master's Thesis, University of South Carolina, 1968). 
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nant (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1956), pp. 224-227. 
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"AMERICA COMES FIRST WITH ME": THE EARLY POLITICAL 
CAREER OF CONGRESSMAN JAMES P. RICHARDS1 
Joseph Edward Lee 
As the Great Depression ravaged the farms, eroded the cotton fields, 
shut the textile mills, emptied the bank vaults, and ruined the businesses of 
South Carolina's Fifth Congressional District, thirty-eight year old James 
Prioleau "Dick" Richards, Lancaster County's probate judge and member 
of a politically prominent family based in the hamlet of Liberty Hill, 
declared his candidacy on 11 June 1932 for the United States House of 
Representatives. The incumbent congressman, seventy-one year old 
William Francis "Seaboard Bill" Stevenson of Chesterfield County, had 
represented the seven county rural district since 1917. 2 
It should be stressed that Congressman Steve~son appeared, on paper at 
least, to be a formidable foe. Born in North Carolina during the Civil War, 
he taught public school prior to graduating in 1885 from Davidson College. 
After reading law for two years, Stevenson was admitted to the South 
Carolina Bar in 1887. From 1887 to 1892, he practiced law in the town of 
Chesterfield. In 1892, the thirty-one year old attorney moved to the 
neighboring town of Cheraw :3 
Stevenson's political career blossomed with his 1895 election as mayor 
of Cheraw. A year later the electorate chose him as one of Chesterfield 
County's members of the state assembly. His political rise was aided by his 
chairmanship from 1896 to 1902 of the county's Democratic Party Ex-
ecutive Committee. In 1900, his peers in the state House of Representatives 
selected him speaker of that body, and he retained the speakership until he 
left the legislature in 1902. Stevenson began his seventeen year service in 
1900 as legal counsel for ~eaboard Railroad. In addition to this lucrative 
position he was general counsel of the state dispensary commiss~on from 
1907 to 1911. He returned to the state legislature in 1910 and remained there 
for four years. In 1917, he defeated four opponents in a battle to repr~sent 
the Fifth Congressional District in congress. Perhaps the extent of Steven-
son's clout can best be seen in his election in 1901 to represent Chesterfield 
County on the powerful State Democratic Party Executive Committee. His 
tenure lasted until his death in 1942. 4 
On the other hand, James P. Richards' resume is quite different. After 
two unproductive years at Clemson College, Richards left the school in the 
spring of 1917 to enlist at Camp Styx, South Carolina in the United States 
Army. Of his scholarship at Clemson, Richards later admitted "I did not _ 
distinguish myself at all in my studies." Athletics rather than academics 
dominated his life at least until the time of his military service. 5 
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The trenches of France matured Richards as he rose through the ranks 
from private to a battlefield commission as a second lieutenant. He saw 
combat in France and Belgium as a member of the Old Hickory Division, 
and by the time of his 1919 discharge he had decided to study law at the 
University of South Carolina. 6 
Richards immersed himself in the university's academic athletic, and ex-
tracurricular life. A review of the 1921 Garnet and Black, the student year-
book, reveals an impressive list of activities in which the veteran was engag-
ed. He captained the schoors baseball team, and the yearbook's editors 
commented "He's one of the few fellows to be found on college teams who 
can be called a baseball scientist." In addition to his first base skills, 
Richards, despite an arm injury, played halfback on the football squad. 
TheGarnet and Black applauded his gridiron expertise and observed "It 
took real nerve for a man so injured to even try to play football." Richards' 
athletic talents earned him the presidency of the athletic association and 
membership in the Block C Club. 7 
Richards . was associate editor of the student newspaper and served as 
vice-president and literary critic of the Clarisophic Literary Society. His 
oratorical skills were demonstrated in the Gonzales Oratorical Contest. 
Politically, Richard led the Campus Democratic Club, a forerunner of the 
present day Young Democrats. His two years of military service were not 
forgotten during his law school enrollment; he joined with other veterans in 
forming the Old Hickory Club. 8 
I find the Garnet and Black profile of young Richards to be especially 
enlightening. The editors said "We have in 'Dick' a perfect combination of 
all-star athlete and all-round lawyer." The editors labeled him "a politician 
of the old order.'' His concern for his classmates, the editors predicted, was 
"a gift that is bound to accomplish for him every office that lies within the 
power of his people to bestow.'' The profile of Richards at age twenty-seven 
concluded "a brilliant career for him lies just beyond Liberty Hill. " 9 
After successfully passing the South Carolina Bar Exam, Richards mov-
ed from Liberty Hill to Lancaster where he ran for the county's probate 
judgeship in 1922. Victorious in his first attempt at elective office, he served 
as Lancaster County's probate judge trom 1923 until he became con-
gressman in March 1933. 10 
Why did Richards decide to risk the security of his judgeship to 
challenge Congressman Stevehson? It seems to me that there were a variety 
of compelling reasons. Thirty-eight year old Richards suspected that sep-
tuagenarian Stevenson might be toppled in a vigorous campaign. Further-
more, Richards was assured of the valuable support of the district's 
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veterans; Stevenson had no military record. Also, Richards could depend 
on the network of contacts who had rallied to his uncle John G. Richards' 
banner when the elder Richards won the state's governorship in 1926. Hav-
ing the surname "Richards" certainly did not handicap James P. Richards. 
Finally, Richards appears to have been genuinely alarmed by the turmoil 
flowing across the district in 1932. New representation in congress could 
energetically assist the soon to be elected president in combatting the 
economic paralysis afflicting America. 
During the campaign, Richards blasted the incumbent's record. At a 
well-attended Winnsboro stump meeting, Richards revealed that Stevenson 
had a top level staff member, A.E. Hutchinson, who held the dual position 
of reading clerk of the South Carolina House of Representatives. Richards 
told the audience that the Stevenson aide unfairly received two salaries 
"while millions of others have no work at all." Sounding what would be a 
major campaign theme, Richards argued that the incumbent was out of 
touch with the district's constituents. The youthful challenger noted "I 
believe in change in office.'' Furthermore, Richards implied that Stevenson 
shared with President Herbert Hoover the blame for America's dire 
economic condition. In his closing remarks, Richards inquired "What has 
Stevenson done? What can you expect of him in the future?" 11 
~imilarly, Richards criticized Stevenson's legislative record during a 
joint campaign appearance in Chester. Defending himself, Stevenson read 
from entries in the Congressional Record to prove his productivity. He 
blamed the Republicans for the economic collapse and expressed his hope 
that he and Richards could be friends after the 30 August Democratic 
Primary. 12 
Before 1500 onlookers assembled in the district's largest city, Rock Hill, 
Richards charged that former Congressman D.E. Finley had done more for 
the district during a brief four year period than Stevenson had done since 
1917. Shifting his attack, Richards reminded the voters of his World War I 
military record. Then, in what I consider the campaign's climax, Richards 
turned to face the rotund Stevenson, pointed, and_ shouted "When he was 
rolling in fat, I was carrying a rifle." 13 
In massive last minute newspaper advertisements, Stevenson defended 
his performance in office. He blamed his modest legislative record on 
Republican control of the House. One advertisement pleaded "Mr. 
Richards is a young man and evidently has not kept up with the work of 
Congress in general and my work in particular." Stevenson's· argument, 
however, fell on deaf ears. When voters visited the polls on 30 August, 
Richards ousted the incumbent by a hefty 9000 vote margin. Two month~ 
later, Richards routed a little known candidate, J.C. Hambright of Rock 
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Hill, offered for sacrifice in the general election by the district's dishearten-
ed Republican Party. 1" 
The sobering condition of America's banks which confronted President 
Franklin Roosevelt and Congressman Richards in early 1933 has been called 
by Professor Paul Conkin ''a sharp ravine in the broad valley of 
depression." Trapped in this "ravine" were thousands of collapsed finan-
cial institutions like Chester's National Exchange Bank. Its doors closed, its 
officers disgraced, its vaults empty, and its depositors ruined, this bank was 
typical of many others of the day. One of the bank's officers lamented to 
Richards in a March 1933 letter "The amount reported (missing) is substan-
tially larger than indicated by my records. I am not connected with the 
others in their misfortune and had no idea that any of them were in trouble 
until disclosed by the various audits." Richards was sympathetic but non-
committal when he wrote the dejected bank executive "I do not know of the 
particulars of the bank failure in Chester but I want you to know that you 
have my deepest sympathy in the trouble you mentioned in your letter.'' 1 s 
Richards clashed later that spring with Roosevelt over the administra-
tion's Economy Bill, legislation designed to limit costly veterans' pensions 
and to slim a bloated federal bureaucracy. In his maiden House speech, 
Richards affirmed "no one has greater admiration for President Roosevelt 
than I." Nevertheless, Richards argued the bill "will place upon the 
shoulders of the States and the municipalities the expense of providing care 
for many disabled and incompetent veterans who should by rights be wards 
of the Federal Government." Splitting with the administration, he told his 
colleagues "If I had voted for this bill, feeling as I do about its unjust ef-
fects upon disabled war veterans of our country, I would be a traitor to 
them and to my own conscience.'' 16 
Minimizing his Economy Bill quarrel with FDR, Richards wrote a 
veteran in the summer of 1933 "Regardless of my difference with the Presi-
dent on this point, I admire him very much as he has shown his ability to 
take a position and stick to it. That is the real test of a President after all." 
His basic admiration of Roosevelt's program is especially evident in the 
legislator's praise for FDR's farm policies such as the Agriculture Adjust-
ment Act and the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act which Richards co-
sponsored. In a June 1934 speech, Richards told the House "To my mind, 
any unbiased person will admit that the present administration has done 
more to alleviate the distressing conditions facing the tillers of the soil than 
has any other administration in the last half century." 11 
An analysis of the congressman's New Deal voting record reveals that he 
followed the president's lead an impressive 70% of the time. This pro-New 
Deal posture placed the legislator near the top of FDR's supporters in the 
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South Carolina delegation. Among the major legislation endorsed by 
Richards were both Agriculture Adjustment Acts, funding for the Civil 
Works Administration, establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
and the Civilian Conservation Corps, and authorization of the National 
~ecovery Administration. 18 
Clearly, Richards' alignment with the New Dealers did not harm him 
back home. When two opponents, J.E. Beamguard of York County and 
A.L. Wood of Cherokee County, challenged him in the 1934 Democratic 
Party Primary, Richards easily overwhelmed both men. Beamguard receiv-
ed 6246 votes and Wood netted 3780 while the Richards landslide consisted 
of 32613 votes. The magnitude of Richards' victory that year deterred 
anyone from challenging him in 1936 or 1938. 19 
Richards' position in the House was also strengthened in the mid-1930's. 
He discarded seats on the Patents, War claims, and World War Veterans' 
committees in favor of a slot on the more prestigious House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. This 1935 change is a watershed in Richards' early career. From 
his vantage point on the Foreign Affairs panel, he became a staunch ad-
vocate of strong neutrality legislation. He assailed various interest groups 
which were lobbying to dilute the provisions of the 1935 Neutrality Act. 
Focusing on certain ethnic groups, Richards asserted in a powerful March 
1936 House speech "It is feared that any more extensive (neutrality) legisla-
tion ... may offend the delicate sensibilities of Englishmen, or Italians, or 
Germans, or Frenchmen, or whatnots who happen to live within our 
borders-legally or illegally." He called for permanent rather than merely 
temporary, neutrality safeguards. Richards told his colleagues "Europe is 
preparing for war, and only God can prevent it." Explaining his sentiments, 
the congressman said "The United States has always shown a sense of 
obligation to downtrodden people all over the earth, but that does not 
change the fact that our primary obligation is to our own people. " 20 
As other southern congressmen abandoned their previous is.olationist 
leanings, Richards continued to cling tenaciously to his. When the House 
debated in February 1940 the merits of fortifying Guam, Richards em-
phasized the 6000 mile distance from mainland United States to the island. 
He conceded that Japan's accelerating belligerance was worrisome, but he 
explained "I am not here to argue about Japan." Responding to admirals 
who advocated fortification, he stressed "I am always glad to take the ad-
vice of naval experts when it comes to the question of what kind of ship is 
best, but I am not willing to take the advice ... when it comes to the ques-
tion of foreign policy." Ominously, three days later Richards warned "We 
are hunting trouble when we go out there, and if we go out there we are go-
ing to have more trouble than you ever heard of in the event of war .... '' 21 
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After France capitulated to Adolph Hitler in the summer of 1940, 
Richards told congress "Our country may in a few months be the last 
citadel of liberty in the world." He lamented that our military strength was 
insufficient to meet the challenge. He remarked "our Army, Navy, and air 
force must be built up, but the job should not be done hysterically or 
spasmodically. Our plans should be sound, our purposes definite, our goal 
clear.'' Concluding, he expressed the hope ''That in the trying days ahead I 
may never be called upon to vote to send our boys to the horrors of the bat-
tlefield; but I am firmly convinced that, if we really intend to prevent war, 
we must be strong enough to demand and preserve peace. " 22 
Richards' pronouncements on foreign policy and national defense did 
little to erode his popularity back in the Fifth District. When Cherokee 
County Probate Judge Roy C. Cobb challenged Richards in the summer of 
1940, the incumbent received 33262 votes to 12748 for Cobb. The district 
had endorsed their congressman's position that America was ill-prepared 
for another world war. 23 
In his judgment, time was needed for our nation to prepare for the Axis 
challenge. Richards voted in September 1940 for conscription. The follow-
ing February, he supported the administration's Lend-Lease Bill. There was 
a limit, however, to how far Congressman Richards was willing to go along 
this path of military mobilization and widening American involvement in 
European conflict. 24 
Nowhe.re do we see Richards' cautious sentiments expressed more clear-
ly than in his November 1941 opposition to modification of the Neutrality 
Act. The congressman's "through-the-back-door" speech on 12 November 
was an emotional appeal to not allow American cargo ships to enter combat 
zones. He recalled World War I when "Many of our men, hundreds and 
hundreds of them, paid the supreme sacrifice." He sensed that America was 
not ready for another conflict, and he pleaded "If we are going to go into 
this war by means of these amendments or otherwise, we should first strip 
our decks for action, not during the battle, but before it." He continued "I 
am thinking of the thousands and thousands of mothers' sons who may be 
sent to foreign soil and foreign seas and never come back." He commented 
that his two sons were not yet military age, but that he hoped that if they 
ever went to war it would be for a clear and direct reason. As he concluded 
his remarks, he said of his own sons - and o(American's sons - "May they 
never be called to battle untrained, half-armed, and in a haze of doubt 
because of a ·divided nation behind them; may they never have cause for 
belief that their country sent tll'.em to foreign battlefields through subterfuge 
and indirection. " 25 
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Reaction to the speech came from all regions of the nation. My research 
reveals that approximately 150 letters and telegrams in the James P. 
Richards Papers supported his position while fifty criticized him. This ratio 
concurs favorably with the research of Diplomatic Historian Thomas Pater-
son who estimates that in September 1941 an overwhelming 80% of the 
American public opposed our drift toward war. 26 
In a South Dakota radio broadcast, Congressman Karl Mundt told his 
constituents "Probably the most impressive speech of the debate was given 
by Congressman Jim Richards of South Carolina." Mundt stated that he 
gave thanks "to men like Jim Richards who put patriotism above politics, 
who serve their conscience as they read its insistent plea, and who .dare to 
speak out against tremendous pressure urging them to hold their peace." A 
Georgetown University professor who witnessed the debate concurred and 
wrote Richards "Nothing it seemed to me stood out so magnificently in 
those closing hours as those strong, sincere and elequent words which you 
there expressed." A soldier on maneuvers added his praise and confide 
"Let me say that the applause was not limited to the House Chamber. " 21 
When the S.C. American Legion's commander lambasted Richards' 
speech and questioned his patriotism, the legislator expressed regret that he 
did not have the veteran's confidence and added "I am sure that we both, as 
well as the overwhelming majority of the American Legion, are willing, 
should the call come, to die for our country.'' Another detractor urged 
Richards to redeem himself by supporting immediate military action against 
the Nazis, who the critic labeled "a bunch of international outlaws." When 
University of South Carolina Law School Dean J . Nelson Frierson, one of 
five instructors at the law school when Richards attended two decades 
earlier, cited America's historic ties to England, chided Richards for aban-
doning Britain, and lectured him on Anglo-American relations, Richards 
was stung. The congressman retorted to his former professor '' I owe no 
allegiance to the Crown-America comes first with me. " 28 
The State newspaper printed an edited version of Richards, speech. 
Refusing to criticize or endorse the congressman's stance, the newspaper 
editorialized "he was aware of the fact that he was differing from the ma-
jority opinion in his home state. So his own reasons are worth printing as in-
formation." The newspaper observed that the speech was delivered "in a 
voice which was described as shaking with emotion. " 29 
A newspaper in Richards' district was less sympathetic to the con-
gressman. The Chester Reporter compared the lawmaker's neutrality posi-
tion as being "equivalent to a boxer's entering the ring with Joe Louis with 
his arms dangling by his sides." Another newspaper in the same town, 
however, editorialized "He voted his honest convictions, which happened 
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to be opposite those of the White House." This newspaper urged Richards 
to continue to "vote his own convictions, after giving the matter under con-
sideration careful thought.·· 111 
The words of praise and condemnation of Richards were swept away 
three weeks later when Japan attacked America's naval base at Pearl Har-
bor. Thus, we find Congressman Richards at the end of 1941 disheartened 
by the reality of a war he had struggled to stall. Richards' anti-war posture 
was founded on his conviction that the United States, still weak from the ef-
fects of the Great Depression, was not prepared to do battle with the Axis 
powers. ·The climax of James P. Richards' early political career was his 
sincere but unsuccessful attempt to gain for his homeland a few more 
precious months to, as he had told his congressional colleagues, "strip our 
decks for action. 
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OLIN JOHNSTON RUNS FOR THE SENATE, 1938 to 1962 
Roger P. Leemhuis 
Olin Dewitt Talmadge Johnston (1896 - 1965) was born in Anderson 
County and resided in Spartanburg during most of his life. This World 
War I veteran and lawyer had a long political career that began in the state 
legislature in the 1920's. Throughout his public life he presented himself as 
a spokesman for the common white people, while associating with the 
Democratic pa.rty. As this party became identified nationally with the cause 
of racial equality, he frequently found himself in a difficult position, 
because most white South Carolinians, including himself, were hostile to 
the civil rights movement. He ran for the United States Senate six times; the 
last four of these bids were successful. During one of these campaigns one 
newspaper derisively called him a '' Jim Crow New Dealer.'' 1 
1938: Against "Cotton Ed" Smith 
Completing a term as governor, Johnston tried to unseat veteran Ellison 
D. ("Cotton Ed") Smith. 1938 was the year of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
"purge" drive against several Democratic legislators who were unfriendly 
to his New Deal. The president hinted that Smith was one of his targets, and 
it was generally assumed that he favored the governor. Also in the race was 
State Senator Edgar Brown of Barnwell. 
Pleased to be recognized as the president's man, John~ton concentrated 
on economic issues, and backed the wages and hours bill (Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act), which Roosevelt endorsed and Smith opposed. He charged that 
big business, Wall Street, and the Republicans were behind the incumbent. 
The governor frequently posed the question: Should the Democratic state of 
South Carolina choose a senator who is antagonistic to the party's national 
leader? Denying that he was anti-Roosevelt, Smith called himself an in-
dependent person who cooperated with the president ''whenever I thought 
if was beneficial and right and opposed it when I thought it was wrong." 
The senator scoffed at his rivals as "coattail swingers" who could not exer-
cise independent judgment. 2 
The governor's record was controversial, especially his use of the militia 
in a futile attempt to take control of the Highway Department. During that 
encounter he had annoyed several state legislators, including the so-called 
"Barnwell Ring" headed by Edgar Brown. Although Smith's record was 
also attacked, he was not hurt politically. He argued persuasively that he 
had worked to protect the farmers and other people. He enjoyed the advan-
tage of seniority and prestige as chairman of the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee. 3 
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In addition, "Cotton Ed" savored a reputation as an eloquent apologist 
for the Southern way of life (white supremacy and racial segregation), 
which he saw as imperiled. In his view, fulfledged backing of the New Deal 
had to include acceptance of racial equality. The senator charged that the 
pro-New Deal C.1.0. (Congress of Industrial Organizations) and 
N.A.A.C.P. (National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple) were helping the governor. "A vote against me is a vote for that gang." 
Johnston tried to resist being labeled a friend of the blacks. In May he sign-
ed legislation that allowed only whites to vote in Democratic primaries, and 
he stated proudly that no blacks would be casting ballots. When some 
blacks appeared at a rally in Sumter, he ordered them to leave the meeting 
hall. After "Cotton Ed" declared that support of the New Deal meant sup-
port of an anti-lynching bill, Johnston noted that the president had not 
recommended the bill. At one meeting he announced that no lynchings had 
occurred during his term in office, then added, 'We keep the Negro in South 
Carolina where he belongs and you know we do."" 
Johnston wanted to focus on economic issues, to make a class appeal, 
and he was irritated by Smith's pursuit of the race question. At one point he 
complained that the incumbent felt impelled to ''hop on the Negro man and 
try to ride him back to the Senate." Smith's skillful use of the race question 
threw his opponents off stride. His warning that the C.1.0. aimed to wipe 
out· the color line among industrial workers was heard. "Cotton Ed" was a 
spellbinding orator and a master of ridicule. He exploited public resentment 
against "dictation" by outsiders, and this feeling was undoubtedly a major 
factor in his success. Roosevelt visited the state briefly on August 11. 
Addressing a crowd from a train in Greenville, he asked his listeners to elect 
men who would back his program~ The presidential appearance was counter-
productive. Smith defeated Johnston decisively in the August 30 primary, 
186, 519 to 1 SO, 437. (Brown withdrew shortly before the balloting.) On~ 
newspaper commented that South Carolina had rebuffed not Roosevelt but 
rather "his apparent attempt to fill Congress with 'yes men.' " 5 
1941: Against Burnet R. Maybank 
After his def eat in 1938 Johnston returned to the practice of law. Three 
years later, in the summer of 1941, he ran for the state's other United States 
Senate seat, after James F. Byrnes resigned to accept a Supreme Court ap-
pointment. His competitors were Governor Burnet R. Maybank, a 
Charleston businessman, and Congressman Joseph Bryson of Greenville. A 
Democratic primary and a special election were scheduled. While the cam-
paign was in progress the United States was drifting steadily towards war 
with the Axis nations, and the international crisis provided the setting. All 
of the aspirants were pro-New Deal and behind Roosevelt's foreign policies. 
Johnston and Maybank publicized what they had done, during their respec-
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tive governorships, to help build up the nation's defenses. Maybank, as the 
incumbent, was able to make especially good use of the defense theme. 6 
None of the contenders excited the electorate, and no controversial 
questions emerged. Johnston took the offensive against his chief opponent, 
Maybank, and tried to arouse class feelings against the affluent Charlesto-
nian. The people were warned about the dangers of electing rich men to 
public offices. "Has Democracy in South Carolina reached the point where 
only the 'member of an old and wealthy family' can serve them as their 
public servants? .. The common people as well as the wealthy have a right 
and place in our Democracy but this right and place will be forever lost 
unless you wisely exercise this right before it is too late." The rich must 
know that ballots cannot be bought ''by money or jobs or promised in-
fluence.'' He accused his main rival of promising two vacant federal 
judgeships "to goodness how many people." Maybank responded that he 
had done no bargaining with judgeships or pardons, and that no "pardons 
racket" presently existed in the executive office. (Here the Charlestonian 
was referring to a "pardons racket" which had allegedly existed while his 
predecessor had been governor.)7 
The man from Spartanburg could not develop a winning issue. Success 
eluded him as he tried to stir the "dry" sentiments of much of the popula-
tion on the liquor question, a perennial issue in South Carolina. One of his 
advertisements stated: ''Johnston is a dry. He has always been dry . . . 
These are perilous times -- we NEED, SAFE, SOBER MEN OF THEIR 
WORD IN WASHINGTON!" (Maybank was generally perceived as 
"wet.") Moreover, the former governor berated Maybank for signing 
legislation that allowed baseball games, movies, and other pleasures on 
Sundays. "Do you think these things desecrate the Sabbath Day?" 
Johnston also predicted that the "Barnwell Ring" would widen its influence 
if Maybank vacated the governship. His successor would be Lieutenant-
Governor J. Emile Harley, of Barnwell County. 8 
Of the two leading contenders, Maybank was a better campaigner. His 
message to the voters was more in tune with the public mood during the in-
ternational crisis. He projected a more unifying image, in contrast with 
Johnston, who appeared to be rather divisive as he sought to ignite class 
feelings. The governor argued: "Burnet Maybank believes the most impor-
tant problem before the American people is the crushing of Hitlerism. To 
bring this about he believes that all American must stand united. He has 
never sought to arouse hate of one group for another and as Governor he 
has worked for unity among the people of South Carolina.'' The Charlesto-
nian was a likeable and handsome man who convinced the voters that he 
would be more effective than either of his rivals in the nation's capital. 
"With the expanded activities of the federal government, South Carolina 
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needs in Washington a Senator who enjoys the friendship of President 
Roosevelt and those holding key positions in the Federal government in 
order that he can get things done for the state. Such a man is Burnet 
Maybank! " 9 
The governor came close to obtaining a majority in the first round of 
balloting on September 2; Bryson was eliminated. In the runoff two weeks 
later Maybank polled 92,100 votes against Johnston's 70,687. In spite of his 
defeat, the Piedmont lawyer remained a formidable public figure, and in 
the following year, 1942, he won a second (nonconsecutive) term as gover-
nor. 
1944: Against "Cotton Ed" Smith 
In 1944 Johnston tried again, as in 1938, to oust "Cotton Ed" Smith. 
Three other persons also ran in the July Democratic primary. The governor 
proclaimed his general support of Roosevelt: "I am not one hundred per 
cent for what the present administration has done in domestic affairs,'' but 
he was fully behind its foreign and defense policies. He complained about 
price restrictions on South Carolina's melons, tobacco, cotton, and Irish 
potatoes, and charged that federal regulations discriminated in favor of 
other states. 1 0 
In 1938 Smith had called himself an independent-minded Democrat who 
often backed Roosevelt. By 1944 he had a reputation for open antagonism 
towards the president. "Four more years of this and our government is 
gone. Our people are regimented," he said. The veteran legislator pursued 
several points that he had used in his last contest -- his seniority, chairman-
ship of an important committee, efforts on behalf of farmers, and devotion 
to white supremacy. 11 
The governor was better prepared than previously to face Smith on the 
subject of race. He had recently summoned the legislature to enact laws bar-
ring blacks from voting in Democratic primaries. On one occasion he 
blasted the Republican presidential nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, for atten-
ding a "negro drinking party." Here, in his words, was proof that South 
Carolina had to remain Democratic. "President Roosevelt has never been 
pictured at a negro drinking party." His stand in favor of states' rights, 
white supremacy, and the Roosevelt administration left him open to 
charges of inconsistency. The Charleston News and Courier called the 
governor a '' Jim Crow New Dealer,'' implying that Jim Crow and the New 
Deal were incompatible. 12 
Johnston gave only secondary attention to his racial views. At one 
meeting he declared that he did not intend for his platform to stand upon 
Olin D. Johnston Runs for the Senate, 1938-62 61 
the race question alone~ However, he wanted nobody to doubt his 
adherence to segregation and white supremacy. As "Cotton Ed". pressed 
the race issue, his principal challenger emphasized the need for unity during 
war, remarking that this was no time ''for demagoguery, jokes, slurs or sar-
casm . . . we should do nothing to prolong this war.'' 13 
In Washington Smith had opposed some defense measures which were 
popular in his home state. The governor was more in accord with public 
opinion when he said, "Now is the time to fight the Japs and the Germans 
and not the administration." Also working against the elderly Smith was his 
declining physical condition, visible to the electorate. He had difficulty 
standing up on the platform at public meetings. In the July 25 balloting 
Johnston polled a substantial majority and led "Cotton Ed" by over 40,000 
votes. Victory in the Democratic primary was tantamount to election. 14 
Assuming his new post in January 1945, the junior senator from South 
Carolina was liberal on most issues except foreign aid and civil rights. The 
Marshall Plan he regarded as "designed for big industry" and not likely to 
help Europe's needy people. President Harry S. Truman's backing of the 
civil rights movement off ended him, and in the months preceding the 
Democratic national convention in Philadelphia in July 1948, Johnston 
spoke disparagingly of him. He hoped that Dwight D. Eisenhower would be 
the Democratic nominee for the White House, but the general was not in-
terested in a political race. 15 
In July 1948, after Truman secured the nomination and called Congress 
into special session, the man from Spartanburg criticized him sharply. He 
was confident that the Southerners in Congress would fight any attempt to 
push through civil rights legislation. "We will not be clubbed into subser-
vience to the will of a man who has defied his party and the will of the 
American people by kidnapping a nomination for the presidency." One 
month later he was less critical of Truman, and speculated that the calling 
of the special session had caused the Republicans some embarrassment. 
Now he believed that the president had strengthened the Democrats' 
chances to win in November. 16 
The senator did not endorse the "Dixiecrat" ticket of South Carolina 
Governor Strom Thurmond (for president) and Mississippi Governor 
Fielding Wright (for vice-president). As always, he stood by the national 
Democratic party, and was quoted as saying that South Carolinians could 
not "be in the party and out of it at the same time." If that party gained 
control of Congress, he forecast, Southerners would hold important com-
mittee positions and be able to block any civil rights bills. Supporting 
Truman's economic program, and particularly convinced that Republican 
policies would harm the Southern farmer, he was among the minority of 
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white South Carolinians who backed the president on election day. The 
Thurmond-Wright "Dixiecrat" ticket swept the state. 11 
A judicial decree in 1947 changed the political atmosphere in the 
Palmetto state. Federal District Judge J. Waties Waring ruled that blacks 
could not be excluded from voting in Democratic primaries. Johnston 
shared the outrage of most white South Carolinians. "Judge Waring went 
too far in his order," he told a reporter in July 1948. "The court has no 
right to legislate such matters." An appeals court sustained Waring's deci-
sion, and in 1948 blacks were voting in a Democratic primary. Two years 
later, when the state's junior senator ran for· a second term, the blacks' 
recently confirmed right to vote had an impact. 18 
1950: Against Strom Thurmond 
In the 1948 presidential election South Carolina's white voters over-
whelmingly endorsed a revolt against the national Democratic party. They 
had a chance to do the same two years later when choosing a senator. Thur-
mond, the "Dixiecrat" standard bearer of 1948, now tried to unseat ·a mail 
who had always been affiliated with the national Democratic party. Thur-
mond believed that he stood for the true ''South Carolina Democracy.'' He 
told the white people, "I stuck my neck out for you two years ago. Don't 
forget that I fought the fight for states' rights while my opponent ran out on 
the Democrats of South Carolina." 19 
Johnston wanted to fight the South's battles within the national party. 
This was the way that Georgia's Senator Richard B. Russell fought, and 
likewise many other prominent defenders of the Southern way of life. By 
fighting this way, Johnston asserted, Southern Democrats occupied the 
chairmanships of major Congressional committees, as they acquired 
seniority and preserved their ties with the national party. With six years in 
the Senate behind him, the upcountry legislator pointed out, he was 
building up his seniority and influence. As a member of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee, he noted, he had done much to help the farmers of 
South Carolina. Thurmond belittled this argument, commenting that his 
opponent "loves his patronage and his committee assignments better than 
he likes the people of South Carolina. "2o 
Caught in the crossfire between these two hardhitting politicians were 
the blacks. They accounted for nearly one-seventh of the registered voters, 
even though they comprised about forty per cent of the state's population. 
More than 70,000 blacks were registered, and they did not have an attractive 
choice. Both candidates, battling fiercely for white support, presented 
themselves as ardent champions of white supremacy. Each accused the 
other of trying to break down segregation. 
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In Thurmond's words, the N.A.A.C.P. and other liberal groups were 
trying to re-elect a "Trumanite" by appealing to "minority bloc" voters 
(the blacks). The governor chided his adversary for remaining silent when 
i:ruman desegregated the armed forces, and for voting to confirm 
J. Howard McGrath, a pro-civil rights person, as attorney-general. In-
furiated by one of his rival's comments, Johnson retorted that "any man 
who says that I am for the mixing of races is an unmitigated liar." He was 
able to throw his challenger on the defensive. On the recommendation of 
the state medical association, Thurmond had named a black physician to a 
hospital advisory board. As the senator publicized this appointment, Thur-
mond replied that legally he had no choice; state law required the chief ex-
ecutive to certify the medical association's nomination. At a rally in 
Charleston Johnston said, "Had I been Governor Thurmond, I would 
never have appointed the nigger physician of Charleston, Dr. T.C. McFall, 
to displace your beloved white physician of this community.'' This state-
ment provoked an uproar in the black section of the meeting grounds. The 
senator waved and spoke into the microphone, "Make those niggers keep 
quiet!" Also cited against Thurmond was a letter which he had sent to the 
black governor of the Virgin Islands, inviting him to visit the executive man-
sion in Columbia. Thurmond explained apologetically that the invitation 
had been extended through a "clerical error. " 21 
Closely related to the race question was the subject of federal aid to 
education. Johnston reasoned that South Carolina was so poor that federal 
aid was necessary to upgrade the quality of education. He insisted that 
federal funds would not bring integration. On the contrary, he believed, 
South Carolina could use federal money to elevate the black schools to a 
level of equality with the white facilities, and thereby forestall any 
breakdown of segregation. The senator quoted a recent Supreme Court rul-
ing that the states must provide equal educational facilities for the races. He 
saw a need to comply with the high court's verdicts: "We don't like them, 
but you have to abide by the Supreme Court." He criticized his opponent 
for favoring foreign aid, which meant spending billions of dollars "every 
year to build up foreign countries -- but Thurmond opposes sending one 
thin dime of Federal funds to South Carolina to build up the schools of 
South Carolina in order to prevent the breaking down of the barriers of 
racial segregation, and to pay our teachers better salaries." The governor 
doubted that federal aid was needed. "If the federal government will cut its 
expenses and leave more money in this state, we can run our schools proper-
ly." He was convinced that federal subsidies would eventually bring "in-
tegration of the races and regimentation of curricula, of teachers and 
pupils. " 22 
The two men disagreed about the Taft-Hartley Act and foreign aid. The 
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senator stood against the labor law, which Thurmond favored. Johnston 
maintained that the sending of foreign aid abroad was destroying American 
jobs. In his view, low paid overseas workers were producing cheap goods 
which competed unfairly with American goods in this country's markets. 
"Cheap labor and foreign goods will lose your job, your home, your car!" 
Thurmond believed that the foreign aid program had saved Western Europe 
from a communist takeover. In his words, the sending abroad of American 
commodities, including South Carolina cotton and tobacc(?, had prevented 
"a shooting war in Europe." The governor observed that his opponent had 
voted against the British loan and also against the Korean assistance act of 
1949. He had joined a small "hard core of Republican isolationists in seek-
ing to wreck this nation's effort to win the cold war against the spread of 
Communism. " 23 
Both candidates assailed Truman whenever possible. After the Korean 
War began in late June, both men criticized his conduct of foreign policy. 
Thurmond blamed him for failing to send sufficient aid to South Korea, 
and for "playing politics" with national security (i.e., desegregating the 
armed forces). "If the president had not been so busy playing Negro politics 
we would not be in the serious situation we are in." Johnston, denouncing 
the foreign aid program, thought that the communist invasion of South 
Korea provided evidence that "friends cannot be bought with dollars." 
War materials which the United States had sent abroad, he declared, were 
now being used to kill American boys. The senator suggested that Truman 
would be delighted to have Thurmond in Washington to vote for foreign 
aid.24 
Thurmond charged that a "pardon racket" had operated in Columbia 
during his opponent's governorship. The senator replied that the number of 
pardons which he had granted was grossly exaggerated, and he noted that 
many of his parolees had been named by Thurmond to the state con-
stabulary. Also injected into the campaign was the question of the gover-
nor's "dignity." Thurmond, a physical fitness buff, had been photograph-
ed by Life Magazine standing on his head. At one meeting, when the stand-
on-head matter was raised, Thurmond retorted that Johnston, as governor, 
had once invited a strip tease dancer to spend a night in the executive man-
sion. 25 
"Who Dislikes Truman Most? It's the Burning Question in South 
Carolina's Race for Senate." With these words the Sumter Daily Item 
described the primary contest. Johnston, identified with the national 
Democratic party, was more vulnerable to charges of being pro-Truman. 
But Thurmond's efforts to tag the senator as a "Trumanite" did not hurt 
fatally. The governor expected that his opponent would be backed by the 
New Deal - Fair Deal coalition, which included industrial workers and 
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blacks. These voters went solidly for Johnston, who carried 24 of 46 coun-
ties. He won the July primary with a margin of about 24,000 ballots. The 
election was close, and the black voters, viewing the incumbent senator as 
the lesser of two evils, undoubtedly made the difference between victory 
and def eat. 26 
1956: Against Leon Crawford 
After the historic decision of May 1954, banning segregation in public 
schools, Johnston no longer spoke about any need to "abide by the 
Supreme Court." He echoed the sentiments of most white South Caroli-
nians when he predicted that ''there will be no breaking down of segrega-
tion in our schools." He remained a "Jim Crow New Dealer," and he con-
tinued to back his party's presidential nominees. In 1956, as Johnston swept 
to an easy re-election victory, the national Democratic presidential can-
didate, Adlai E. Stevenson, garnered a plurality of popular votes in South 
Carolina. Stevenson, who accepted integration, drew about 138,000 votes 
against 75,000 for Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower and 88,000 for an In-
dependent slate of electors. The Independents, who advocated defiance of 
the Supreme Court decree on racial mixing, promised to vote for Virginia 
Senator Harry Byrd for president. 21 
Johnston's Republican opponent was Mayor Leon Crawford of Clem-
son, who pictured him as a friend of Northern liberals and labor leaders, 
people hostile to the South. The senator insisted that the region must remain 
Democratic and enable Southern Democrats to occupy the major Senate 
committee chairmanships. Only in this way, he argued, could segregation be 
preserved. In contrast, a Republican-dominated Congress would surely 
"ram integration down the throats of the South." As in the past, he 
described the Republican domestic policies as harmful to farmers and small 
businessmen. The senator polled over 200,000 votes against Crawford's 
50,000. Even though there was a significant revolt against the Democratic 
presidential ticket, South Carolina was still a heavily Democratic state, and 
Crawford had no serious chance of winning. With his reputation as a 
staunch foe of integration, the incumbent was unbeatable. 28 
1962: Against Ernest F. Hollings and William Workman 
Six years later, when Johnston ran for a fourth term, changes were evi-
dent on the political landscape. The civil rights movement had gathered 
momentum. The Republican party was gaining strength in the South, voic-
ing the protest of many people against the welfare state and "big govern-
ment." In 1956 Johnston's Republican rival, Crawford, took about one-
fifth of the statewide vote. In 1962 his Republican challenger, William 
Workman, drew almost forty-three per cent. 
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In 1962 the upcountry legislator faced Ernest F. Hollings of Charleston, 
the state's young and attractive governor, in the Democratic primary. Call-
ing himself a conservative, Hollings embraced the principles of free enter-
prise and disdained "government intervention" in the economy. In his 
words, Johnston was a friend of Northern labor bosses who wished to pre-
vent industrial growth in the South. Hollings deplored the senator's opposi-
tion to the Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed state right-to-work laws. The 
governor maintained that South Carolina's right-to-work law was a key fac-
tor in luring industry to the state. 29 
Johnston took credit for attracting industry and jobs during his gover-
norship (1935 - 39 and 1943 - 44), while the incumbent chief executive made 
similar claims for the years since 1959. The senator was proud of his reputa-
tion as a friend of labor. "Yes, labor is for me -- organized and unorganiz-
ed. And they've got a reason." He emphasized his seniority in the Senate, 
pointing to his chairmanship of the Post Office Committee and vice-
chairmanship of the Agriculture Committee. In his words, he had done 
much to help the state's farmers, and he had worked to block civil rights 
bills. And once again, as in past campaigns, he reminded his constituents of 
his status as a "dry." 30 
Hollings contended that the senator's long record of service had not 
really benefitted South Carolina. In his view, the A.F.L. - C.1.0. was the 
real possessor of Johnston's seniority. He called his opponent a man who 
claimed power but apparently had none. He charged that his rival, as head 
of the Post Office Committee, had done nothing about a black postal 
carrier accused of indecent exposure while on the job. 31 
The governor's arguments did not sway the electorate, and the primary 
result in June was one-sided. Only one county (Calhoun) went for Hollings, 
who polled about 110,000 votes against 216,000 for the winner. 
The Republican aspirant in the general election was William D. 
Workman, a Columbia journalist who believed that John F. Kennedy's 
Democratic administration was taking the country to "state socialism." 
While Johnston advocated medical care for the aged, financed through 
Social Security, his opponent rejected this proposal and other parts of the 
New Frontier program. Attempting to stir racial feelings, Workman criticiz-
ed the federal government's use of force to integrate the University of 
Mississippi. He laughingly suggested that the United States could resolve 
the Mississippi and Cuban crises by enrolling James Meredith at the Univer-
sity of Havana. (The Cuban missile crisis occurred while this campaign was 
in progess.) Workman and his followers contended that a victory for the in-
cumbent senator would be a vote of confidence for Kennedy. 32 
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Stressing his seniority and economic issues, Johnston again named the 
Republican party as the party of the rich and the privileged. Still a "Jim 
Crow New Dealer,'' he sought to reassure whites that he was fighting for 
the Southern way of life. One of his pamphlets mentioned his record of 
"filibustering against all kinds of Civil Rights legislation, and working with 
other Southern leaders to out-maneuver Northern liberals." A few months 
before the election he made a Senate speech denouncing Thurgood Mar-
shall, a black lawyer, as unfit to serve as a federal appeals judge in New 
York. 33 
At the same time Johnston was the only candidate for any office who 
published an advertisement in a black newspaper, the Palmetto Times (~ol-
umbia). His message to the blacks highlighted his seniority as beneficial to 
South Carolina; no comments were made about civil rights or racial mat-
ters. In late October about thrity-five black leaders met in Orangeburg to 
discuss the election. While believing that blacks had little to choose from 
among the candidates, they preferred the Democrats, and they regarded 
Workman as obnoxious. J.B. Drake, one of these black leaders, remarked, 
"One thing Johnston has done, he has found it very necessary to be out of 
town when the time comes to vote on civil rights legislation so that he would 
not have to vote for or against civil rights. He has not yet come out against 
our people. " 34 
The senator tried to put some distance between himself and Kennedy. In 
one speech he denied that he had been solidly for the president's program, 
noting that on 94 votes he had been with the administration 59 times and 
against 35 times. In 1962 as in 1950, when he faced Thurmond, he wanted to 
avoid close identification with a pro-civil rights liberal Democratic presi-
dent. In November he won his fourth term, but the Republicans were gain-
ing ground in South Carolina. Workman polled 133,930 votes against 
178,712 for the incumbent. 35 
Two years later, during the presidential contest between Lyndon 
Johnson and Barry Goldwater, the senator stood by his party, and he work-
ed closely with a black civil rights leader, I. DeQuincy Newman, on behalf 
of the Democratic ticket. The Republican nominee, Goldwater, he 
characterized as a "trigger happy reactionary." In 1964 South Carolina 
resisted the national trend by giving its electoral votes to the Republicans. 36 
Johnston, who died in 1965, was primarily concerned with economic 
· gr~wth and prosperity, and secondarily interested in racial questions. Black 
voters, who overwhelmingly favored the national Democratic economic 
programs, supported the senator. During his last years he made some con-
ciliatory gestures toward the black community. 
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ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE CHARLESTON EARTHQUAKE 
Kenneth E. Peters 
Nearly 100 years ago the eastern United States experienced a great earth-
quake. This earthquake affected an unprecedented area of over two-
million-square-miles. 1 It was perceived by millions of Americans from 
Florida to Michigan and from New Jersey to slightly west of the Mississippi 
River, making this seismic event one of the most widely felt earthquakes in 
American history. In comparison, the famous San Francisco Earthquake of 
1906 rocked and jolted an area one twentieth as extensive. 
The closest major settlement to the source, or epicenter, of this tectonic 
earthquake was Charleston, South Carolina. For this reason the earthquake 
generally has been known as the Charleston Earthquake, even though the 
true epicenter for the disturbance probably lies closer to Summerville, 
South Carolina, some 22 miles northwest of Charleston. 
The great earthquake struck Charleston after sundown at 9:51 p.m., 
75th Meridian Time, on Tuesday, August 31, 1886. It was the strongest 
earthquake that Charleston, than South Carolina's largest municipality and 
commercial hub, ever had experienced. The earthquake had the high inten-
sity of X on a 12-point scale and a magnitude of 7 on a 10-point scale. 2 It 
and the most powerful of its 79 or more aftershocks sheared over 14,000 
chimneys at the roof lines, toppled walls, parapets, and cornices, cracked 
plaster, and heavily damaged or seriously weakened upwards of two thirds 
of the city's buildings (including almost all of its brick structures). The ear-
thquake and its aftershocks caused destruction ranging from $5,000,000 to 
$6,000,000 to a proud and historic southern port city of 62,000 people 
(32,540 blacks and 29,460 whites) whose estimated total assets in building 
structures stood at between $20,000,000 and $25,000,000. 3 
When daylight broke on Wednesday, September 1, 1886, it was all too 
obvious that something could have been finer than Carolina in the morning. 
Abundant visible proof of the earthquake's nocturnal visitation was om-
nipresent. The city of Charleston indeed had lived through a nightmare. 
Evidence of wholesale devastation could be seen in just about all of 
South Carolina's "Queen City's" wards. The great earthquake and 
earthquake-initiated fires had leveled dozens of houses and other structures. 
Many of the city's streets were impassable, being blocked by tons of fallen 
bricks and other debris. Choking dust filled the air as Charlestonians con-
gregated nervously and dazed in the city's squares, parks, vacant lots, and 
few other open areas. No respecter of race or socio-economic class, the 
earthquake had exacted a toll from Charlestonians whether they were black 
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or white, rich or poor, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, immigrants or 
scions of old Charleston families. 
The unexpected seismic catastrophe that so greatly injured Charleston's 
real estate also contributed directly to the deaths of 83 individuals and 
physical injury and severe mental anguish to several hundred more persons 
in a city that had had more than its fair share of misfortunes. For many 
residents of Charleston and South Carolina, the earthquake seemed to cap 
the natural calamities and man-made disasters that had beset South 
Carolina's "City by the Sea" over a number of generations. Charleston had 
a long-standing tradition of recuperating from horrible epidemics of 
measles, yellow fever, smallpox, and influenza since its founding at the con-
fluence of the Ashley and the Cooper rivers on Oyster Point in 1680; 
likewise it had an amazing capacity of recovering from hurricanes, 
cyclones, and great fires. During the Civil War, it even had survived a nasty 
artillery bombardment by General Quincy A. Gilmore's troops who, among 
other things, had sent ten shells crashing into the sanctuary of St. Philip's 
Episcopal Church, demolishing it and the church's expensive pipe organ. 
But, when the great earthquake struck, many Charlestonians had serious 
misgivings whether they and their city could muster enough pluck and met-
tle to surmount one more major challenge to Charleston's integrity. Yet, in 
the wake of the earthquake crisis, Charleston and its populace somehow 
found the strength to overcome adversity and press on with "business as 
usual." 
This illustrated short paper will focus on some of the economic conse-
quences that the Charleston Earthquake had for Charleston and its people. 
It will touch on how Charlestonians coped with the immediate herculean 
task of disaster relief -- how they dealt with such matters as caring for the 
injured, infirm, destitute, demoralized and psychologically disturbed in-
dividuals, how they managed with giving food, shelter, and other 
sustenance to those persons that the earthquake had displaced from their 
regular residences or had deprived of their livelihoods, and how they 
handled rebuilding or replacing their fractured dwellings, businesses, 
churches, and public buildings. It also will highlight how they restored 
public confidence in the viability of Charleston's business and commercial 
institutions and recaptured or captured markets that would give Charleston 
the income necessary to regain its economic status and well-being and to 
continue the steady progress that it had made in manufacturing and com-
merce since the early 1870's.4 
However, before treating these economic consequences of the 
Charleston Earthquake, let us gain a visual perspective of the problem by 
viewing about 30 slides of Charleston and Charleston area houses and other 
buildings as they appeared after the great earthquake. 
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The following 35 mm. slides are of photographs that Charleston 
photographer George L. Cook and other photographers took during the 
first several weeks after the Charleston earthquake. They graphically il-
lustrate the extent to which Charleston and its environs were damaged by an 
unusually powerful earthquake. If people visit Charleston today and look 
closely at some of the old buildings, they may be able to detect scars which 
the earthquake caused nearly a century ago. 
[the slide show] 
It cannot be pinpointed with any degree of precision just when disaster 
relief from the Charleston Earthquake began and when it ended. Perhaps it 
commenced in those dark and dust-choked moments immediately after the 
initial shock of earthquake at 9:51 p.m., when old women were seen with 
hatchets chopping away at debris as they tried to free trapped relatives and 
salvage family possessions. It well may have continued beyond the year 
1887 to about 1910, originally to commemorate Charleston's economic 
deliverance from the earthquake and to promote commerce and to bring 
capital to Charleston. However, the important point is not when relief came 
to Charleston, but rather that it came. 
Disaster relief connected with the 1886 Charleston Earthquake assumed 
many different forms. Some of the relief was spontaneous and unsolicited, 
while some was solicited and organized. Some of the relief was designed to 
satisfy earthquake victims' pressing needs for such items as health care, 
food, pure water, clothing, and shelter. Other disaster relief was concerned 
more with long-term issues such as the complete repair, renovation, or 
reconstruction of earthquake-damaged structures. ReHef' aiso covered a 
wide spectrum 9f efforts designed to assist earthquake victims. Sometimes 
these efforts were but kind words. Other times they were efforts to feed, 
clothe, and shelter earthquake victims, to secure employment for those 
made jobless by the earthquake, to rehabilitate private residences so that 
they again could be occupied by the time cold and blustery weather arrived, 
to repair churches, business houses, factories, government buildings, and 
structures used by schools and various fraternal groups, and to provide the 
overall cultural, governmental, economic, and financial climate which 
would stimulate Charleston's full recovery from an event that had pro-
strated a great American city of the South and deeply interfered with the 
lives and livelihoods of persons throughout South Carolina and other 
states. 
Many of the disaster relief efforts were initiated locally almost im"'.' 
mediately after the earthquake, many being nothing more than self help or 
family member assisting family member, friend assisting friend, and 
neighbor assisting neighbor with problems and needs arising from the earth-
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quake. Charleston firemen, policemen, physicians, nurses, clergymen, and 
city employees did what they could to handle the incumbent problems of the 
first night and the following several days. But it soon became clear that 
these local relief initiatives would not suffice to solve the myriad problems 
that the great earthquake had caused Charleston. Outside help and disaster 
relief would need to be encouraged and enlisted. Yet, Charlestonians and 
other persons concerned with Charleston's recovery were not all of one 
opinion as to what form disaster relief should take or how it should be ad-
ministered. 
Advocates of state aid hoped for the state of South Carolina to come 
quickly to the assistance of Charleston. However, there was little that the 
State could do because of prohibitions in its constitution and the un-
preparedness of its government to act effectively and swiftly in this crisis. 
The state could repair or reconstruct its own buildings damaged in the ear-
thquake, but that was about all that it could do. Some state politicians talk-
ed of relief for Charleston, but with the legislature not scheduled to meet 
until November 23, 1886, most realists knew that the state could be counted 
on for little immediate assistance. 5 State officials were sympathetic to 
Charleston's plight, and Governor John C. Sheppard from the outset was in 
contact with Charleston's municipal officials; he even made a trip to 
Charleston on September 5 to assess the extent of damage. However, Shep-
pard, greatly limited in his executive powers by the state's constitution and 
intimidated to a degree by its powerful legislature, seemed powerless and 
maybe unwilling to mount any full-scale campaign of state aid unless 
Charleston city officials and low-country politicians and their friends plead-
ed with him to do so. State aid for Charleston's recovery was a political 
"hot potato" that Sheppard preferred not to have to juggle, especially 
when the state aid advocated came to be less advocated for things such as 
food, clothing, and temporary shelter and more for the repair of Charleston 
private residences. Even pressure from several important Charleston 
businessmen and pro-state-aid articles and editorials in three or four leading 
South Carolina daily newspapers, including The Columbia Register and 
The (Orangeburg) Times and Democrat could not convince Sheppard to call 
an extra session of the legislature so that a constitutional amendment could 
be proposed aimed at easing the burden for Charleston homeowners and 
landlords. Meanwhile, the governor and the state's government did what 
little they could do to channel asssistance to Charleston and indicate their 
willingness to present to the regular session of the legislature those other 
earthquake disaster relief measures which they deemed essential. 6 
Proponents of federal aid earthquake relief for Charleston were eager to 
suggest that the Federal Government offer Charleston considerable help in 
its recovery from the great earthquake. The Federal Government acted with 
alacrity in announcing plans for repairing Federal buildings and facilities in-
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jured by the earthquake, in sending several large hospital tents from 
Washington's Marine Hospital to Charleston to shelter patients of 
Charleston's hospitals all of whom had to be relocated because of severe 
damage to the hospital buildings, in sending scientists to investigate the 
cause of the earthquake, and in sending engineers and architects to 
Charleston to aid local personnel with inspection of the city's buildings for 
earthquake injury. It also acted swiftly in dispatching a Department of the 
Treasury revenue cutter to Charleston with a Wilmington, NC, citizens' 
relief committee on board which had provisions for Charleston's needy 
citizens. But, on the whole, the Federal Government provided little to a city 
that needed so very much. 
Some Charlestonians, particularly a number of influential financiers, 
sought to bring Federal money to Charleston through complicated lending 
operations and other financial packages. Two local financial organization, 
the Charleston Exchange and the Merchants' Exchange of Charleston, as 
early as September 3, adopted a resolution petitioning the President and the 
Congress for a federal loan of IO-million-dollars under which owners of 
damaged Charleston residences could finance repairs of these structures at 
low interest rates over a long period of time.' Talk of this loan was per-
vasive during most of the fall of 1886. But, while some Charleston 
businessmen pushed hard for this form of federal aid, others maneuvered 
just as hard to block it and all other such federal aid. "Strict construc-
tionist'' Charlestonians and South Carolinians had carried the day when 
they had spurned federal aid after the Charleston Cyclone of 1885, and they 
were just as determined to prevail again despite the greater damages 
wrought by the earthquake. 8 
One of these "strict constructionists" was William L. Trenholm, who 
seemed to have as many or more close contacts in the various national ex-
changes and banking institutions as did his rivals who touted federal aid. 
With men like Trenholm in opposition, federal aid proponents would find it 
very difficult to engender enthusiasm· for their proposals, and they did. 9 
In addition to the moribund efforts to provide disaster relief to 
Charleston through state aid and through federal aid, there were many 
other strategies aimed at combating Charleston's economic plight. "Sym-
pathy, money, and business -- all three in great abundance,'' said The 
[Orangeburg] Times and Democrat, would bring Charleston's recovery. 10 
To a remarkable extent that newspaper was correct. Although some in-
dividuals tendered Charleston only their sympathy, many others connected 
their sympathy with their pocketbooks and sent Charlestonians money to 
use for disaster relief, assisted them by doing business with Charleston 
firms, or helped individual Charlestonians and Charleston enterprises by 
easing credit, payment, etc. Charleston's agents sought major donations 
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and financial favors from the large banking and commercial houses and ex-
changes in the North and elsewhere, and they also petitioned them for le-
niency toward Charleston merchants, some of whom were in arrears in their 
payments because of the earthquake. 11 These agents were successful in a 
number of these ventures. 
Many businesses did special favors for their customers who were earth-
quake victims. All three of South Carolina's major railroads maintaining 
connections with Charleston aided relief efforts by awarding free passes or 
reduced fares to Charleston earthquake refugees who were certified as being . 
too poor to pay for tickets to take them out of the beleaguered city to 
friends or relatives in South Carolina's midlands or piedmont. 12 The South 
Carolina Railroad Company even placed several rooms in the Union Depot 
over their main offices in Columbia at the disposal of the Columbia Relief 
Committee for temporary quartering of indigent earthquake refugees from 
Charleston and Summerville. 13 Telegraph companies sent wired earthquake 
subscriptions monies free of any charges. Life insurance companies, like the 
Equitable Life Assurance Society and the Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
allowed Charleston policyholders an extra grace period of 60 days to pay 
their premiums. 14 
When Francis W. Dawson's News and Courier, which acted as a 
mouthpiece for earthquake news and relief efforts, ran a major nationally 
syndicated article headlined "Charleston Ready for Business," in its 
September 3 issue in an effort to convince readers that the earthquake had 
not annihilated most of Charleston's wholesalers and other business houses 
and in an effort to buoy Charleston's commercial sales, and thus speed 
relief and recovery in Charleston, most South Carolina newspapers and the 
communities which they served paid heed. Most of these newspapers subse-
quently ran editorials encouraging local persons and businesses to increase 
their trade with Charleston business concerns. 15 Most newspapers ran 
statements similar to the one that The Anderson Intelligencer for September 
9 carried which said, "Charleston is the commercial hope of our State, and 
her prosperity is a matter of interest to all our people." But, behind some of 
these outpourings of charity lurked old frictions and commercial rivalries. 
Such was the case with Georgetown, whose newspaper The Enquirer was 
prompt to fault Charleston and its News and Courier for slighting 
Georgetown, which, the paper alleged, had raised more money for 
Charleston's recovery than had any other community in South Carolina ex-
cept for Columbia. The Enquirer, while agreeing that Georgetown 
customers and firms should cultivate trade with Charleston, turned pro-
gressively parochial, and it cautioned Georgetown residents to trade only 
with those Charleston merchants who advertised in The Enquirer. 16 Similar 
glints of commercial jealousy and/or local ~conomic selfishness manifested 
themselves in the Aiken Recorder and the Newberry Herald and News in 
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editorials appearing respectively on September 9· and September 8. 
While Charlestonians in 1886 and 1887 endeavored to do whatever they 
could to restore their city to its pre-earthquake grandeur, it was obvious to 
most of them that they could not achieve this goal by their own initiative 
alone. Had not other individuals, groups, and governments come to their 
aid, Charleston may have had a much longer and more difficult time in its 
recovery. 
By far the largest, most significant, best documented, and also the most 
organized, successful, and appreciated relief efforts connected with the 
Charleston Earthquake were those which Charleston's municipal govern-
ment sponsored and coordinated. The city of Charleston initiated its of-
ficial earthquake relief efforts on Friday, September 3, when William E. 
Huger, Charleston's acting mayor, called a meeting of the Charleston City 
Council. The Council, believing that Charleston needed prompt relief, feel-
ing that the relief needed was well beyond the capacity of the regular 
municipal relief agencies (all of whose facilities had been crippled or im-
paired by the earthquake) to provide, and anticipating the stream of finan-
cial assistance from places outside of Charleston, created the Executive 
Relief Committee (ERC). The ERC, then consisting only of three persons, 
was charged with the oversight of the provision of shelter, the. distribution 
of food, clothing, bedding, and other rations, and the dispensation of other 
relief to earthquake sufferers as could be afforded with monies being receiv-
ed for relief. The work of the first ERC and its appointed committees com-
menced on September 4. But the life of this ERC was brief. However, its 
ambitious activities paved the way for the more extensive and less frenetic 
efforts of its successor of the same name. 
The second ERC was the brainchild of Charleston's very popular 
mayor, William A. Courtenay, who, shortly after his return to Charleston 
from a trip to England, on September 7 reorganized the ERC and increased 
its membership so as ''to embrace representative men from all classes of 
citizens." 17 It was Courtenay's intention that the new ERC should assist not 
just certain elements of Charleston's population but all of its people who 
had been left destitute by the earthquake regardless of social class, race, 
ethnic bapkground, occupation, or religious preference. The mayor also 
entertained hopes that the ERC's relief efforts would tower above all others 
being undertaken. He believed that the establishment of one comprehensive 
relief agency such as the ERC would enjoy significant advantages. For one 
thing, he saw it as having more potential for raising more money for relief 
than smaller, less visible fund-raising efforts were doing or would be 
capable of doing. Second, he looked to the ERC to foster a sense of unity 
and local pride among the people of Charleston. Third, he believed that 
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with the ERC serving as the recipient and collector of contributions, donors 
would be spared the frustration of being dunned repeatedly by so many 
Charleston groups and their friends, all seeking gifts for their own pet relief 
operation. Fourth, he felt that the ERC would be about the only vehicle 
through which these destitute persons in Charleston having no ties to other 
charity could be helped. Fifth, he felt that the ERC could so conduct its own 
operations as to encourage the indigent and the destitute to gain meaningful 
employment so that these persons could begin to help themselves and, thus, 
eliminate the need for further relief from the ERC, which then could pass 
out of existence, its purpose fulfilled. 
The ERC under Mayor Courtenay held regular meetings from 
September 10, 1886, to January 10, 1887, most of the time meeting once 
each day. It remained a viable agency until it submitted its final report to 
the City Council on March 22, 1887. The ERC was responsible for the 
disburse~ent of $646,109.90, which it ultimately received in 
contributions. 10 Its busiest and most hectic days were those immediately 
after the earthquake, when the human needs seemed to be the greatest. 
Although it made mistakes and sometime rankled and antagonized, its 
generally professional, caring, and efficient stylP- of performance drew high 
commendation and praise locally, state-wide, nationally, and even interna-
tionally. 
The ERC, unlike so many of the other relief efforts connected with the 
Charleston Earthquake, intrinsically did not have as its primary goal the 
solicitation of monies. It usually relied on individuals and groups aligned 
and friendly to it to provide it with the wherewithal to carry on its work. 
Nonethless, because the compass of its activities was directly determined by 
the money in its coffers, the ERC naturally was supportive of any enterprise 
designed to enhance its financial position. Indeed, there were moments dur-
ing the fall of 1886 when the ERC had serious doubts about whether enough 
disaster relief revenue was being generated. But, when shortfalls in relief 
money threatened the ERC's efforts, it prevailed on its supporters to can-
vass for funds, often using the newspapers to broadcast its appeals. For-
tunately, Mayor Courtenay and the ERC knew well the value of the press 
for exploiting the sympathies and pocketbooks of persons and groups 
throughout the nation who possessed the material wealth that they needed. 
Thus, when money problems arose in mid-September, Mayor Courtenay, 
through The News and Courier, issued his famous "Proclamation" of 
September 17, appealing to the "Press of the United States to give this pro-
clamation the benefit of its far reaching circulation." 19 The Associated 
Press wire service helped along this proclamation, as did the newspapers 
themselves. This strategy worked well, so well that the flow of contributions 
increased to the point that the ERC on October 5, with the City ·council's 
backing, decided to end the active solicitation of monies under the mayor's 
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proclamation. 20 
Most communities in South Carolina were very willing to assist 
Charleston's recovery. Examples of great outpourings of sympathy and 
financial aid and other support were evidenced throughout the state. 
Aiken's efforts were perhaps typical. · 
Aiken established a relief committee two days after the earthquake, and 
the Aiken Journal and Review posted a subscription list at its office. By 
September 11, the people of Aiken county had subscribed a total of 
$1,120.59 to Charleston's ERC. The total included monies from the Aiken 
town council, the Aiken Baptist Church, the Aiken Episcopal Church, and 
Aiken Citizens' group, and the Graniteville Relief Association. Later, still 
other groups joined in to boost the total; these groups included the Aiken 
African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Masons, and the Aiken 
Methodist Church. 
Besides the monies and goods that they sent to Charleston, Aikenites 
were not in the least reticent about helping the many earthquake refugees 
who flooded into Aiken county following the earthquake. The Aiken 
Recorder for a while in September printed the names of recent Charleston 
and Summerville refugees and where they were staying in Aiken. Kinsfolk 
and friends of the low country sojourners made room for these displaced 
souls in their homes, and generous landlords, like Henry Hahn, a German 
emigree, gave rent-free shelter in several of his Aiken houses to a number of 
such persons. Hahn's charity motivated other Aiken landlords to at least of-
fer reduced rates in their rooming houses and hotels to the refugees. 
Eschewing financial help from the national govenment and even state 
aid for Charleston, Aiken's two local newspapers advanced their own 
panaceas for Charleston's economic recovery as well as mirrored the 
economic philosophies of individuals and special interest groups in the area. 
Particularly interesting were the economic remedies that they proposed for 
the revitalization of Charleston's trade and commerce. 
On September 15 the Journal and Review ran an editorial strongly sug-
gesting tliat Aiken county farmers and merchants pay up or even pay in ad-
vance to ease the economic pressures being put on the Charleston business 
community by the earthquake. By September 21 the Aiken Recorder was 
editorially echoing the same message and was calling on Aiken merchants to 
increase their orders and to throw as much of their trade to Charleston as 
was "compatible with sound business principles" in order to stimulate 
Charleston's economy. Yet, it was clear that the assistance of the Recorder 
was not totally disinterested because in another editorial · on the very same 
page the newspaper stated that ''. . . The Charleston merchants should not 
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only send out their drummers but they should do what they never have done 
in a proper amount, viz. advertise liberally in the country press. " 21 
It is sheer conjecture whether or not Charlestonians took seriously such 
ruminations from Aiken or from any other place or persons. It also is con-
jecture to speculate whether the earthquake of August 31, 1886, greatly in-
terfered with Charleston's long-term economic development. What is clear, 
though, from a painstaking scrutiny of newspapers, letters, journals, 
reports, and other documents contemporary with the earthquake, is that the 
earthquake generally was ~ sizeable temporary economic setback to 
Charleston. Yet, it was a setback which Charlestonians, through 
remarkable initiative, enterprise, and effort, were able to greatly meliorate. 
Carl McKinley in the last two pages of his 94-page, very informative "A 
Descriptive Narrative of the Earthquake of August 31, 1886" that appeared 
in the city of Charleston's Year Book - 1886 remarked that Charleston's 
economic recovery had "been marvelously rapid and thorough." 
McKinley's account, which was published at least nine months after the 
earthquake, may not be completely objective in its appraisal. However, it 
leaves the reader with the unshaken impression that Charlestonians suc-
cessfully weathered the earthquake crisis and, by themselves and with out-
side help, rebuilt their beloved city and its economy. McKinley admitted 
that "lingering signs of the distrubance" remained, but that "the energy of 
the citizens, reinforced by the generous aid of the people of the nation, and 
of friends beyond the sea, ha[ d] well nigh cancelled the last visible tokens of 
the play of the vast forces of nature ... [and that] growth ha[d] followed 
recovery; nay, ha[d] accompanied it, hand in hand." 
1T.R. Visvanathan, Earthquakes in South Carolina, 1698- 1975. Bulletin 40 (Columbia: SC 
Geological Survey, 1980) and G.A. Bollinger, A Catalog of Southeastern United States Earth-
quakes, 1754 through 1974. Research Division Bulletin 101 (Blacksburg: Department of 
Geological Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1975). 
2Ibid. Charleston experienced earthquakes in 1698, 1754, 1757, 1766, 1799, 1816, 1817, 
1857, 1860, and 1876 prior to the 1886 earthquakes, but the 1886 events dwarfed all of these 
earlier tectonic events. Interestingly Charleston physician and historian David Ramsay and 
Charleston architect Robert Mills both give scant attention to these earlier earthquakes. It is 
true that five occurred after Ramsay wrote his book and three happened after Mills compiled 
and wrote his famous study on South Carolina; however, their identical statement that "From 
the fatal consequences of earthquakes, we are happily exempt," from hindsight seems 
foolishly naive. Ramsay passes off the earthquakes of May I 9, 1754, and April 4, 1799, as 
rather mild ones; he then writes, "Though earthquakes in Carolina are harmless, thunder 
storms are not always so .... " Mills echoes Ramsay verbatim. See David Ramsay, Ramsay's 
History of South Carolina from Its First Settlement in 1670 to the Year 1808. Vol. Ill 
(Charleston: Walker, Evans & Company, 1858), 171, and Robert Mills, Statistics of South 
Carolina (Charleston: Hurlbut and Lloyd, 1826), 67. 
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3(Charleston] News and Courier, Annual Trade Review - 1886 - 1887 (Charleston: Walker, 
Evans & Cogswell Co .• Printers. 1887). 
4W.H. Callcott, editor, South Carolina: Economic and Social Conditions in 1944 (Colum-
bia: USC Press, 1945), 51. 
1The Columbia Daily Register: September 9, 1886. The reluctance of South Carolina's 
government to act was alluded to in an editorial in this newspaper which said: "We see the 
poor Charleston sufferers are looking to Congress for help to build up their ruined city. God 
grant they may get it ... Nevertheless we cannot see with what grace we can ask anything from 
the Federal Government until the State of South Carolina herself has shown the willingness to 
help her own people in their dire calamity ... " 
6 Letters of Governor J.C. Sheppard, Columbia, October 4 and 5, 1886, to William A. 
Courtenay, Courtnay Scrapbook, Vol. III, 127-128, South Caroliniana Library, University of 
South Carolina (SCL-USC). 
'The Columbia Daily Register, September 4, 1886. 
1The Cincinnati (OH) Commercial Gazette, September 4, 1886. 
For a detailed explanation of William L. Trenholm's views on federal aid and for a look at 
his ·own detailed plan for the formation of a joint stock company under the laws of South 
Carolina which would be able to assist home owners in Charleston and Summerville with 
financing repairs to their residences at low interes·t rates see: Letter [copy], W.E. Dodge, New 
York, September 10, 1886, and Letter [copy], W.L. Trenholm, Washington, September 14, 
1886, to W.E. Dodge, Courtenay Scrapbook, Vol III, 109 - 110, SCL-USC. 
10The (Orangeburg) Times and Democrat, September 9, 1886. 
11 Letter of J.B. Lanneau, New York, September 11, 1886, to Mayor Courtenay, Courtenay 
Scrapbook, Vol III, 114, SCL-USC. 
12 Letter of Maggie [Mrs, James Simmons], Charleston, September 12, 1886, Bryce Family 
Papers, SCL-USC. Later in September, October, and November railroad lines which had pro-
vided such services to earthquake refugees recouped their lost revenues by sponsoring special 
"excursion trains." These excursion trains transported citizens from many South Carolina, 
Georgia, and North Carolina communities to Charleston so that they could have first-hand 
views of the damage and evidence of the great earthquake. Most of these trains were filled to 
capacity. One newspaper account tells of an excursion train for blacks only that was chartered 
to go to Charleston from Cheraw, SC. By mid-September the railroad companies serving 
Charleston restricted their giving of free passes out of Charleston and Summerville to indigent 
women and children; however, by that time most of those persons seeking escape from 
Charleston and its environs already had departed. Acccording to The Columbia Daily Register 
for September 9, 1886, the exodus from Charleston was "beginning to ~low to a trickle." 
'-'The Columbia Daily Record, September 9, 1886. 
••The New York Evening Post, September 2 and 3, 1886. 
11 (Charleston, SC) Southern Christian Advocate, September 9, 1886. South Carolina 
newspapers and many out-of-state newspapers also often carried advertisements for earth-
quake memorabilia, especially bottles of earthquake sand and photographs of earthquake 
damages in Charleston. Photographers came from as far away as Boston and New York to 
photograph earthquake-injured structures so that they could market these views to South 
Carolinians and other persons, of course, for handsome profit. Some newspapers ran adver-
tisements for products designed to capitalize on the earthquake mania. Many stores advertised 
earthquake sales or a "shake down"' in prices; Charleston's Palmetto Brewery ran a large 
advertisement for what it called "Earthquake Beer." Enough of such sensational advertising 
occurred as to warrant an historical study. 
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11City of Charleston, SC, Year Book-1887 (Charleston: Lucas, Richardson and Company, 
1887) 300. 
11City of Charleston, SC, "Minutes of the Executive Relief Committee, 1886 - 1887," 13, 
Charleston City Archives, Charleston. The Annual Trade Review - 1886-1887 on pages 2, 6, 
and 7 says that in addition to the $646,109.90 contributed to the ERC, societies and lodges rais-
ed $50,000, individuals raised $25,000, and the churches raised $288,000, making a total of 
$1,009,109.90. 
"The (Charleston] News and Courier September 18, 1886. On September 15 Mayor 
Courtenay reported that he and the ERC had received only a little over $200,000 to be spent on 
disaster relief. He, the City Council, and the ERC determined that this amount was far below 
what they needed, knowing that damages to buildings alone had been estimated at over 
$5,000,000. See The Charlotte (NC] Home-Democrat, September 15, 1886. 
20The (Charleston] News and Courier, October 6, 1886. 
21 The (Aiken] Recorder, September 21, 1886. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY COMES 
TO CHARLESTON: 
THE HOSPITAL STRIKE OF 1969 
Stephen O'Neill 
The Charleston hospital workers' strike of 1969 provides an important 
opportunity to understand the city's race relations and how those relations 
entered a crisis that would fundamentally transform them. Until now, the 
hospital strike has been portrayed by historians as primarily a labor struggle 
or as an ill-fated but potentially revolutionary attempt to ally northern 
union strength with the southern civil rights movement. 1 The first inter-
pretation does not appreciate the real underlying source of the workers' 
dissatisfaction. The second view looks at the strike in terms of what it might 
have accomplished but did not. Both of these approaches overlook the 
primary importance of the event. The hospital strike, as the first major 
disruption of the stability and quiescence between the races in Charleston, 
forced white and blacks to become aware of and to address the inequality 
which pervaded their culture. 
Historically the relationship between the races in Charleston has been a 
cordial one -- at least on the surfaee. 2 White Charlestonians have viewed 
themselves and their city as distinctive, governed by aristocratic ideals. Con-
sequently, they have been more responsible in their conduct of racial policy 
than the upstate or other areas of the Deep South. During the extremism of 
the Tillman-Blease era of White Redemption, no fewer than 120 lynchings 
occurred in the state, yet none of them in Charleston. During this period 
and after, the Ku Klux Klan thrived throughout most of South Carolina, 
but Charlestonians proved to be notably unreceptive. 3 
Integrated housing patterns have also been part of Charleston's history. 
This demographic factor fostered close contact between blacks and whites. 
Before the Civil War, free people of color had lived interspersed throughout 
the city, and slaves usually lived in their master's house or in separate 
quarters in the yard. 4 The end of the war did not alter this residential situa-
tion much, and it was not until the post-World War II years that whites 
began to leave the peninsula for the suburbs across the Ashley or Cooper 
Rivers. Charleston, then, was different from the average southern town. 
Blacks and whites in the city grew up together and were geographically if 
not socially integrated. Rev. Z.L. Grady, a life-long Charlestonian, and 
prominent black leader, tells what this residential pattern meant for black-
white relations: "Black and whites were living next door to one another. As 
far as a lot of animosity and not getting along and misunderstanding, we 
didn't have that." 5 Yet racism was embodied within this amicable relation-
ship. The goodwill of the whites was always predicated on blacks' tacit 
acknowledgement of their inferior position. Grady punctuates his remarks 
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Not having to face the hostility that was prevalent elsewhere in the 
South, black Charlestonians, for their part, were less attracted to 
radicalism. The early 1960's, a time of tumult in many cities throughout the 
South, brought only a few lunch-counter sit-ins and peaceful demonstra-
tions to the Port City. Mayor Palmer Gaillard set the tone for the white 
response by enforcing court orders and maintaining law and order. 1 
Charleston missed the violence and bloodshed that racked other cities; yet 
without direct confrontation and violent responses by the establishment, the 
majority of the blacks in the city remained complacent and inequalities were 
perpetuated. 
White Charlestonian William H. Barnwell discusses the blacks' lack of 
initiative which he encountered during his struggles against the prevailing 
racial inequalities in the pre-strike years: 
As far as I can tell, there is very little indigenous leader-
ship . . . The issue of segregation appears to be far 
removed from their minds. That's not to say these peo-
ple don't feel suppressed .... But there is no open talk 
of fighting for one's rights. Not once have I heard the 
mention of the name of any civil rights leader, not even 
Dr. King's. The people of this neighborhood seem to ac-
cept their servile position. Their frustrations and hostili-
ty remain dangerously subconscious. And this is, at 
least partially, the result of "dead-end" paternalism. 8 
This "dead-end paternalism" undergirding Charleston's placid exterior 
was perfectly mirrored in conditions at the South Carolina Medical College. 
The College had no black nursing students enrolled and the College's 
hospital had no black doctors on the staff. 9 Almost all of the lower-echelon, 
non-professional positions -- nurses aides, practical nurses, orderlies, kit-
chen workers -- were staffed by black women. The loose organizational 
structure governing the operations of the hospital provided no job descrip-
tions, no personnel procedures, and no vehicle for airing grievances.'° Con-
sequently, whites held nearly every position of authority, from the lowest 
level of supervisors to the president; and any racial tension could easily be 
exacerbated by the lack of any formal rules directing the relations between 
worker and supervisor. In short, the more these working relationships were 
based on personal, face-to-face interaction, the greater the possibility of 
racial subjugation. 
Job dissatisfaction centered on two issues. One was the concrete matter 
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of wages. The second and more important concern involved respect. The 
condescension with which most white supervisors at the hospital traditional-
ly viewed blacks increasingly came in conflict with the rising expectations of 
black workers. Charleston, despite its unique racial history, did not exist in 
a vacuum. The civil rights struggles of the 1960's had raised the con-
sciousness of the blacks, but those blacks had not yet been confronted with 
an issue on which they could take a stand. The treatment of the black non-
professionals at the hospital provided that issue. The blacks slowly came to 
realize that the power that whites exercised over them at the hospital 
transcended vocational rank. Claire G. Brown, an obstetrical technician at 
the hospital, explains: 
There was a lot of lack of respect. Basically, it was a 
black-white issue. I don't think whites [in similar non-
professional positions] felt it. Of course there wasn't 
too many whites that was in the positions we were --
unlicensed, nurses' aides-type positions. Basically 
[whites were] R.N. 's, professional workers. 11 
Mary Moultrie, who was born and reared in the shadows of the hospital 
and who emerged as the most important strike leader among the actual 
workers recalls conditions at the hospital: 
If you were white you ran the hospital. Seventeen- and 
eighteen-year old nursing students who didn't know the 
work -- we had to show them what to do -- but they gave 
us the orders. The white nurses just sat and drank coffee 
while we did all the work. 
Although Moultrie says that the low wages were a factor, especially con-
sidering the number of single parents among the workers, she believes that 
the working relations catalyzed the strikers. "The treatment is what 
motivated people to want to change things. The discrimination, the pre-
judice sort of blew the top off the bottle." 12 
The particular incident that pushed the workers toward an organized 
response to the situation at the hospital occurred just before Christmas in 
1967, more than a year before the strike. Five non-professional blacks were 
fired when they refused to go to work without first being given the usually 
customary access to the patients' reports. 13 The five contacted Mary 
Moultrie. She contacted William Saunders who worked full-time at a 
downtown mattress factory and served as community liaison with the 
Health, Education, and Welfare Department. The local office of HEW, ac-
ting under civil rights regulations, ordered the hospital to reinstate the five 
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But the issue was not closed. Mary Moultrie and Saunders initiated in-
formal meetings to try to muster some sort of organized response to the ad-
ministration. Saunders stresses the fact that, at this time, 
A union is not what we were interested in. We felt that 
the doctors and nurses had their associations. They 
don't call them unions, but the American Medical 
Association is the most powerful union in this country 
today. We were looking for an employees' association." 
Many blacks, accustomed to inferior treatment for so long, were reluc-
tant to join the fledgling workers' group. "When we started to organize." 
Moultrie remembers, "a lot of people were afraid. I was instrumental in let-
ting them know, 'We ain't got nothing to start with.' " 16 The ranks of the 
movement grew slowly at first, but expanded rapidly as workers realized the 
strength in numbers. They met at local churches once a week, and according 
to Moultrie, "Each week the people who came were responsible for bring-
ing one other person with them. And it just kept growing until we got 450 to 
500 people strong." 17 Thus during spring and summer of 1968 a new 
phenomenon was taking place in Charleston. A group of blacks who had 
traditionally been cautious and complacent were beginning to confront their 
unequal relationship with whites. 
During the time from the firing of the five workers in December of 1967 
until the beginning of the strike on March 19, 1969, every official door was 
closed to the workers. 1 • They had nowhere to go to address what they felt 
were legitimate grievances, and they decided their only recourse was a 
union. ''The union was called in at a point when we realized they were not 
going to sit down and talk," Saunders says.' 9 J. Edwin Schacte, President 
of the Board of Trustees of the hospital during the strike, agrees: ''Through 
another course of action, early in the game, this whole thing could have 
been avoided. These people got not recognition from the administration 
and that's when the thing got out of hand. " 20 A powerful New York union, 
Local 1199 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers, took 
up the hospital workers' cause. Fresh from a series of labor victories over 
hospitals in the northeast, yet well aware of the traditional obstacles to 
unionization in the South, l l 99's leadership nevertheless was banking on a 
coalition of "union power and soul power" to forge revolutionary inroads 
in a hostile Dixie. 2 1 
On March 19, 1969, the hospital administration, aware of union activi-
ty, forced the workers' hand by firing twelve workers, ostensibly for derelic-
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tion of duty. That night q99B, the name assumed by the Charleston af-
filiate of the R WDSU, voted to strike; the struggle for black equality 
had come to Charleston. In the one hundred days that it took to settle the 
strike, Charleston witnessed over eight hundred arrests, hundreds of 
demonstrations and rallies, a dusk to dawn curfew, numerous fire bomb-
ings, and over five hundred National Guardsmen with fixed bayonets in the 
city streets. The issue, which had begun with deceptive inauspiciousness, 
soon mushroomed to include the foremost civil rights and labor leaders in 
the nation, the state governor, the state legislature, both houses of Con-
gress, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, and the closest advisors to the President of the United States. 
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference quickly adopted the 
cause of the striking workers. The presence of Ralph Abernathy and 
Andrew Young served to bolster the strikers' morale and to focus the na-
tional media's attention on the Holy City. The presence of the SCLC served 
another important though less visible role: it forced the black leadership to 
galvanize behind the strike effort. Ever since the workers' dispute had 
become widely-known in the black community, the local leaders had 
disagreed on the issue. The older, established elite who had political ties 
with the white establishment had refused to support the workers 
wholeheartedly. Saunders remembers, 
The black leadership of Charleston was not involved. 
They assured Mayor Gaillard and them that they were 
not involved and it would not work. If the strike came 
on it would be over in ten days or less. 22 
Before the SCLC arrived, the hospital dispute had threatened to polarize 
the black community; but the organization's presence tended to pull the 
community together. 
A split was also observed in the black churches in the city. The Southern 
black church had functioned as the center of the modern civil rights move-
ment, and Charleston was no different. The Interdenominational 
Ministerial Alliance, a group of black clergy formed to push for economic 
rights for their people, could not agree to support the workers. A faction of 
younger, more progressive leaders, led by the Reverends Grady and J. T. 
Enwright, split to form the pro-strike Committee of Concerned Clergy. "A 
number of ministers,'' Grady recalls, 
were afraid to open their doors, and others did open 
their doors but did not take a very active part. We form-
ed the Committee of Concerned Clergy because some 
denominations in the Interdenominational Ministerial 
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Alliance would not take a firm stand. 23 
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As the days passed and tensions mounted, most of the reluctant clergy 
"became a part whether they wanted to or not." 24 
Support among the black community at large was strong, especially 
after the walkout. A crowd estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 joined 
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, and Walter Reuther, president 
of the United Auto Workers' Union, for a Mother's Day march on the 
hospital. 2s At nighttime rallies in the churches around the city, crowds of 
2,000 were not uncommon. The fact that the four hundred women who 
walked out came from points all around the Charleston tri-county area 
meant most blacks knew at least one of the strikers. 
As no settlement appeared, the media attention increased and tension 
rose. The New York Times called the strike "the country's tensest civil 
rights struggle. " 26 Each side held firm, and despite the efforts of the Com-
mittee of Concerned Clergy and an ad hoc Citizen's Committee set up by 
Mayor Gaillard, no direct communication between the workers and the ad-
ministration took place for six weeks. The situation looked hopelessly 
deadlocked in May when the governor vowed "no surrender" and the 
SCLC announced that it would "never leave until the union is 
victorious. " 21 
Although he was backed by the state's executive branch on the union 
issue and affirmed by a resolution in the state legislature, Medical College 
President William McCord emerged as the biggest obstacle to the settle-
ment. Even after the workers had conceded the issue of union recognition, 
McCord took the extremist position of refusing to meet with any strikers 
and refusing to consider rehiring the twelve fired workes. 
Sometime during May, Governor McNair determined that the strike had 
little hope of settlement as long as McCord directed the administration's ef-
forts. 28 Vice-President for Development William D. Huff surreptitiously 
took over negotiations at the Governor's behest. At this point the union, the 
SCLC, the Committee of Concerned Clergy and a couple of politically ap-
pointed citizens' groups all claimed to represent the interests of the workers. 
But Huff shunned these quasi-official representatives and sought out 
Saunders, who had been involved with the workers since the initial incident 
in 1967, but had been overshadowed by the national figures during the 
months of the strike. 
Saunders came from a position outside the black establishment. He was 
not beholden to any group -- the SCLC, the union, the white or black power 
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structures. This fact and his honesty had earned the trust of the blacks and 
the respect of the whites. Schacte remembers Saunders as "a reasonable 
person who was motivated by the welfare of his own people, but practical 
enough to understand what mediators would say to him." 29 
Huff and Saunders set up a clandestine meeting of worker represen-
tatives and some moderate members of the hospital administration at the 
Santee-Cooper hydroelectric plant in Moncks Corner, some thirty-five 
miles north of Charleston. Neither McCord nor members of the union or 
SCLC was present. It was at this meeting, on June 5, that the basic terms of 
the settlement were hammered out face-to-face, on a personal level. 
Saunders calls it "the real turning point." He continues, 
The Board realized that these people were just good 
people. These black women and these white men got 
together. The men held their chairs out and stuff like 
that. The union was feeding the workers all this shit 
about how bad the Board of Trustees were. And the 
lawyers were telli,ag the Board how bad these people are. 
And they're going to take over your state and they're 
going to run everything. 30 
Events moved quickly in the wake of the meeting. Governor McNair and 
the Board of Trustees announced that the rehiring of the twelve workers 
was no longer an obstacle for them. A pay hike, which the state insisted was 
already in the plans, was presented. It raised the workers' wages to the levels 
they had demanded. The workers softened their demands for union recogni-
tion, saying that a well-structured grievance procedure and a credit union 
would suffice. 31 But McCord still stood firm in his position, refusing to 
rehire the workers. Only when it became clear that the HEW intended to 
follow through on its threats to cut off $12 million in federal funds to the 
hospital did McCord agree to settle: 
The immediate results of the strike did address those aspects of employ-
ment at the Medical College that the workers found most onerous. A 
grievance procedure was set up which mitigated the prejudicial attitµdes of 
white supervisors. A job classication system clearly prescribed the respon-
sibilities of each position, thereby curtailing the discretionary power that 
whites had held over blacks. 
Although all agree that conditions improved vastly, some dissatisfaction 
and charges of discrimination persisted after the settlement. Despite at least 
some remaining discontentment and the fresh memory of the recent strug-
gle, the union lasted barely a year, falling victim to lack of interest and in-
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fighting among indigenous blacks vying for power. 32 When the SCLC, the 
national media, and the big guns of the union left the scene, local blacks 
could not maintain their ranks. 
William Saunders sees the workers' retrenchment as a tendency to 
celebrate an initial victory when much work still remains to be done. He 
faults those workers who complain about conditions for not capitalizing on 
the opportunities presented them: 
If any [bad] conditions exist at the hospital, it's the 
workers' fault. We changed the rules. We had the 
grievance procedure enacted. You are responsible for 
youself. And there are certain people ... who are look-
ing for others to be responsible for them. All I've fought 
for is for blacks to have access, to have the right. Now 
whether you utilize that right is your own damn 
business. But don't complain to me if it's bad that you 
need a savior to come and get you. 34 
Perhaps Saunders is too harsh. Black Charlestonians' attitudes and ac-
tions are the product of a long and unique history. If blacks are still not 
adamant enough in pushing for their rights, one must still appreciate how 
far they have had to come. A way of life, a culture, does not die out over-
night; but considering white Charleston's long record of cordial superiority 
and black Charleston's traditional absence of militancy, the hospital strike 
represents the start of a new era in race relations in the city. If remnants of 
black complacency still remain, so does the type of personal rapport that 
made the Santee-Cooper meeting a success. 
Since the strike, Charleston has been able to combine the positive aspect 
coming out of the strike with useful traditions from her history to build a 
new order. The pre-strike harmony has returned, but the harmony is no 
longer based on black acquiescence. The strike activated the black popula-
tion and forced whites to recognize their power. Z.L. Grady describes the 
long term effects of the strike. 
It brought the power structure of the blacks and whites 
together to help them form a better relationship in the 
community overall. A number of prominent whites in 
the community became afraid of what could happen in 
the community. They were interested in saving the com-
munity from bloodshed or hatred. 35 
Saunders believes the strike changed the way blacks and white saw 
themselves: 
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It brought a recognition of a change. The important 
thing was a changing of attitudes. Changing blacks' at-
titudes -- that you are not helpless, creature. You are 
somebody. You are important. And the white structure 
recognizes also that you are important. It was a real 
coming together for the state of South Carolina. And 
we've had one of the better race relations systems since 
then. 36 
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MARIE-JOSEPH BLAISE CHENIER (1764-1811): 
THE STAGING OF CHARLES IX 
Jesse L. Scott 
Marie-Joseph Blaise Chenier (1764-1811), revolutionary playwright and 
politician, was actively involved in Parisian life. He sparked controversies 
among his contemporaries, and his work endured to inspire, or to infuriate, 
succeeding generations, who, depending on their political perspectives, 
perceived Chenier as a revolutionary hero or villain. Chenier the playwright 
and politician reflected his society and tried to influence it through his 
drama and through his work as a politician. 
Paris after 1789 became a city of theaters in which dramatists and actors 
and actresses played out the theatrics of the political arenas and events they 
witnessed about them during the French Revolution (1789-1799). Young 
men and women, mothers and daughters, fathers and sons, merchants and 
craftsmen, aristocrats and sans-culottes, politicians all, often gathered dur-
ing the late afternoon around Paris' theaters eager to be entertained and, 
though perhaps unsuspectingly, to be educated and politicized as well. 
Charles IX is undoubtedly Chenier's most famous play. His struggle to 
have this play performed and the play's consequent success are the subj.ect 
of this paper. · The production of Charles IX ·on November 4, 1789 signalled 
the advent of revolutionary changes within the Parisian world of theater. By 
the Autumn of 1789 Paris had already many times demonstrated its ex-
plosiveness. The revolution was well under way. Accompanying the more 
traditional political, economic, and social upheavals during these years was 
a less written about but no less significant revolution that thrived within the 
hierarchical world of theaters. At the heart of this controversy was 
Chenier's Charles IX, a play of utmost influence that was both a mirror of 
and a model for society. No aspect of society was immune to the 
revolution's convulsions. Paris' theater audiences, its actors, producers, 
and even the organization of the theaters themselves reflected important 
political changes and historical developments in general. 1 
Charles IX is based on the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 
when Charles IX (1560-1574) ruled France under the eye of his mother, 
Catherine de Medici. During a truce in the Wars of Religion the Protestant 
Henry of Navarre, a cousin of the King, was in Paris to marry Charles IX's 
sister. Catholics attacked Huguenots in the early morning of St. Bar-
tholomew's Day. Many Huguenots and their leaders were killed. The 
violence spread throughout France. Perhaps more than 10,000 Protestants 
were massacred. 
Set in Paris in the Chftteau du Louvre, Charles IX attacks fanaticism, 
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criticizes the aristocracy and ridicules the Church. Allusions to contem-
porary circumstances, though Chenier claimed them to be fortuitous, were 
evident to many people and threatening to some. Charles IX, heralded as 
France's first national tragedy, made Chenier' s career. 
Chenier ridiculed The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre and the people 
responsible for the atrocity. Absolute monarchy is symbolized in the 
character of Charles IX, who is a weak and indecisive man easily led by his 
wicked and domineering mother, Catherine de Medici. It is Catherine de 
Medici who persuaded Charles IX to allow the murder of the Huguenots. 
Disturbed and guilt-ridden after the massacre, Charles IX laments, "I am 
no longer a king; I I am an assassin .. · 1 And I am covered with the blood of 
my subjects . . . j I have betrayed my country, and honor and law .j ·Heaven, 
in punishing m~ Provides an example to kings. " 2 
Even the Church, as an institution perpetuating fanaticism, does not 
escape Chenier's scorn.,. Catholicism is symbolized in the character of the 
Cardinal of Lorraine who, like Catherine de Medici, plays a vital role in 
shaping Charles IX's attitudes and decisions. The Cardinal is a hypocrite as 
evil as any Tartuffe ever conjured. He is only concerned with preserving the 
power of the Catholic Church against the Protestants. In answer to Charles 
IX who questions the benevolence of a God who would condone such car-
nage as the massacre, the Cardinal responds, "the God we serve is a God of 
goodness;! But a God of goodness, of peace, and indulgence,! Sometimes 
demands war and vengence . . . . '' 3 
Charles IX was not initially a success. Many people attempted to ban the 
play from the stage. But with time the play became a success because its 
controversial topic fit perfectly with the events of its day. Years before 
1789, in 1764 specifically, Voltaire had suggested that "the time will come 
when the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day will be made the subject of a 
tragedy."' That day had arrived. On September 2, 1788 the 
Comedie-Francaise, the royal theater, had heard a reading of Charles IX 
and had accepted it into its repertory. Yet J.-B. Antoine Suard (1734-1817), 
the royal censor, banned the play from the stage because he considered its 
attacks on the Church and the State "excessive. " 5 As early as late 1788 
Chenier began his battle against censorship in order to have Charles IX 
staged. 
Charles Palissot de Montenoy (1730-1814), Chenier's mentor, arranged 
(or Charles IX to be read before the Duke and the Duchess of Orleans; the 
reading took place in the horn~ of the Viscount of Segur in early January 
1789. As one contemporary observed, "nobody was moved, many yawned 
and all exclaimed that it was magnificent ... , but the play was feared by the 
Duke of Orleans himself. " 6 In January 1789 Chenier could not muster sup-
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port for his play, persuade the royal actors to perform it, or remove the 
royal ban from it. Throughout the eighteenth century the philosophes had 
attacked religious fanaticism, but Charles IX was different: 
it is no longer fanaticism alone, but royal authority as 
welf as the Church, which are flouted, humiliated, and 
held up to public scorn, in the character of Charles IX, 
Catherine de Medici, and the Cardinal of Lorraine, dur-
ing that sinister St. Bartholomew night, so cruelly ·ex-
piated. 1 
It was this message from the play that the royal actors refused to deliver 
from their stage. 
From January to August 1789 a number of events took place that com-
bined to create an atmosphere in which Chenier was able to make progress 
with his fight to stage his play. For Chenier the timing was just right. On 
May 2, 1789 the Estates General was called. On June 20, 1789 the famous 
Tennis Court Oath was signed. News of Finance Minister Necker's 
dismissal vibrated throughout Paris beginning on July 11, 1789. And on Ju-
ly 14, 1789, the Bastille was stormed. Between August 4-11, 1789 the Na-
tional Assembly produced its famou~ decrees in which liberal nobles re-
nounced their feudal rights and privileges. Chenier like all of Paris was 
aware of these incidents. 
It was under these precarious circumstances that Chenier managed to 
find support for the staging of his play. On a Wednesday, August 19, 1789 
at the Comedic-Francaise (The§tre de la Nation) an event of historic impor-
tance took place. For the first time since the outbreak of the revolution, a 
political and not simply a literary faction demanded the production of 
Charles IX. s The restive mobs in Paris had already forced a number of clos-
ings and had intimidated the royal actors of the Comedic-Francaise into 
changing the theater's name to Thefttre de la Nation. The royal theater 
realized its monopoly was in jeopardy. Already a host of minor theaters, 
though unsanctioned by the government, had begun to.stage plays from the 
classical repertory as well as other plays supporting the revolution. With the 
weakening of the throne, the royal theater weakened as well. 
On August 19, 1789 during the intermission between a performance of 
Fontenelle's Ericie, ou la Vestale, which had been banned twenty years 
earlier, and a scheduled presentation of Jean Baptiste Poquelin Moliere's 
(1622-1673) Ecole de maris, members of the audience distributed handbills 
demanding Charles IX's performance. Handbills were thrown throughout 
the theater and filled the orchestra pit. 9 One of the statements titled 
"Adresse aux Bons Patriotes" declared that Chenier's play was intended to 
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inspire hatred of fanaticism and that it had been written for a nation of free 
people. 10 This handbill was signed "Du Croisi," probably a pseudonym us-
ed by Chenier. Regardless, the controversy over Charles IX had become a 
political and a public matter. 
Likewise another handbill was simultaneously distributed among the au-
dience that evening. It carried the title "Appel aux Spectateurs" and ex-
plained that Charles IX was France's national tragedy and that it must be 
represented for a people who had destroyed despotism. 11 That evening's au-
dience was already in an excitable frame of mind since it had just witnessed 
a staging of Ericie, a controversial play in itself which had not been per-
formed for twenty years. 
The audience, characteristically uproarious, even verging on rioting, 
barked forth calls. From the orchestra pit, as the curtain rose on Moliere's 
L'Ecole des maris, a voice shouted, "why do you not perform Charles IX?" 
Other voices joined this first caller, Georges Jacques Danton (1759-1794), a 
leader of the people in the revolution. They shouted repeatedly, "Charles 
IX! Charles IX!" The house was ·filled with these cries; Moliere's play was 
delayed. 
Abraham Joseph Benard Fleury (1751-1822), actor and member of the 
royalist faction among the actors called "les Noires, "
1 
appeared on stage 
alone to face the audience. A voice asked, "why is Charles IX not perform-
ed?" Fleury claimed the company lacked official permission. Suddenly the 
audience screamed at Fleury, "no more permission ... "; Danton insisted, 
"it is time that despotism and censorship cease: we want to have the 
freedom to hear and to see works represented that please us, just as we are 
now free to think." 12 Fleury, frightened by the outbursts and demands but 
unwilling and unable to appease the crowd, promised to approach the 
municipality on the next morning. 
The protesters were temporarily calmed by Fleury's agreement. They 
left the theater, and Moli~re's play was performed. Fleury kept his promise 
to the audience by approaching the municipal assembly on August 20, 
1789. 13 Unlike during the old regime, the royal actors after the revolution 
began in July 1789 were subject to not just the king's censors but also to the 
municipality and the newly established mayor of Paris. Also evident is the 
fact that already by August 1789 public opinion had begun to play a role in 
determining which plays would and would not be staged at the theaters. 
This incident of August 19, 1789 made clear the fact that popular leaders 
such as Danton, Lucie Simplice Camille Benoit Desmoulins (1760-1794), 
Honore Gabriel Riquetti, comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791), as well as 
Chenier, were aware of the advantage of using the stage to promote their in-
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terests and to influence public opinion. Without doubt the controversy over 
Charles IX became a matter of general, or public, interest. Its fate was 
directly tied to the revolution's success or failure. 14 From the very beginning 
of the revolution audiences began to manipulate and to dictate what would 
be performed in the theaters. Many people such as Danton and Chenier 
were determined to use the theater to fuel the revolution; the stage became 
an effective weapon. 1 s 
The next morning, on August 20, 1789, Fleury accompanied by several 
other actors walked from the Comedie-Francaise to the City Hall to ap-
proach the municipal assembly. They found Jean Sylvain Bailly 
(1736-1793), a constitutional royalist who was then Mayor of Paris. They 
informed him of the _previous evening's events at the theater and requested 
permission to stage Charles IX. Suard, the royal censor, was no longer 
answerable to the king but to the Mayor of Paris, who had control over the 
city's theaters. 16 Bailly postponed making a decision and insisted that the 
matter must be presented to the National Assembly. He did, however, state 
later in his memoirs that he had been at the time against the staging of 
Chenier's play. Bailly remarked, "I thought that in our present cir-
cumstances at a moment when the entire population had revolted, not 
against the king, but against arbitrary authority, it was not prudent to ex-
hibit on the stage one of the authority's most fightful abuses .... " 11 Bailly 
passed the matter on to the Assembly; the Assembly in return appointed a 
. committee to examine the play. 
This delay prolonged the controversy over whether to stage or not to 
stage Charles IX. It continued throughout September and much of October 
1789. The National Assembly was preoccupied with more urgent business at 
this time. Between August 20-26, 1789 the Assembly was forging and pro-
claiming the declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The 
Municipal Assembly meanwhile had denied Chenier's request to read his 
play before them or to be present during a reading of his play. He wanted to 
answer any questions immediately and on the spot. He also wanted to keep 
his hands on his manuscript. 18 He waited for the committee's verdict 
though not silently. 
From late August through September Chenier confronted much opposi-
tion. On August 23, 1789 Chenier insisted in his Discours prononce devant 
M.M. Jes representans de la commune that censorship must be abolished 
completely and that all free men had the right to publish their thoughts. 19 
Four days later on August 27, 1789 Suard, the royal censor, published 
anonymously in the Journal de Paris an argument for upholding censor-
ship. Censorship was necessary for preserving public order, he argued. 
Chenier, knowing the author's true identity, published a refutation, signed 
. it with Suard's name, and in this brief pamphlet cleverly had Suard disman-
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tie the arguments of his earlier anonymous article and even has the royal 
censor, Suard, call himself a "jackass. " 20 On September 6, 1789 Chenier 
published his Courtes reflexions sur l'etat civil des comediens. 21 In this 
treatise he attempted to defend actors' civil and political rights. 22 Though he 
had weakened the opposition to his play among the actors with this timely 
and opportunistic declaration, his play still was not performed. He had, 
though, contributed to the movement to gain citizenship for actors and ar-
tists in France. 23 Overall, Chenier worked to promote his play. He believed 
Charles IX was being unfairly judged by people who had not even bothered 
to read his play. 24 
In late September or early October 1789 the committee appointed to 
study Chenier's play decided that Charles IX could be presented by the 
royal actors; however, opposition continued in October, especially after the 
march of the women on Versailles during Octobr 5-6, 1789. B This journee, 
which returned the king and the National Assembly to Paris, frightened 
many people who were convinced that a staging of Charles IX would only 
create more unrest. 26 
Preparations for the production were halted on October 15, 1789 when 
the municipal assembly ordered the police to suspend the performance. 
Chenier was furious. On October 20, 1789 in his "Adresse aux soixante 
districts de Paris" Chenier appealed to Parisians. 1-:le ignored the protests 
from royalists such as Suard, bishops, or academecians from the Sorbonne 
who hoped to ban his play permanently. In short, he professed his civic 
·loyalty and his general good intentions. 21 He also patronized Louis XVI to 
evidence his support of the monarchy. 28 
Initially the October Days had fostered reaction against Charles IX and 
jeopardized its performance, but in the long run this march on Versailles 
had produced revolutionary sentiment among Parisians who felt more com-
fortable and confident with the royal family within shouting di~tance. 
Charles IX was finally scheduled for presentation on November 4, 1789, a 
Wednesday. About the staging of the play, Fleury lamented, "that time 
which Voltaire's prophetic imagination pictured at a remote distance among 
future generations, arrived eleven years after his death: Chenier produced 
his Charles IX, our L'Ecole des Rois." Later, however, Fleury admitted 
that "Charles IX brought us as rich a harvest as The Marriage of Figaro." 29 
It was afternoon, November 4, 1789. Chenier was at the Cafe Noel 
together with his friends and associates: Charles Palissot, Jean Marie Collot-
d'Herbois (1750-1796), Philippe Francois Nazaire Fabre-D'Eglantine 
(1755-1794), Jacques Danton, Mirabeau, and many others who had crowd-
ed into the Cafe to talk and to have a bit of brandy before heading off to the 
Comedie-Fran~ise. It was on this Catholic St. Charles day, ironically 
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enough, that Chenier's play, Charles IX, was first performed by the royal 
actors. He and his party of political associates and a body of nearly one 
hundred supporters from Paris' surrounding districts were at the Cafe Noel 
to muster their forces, their courage, and to organize their strategy for the 
evening's performance of the controversial play. The battle Chenier had 
waged against censorship since late 1788 and that he and his associates had 
fought since August 19, 1789 made them all a bit nervous. They claimed 
their fears and uncertainties about the coming evening. After their brandy 
they headed off with Chenier to the Theatre de la Nation 
(Comedie-Francaise) with hope of a victory to be relished. 30 
An actress at the Comedie-Francaise, Mme. Vestris, insisted to her 
_friend Chenier that '' I am running some risk on your account. This queen 
mother is so hateful that I am certain to be shot at." 31 Mme. Vestris was 
playing the role of the evil Catherine de Medici. The actors were also ner-
vous about the performance. The gulf between the factions of the revolu-
tionary "les Rouges" (Reds) and the royalist "les Noires" (Black) had 
widened during the fight over Charles IX. Etienne-Maynier Saint-Fal, 
royalist, had refused the role of Charles IX; he disliked the play's 
sacrilegious tone. It was thus that Francois Joseph Talma (1763-1826), a 
young actor in the company, gained his first great role, by default. 32 
Nearly everyone, whether actor or spectator, anticipated trouble at the 
performance on November 4, 1789. Chenier had been warned that his play 
would not be well-received. Anonymous threats had been made on the ac-
tors' and the actress' lives. Fifteen minutes before the opening curtain a per-
son barged into Mme. Vestris' dressing room to tell her of an assassination 
plot against her life. She believed her war.st fears were coming true. Swords 
and pistols were in plain sight among the audience, which included 
Mirabeau with delegates from the National Assembly, Camille Desmoulins, 
Danton, and Cordeliers from various districts. 33 In a sense Chenier had the 
peoples' support from the beginning; Danton led the people. Danton sup-
ported Chenier. 
Even before the curtain was raised a voice from the orchestra pit warned 
that the performance would be seen from start to finish by the people. 
Charles Palissot, Chenier's dramatist mentor, shouted in agreement. 
Moments later throughout the audience came threats of "to the lantern." 
Any person in the audience who had hoped to spoil the play was likely to 
have been intimidated into silence by such threats. In fact, given the con-
troversial history behind Charles IX's first staging, the performance pro-
ceeded without much disturbance. 34 
The audience cheered, stamped its feet, and voiced its approvals time 
and again. The theater was packed; orchestra seats, usually only forty-eight 
Marie-Joseph Chenier (1764-1811 ): 99 
The Staging of Charles IX 
sous, had sold for a louis apiece; receipts, as they would be for the first six 
performances were over 5,000 livres. They would not fall below 3,000 livres 
through twenty-three performances during the next two months. In two 
months time an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 spectators saw Chenier's Charles 
IX. 35 Charles IX was a smash. 
A story has it that after the performance Desmoulins bragged, 
''Gentlemen, this play brings monarchy and priestcraft nearer their doom 
than the July and October days.'' Likewise, Danton predicted, ''if Figaro 
killed the nobility, Charles IX ... will exterminate royalty.'' 36 Talma, con-
gratulated by Chenier backstage for his brilliant performance, pulled the 
playwright on stage with him to greet a demanding audience; showered with 
applause they left the theater to celebrate their triumph. Even Fieury, who 
had opposed both the play and Talma's having been cast in the lead role, 
admitted, "we did not certainly anticipate that the young tragedian would 
have produced the effect he did in this part ... The sublimity of Talma's 
conception ... filled us with no less astonishment than admiration." 37 
What was evident and most important, as a contemporary, Amaury Duval, 
explained, was that ''the premiere of Charles IX was more ·than a dramatic 
event; it was a political event. " 38 
As each month passed Chenier became more firmly placed in Paris' eye 
--winning him friends and foes alike. True enough, each performance, to 
lesser and greater degrees, instigated controversies, heightened fears among 
counter-revolutionaries or inspired revolutionaries to work toward their 
goals. An anonymous contemporary admitted, "I cannot get away from the 
idea that Hell itself must have entered M. de Chenier's domicile, that Pluto 
dictated what he wrote, and that the devil held the ink-pot. " 39 Even Pierre 
Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais (1732-1799), author of The Marriage of 
Figaro, staged just more than four years previously on April 27, 1784 in 
spite of much opposition to its presentation, explained to an actor, 
Florence, that he was uneasy about Charles IX. The letter from Beaumar-
chais to Florence is dated November 9, 1789. It was written only four days 
after the first performance of Chenier's play. Jn short, Beaumarchais warn-
ed that Charles IX would incite the people to revolution. 40 Indeed, the play 
spawned disputes. But it also won the author fame and friends among the 
revolution's popular leaders and it gave him the people's support. News of 
the play spread through Paris during the first weeks of November 1789. 
Popular songs praised Chenier and Charles IX, or "The School for Kings ." 
In mid-November several districts bestowed a "civic crown" on Chenier to 
express their appreciation and admiration. 41 
From as early as 1788 up to 1791 with the passing of the January 13-19, 
1791 Le Chapelier Laws Chenier had already played a major role in reform-
ing Parisian theater, had written political pamphlets and songs, had con-
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tributed to journals, had frequented salons and clubs, and was elected even-
tually to the National Convention, for which he served most notably begin-
ning in 1792 on the Committee of Public Instruction. Though his political, 
as well as his theatrical opinions, and consequently his popularity, 
vacillated between 1789 and 1795 with the oscillations of the revolution, 
Chenier remained, throughout the years, a republican who, later, during the 
Empire (1804-1815), was considered too liberal and forced to defer to 
Napoleon I's regime. 42 
After the suppression of his play, Timoleon, by the centralized govern-
ment of the Terror in 1794, Chenier's popularity as a playwright and as a 
politician declined. He became a symbol of the moderate revolutionary who 
had once directed the revolution of 1789. Chenier remained a republican, 
but during the Terror he became persona non grata. After the fall of 
Robespierre he again pursued his political career. But never again after 1794 
did Chenier or his drama reach the height of popularity they once held in 
Paris. The mood or beliefs of Parisians changed, but, regardless, Chenier 
had also become between 1789 and 1794 a social and political figure, as well 
as an accomplished playwright and man of letters. 
His literary career and his political associations and aspirations made 
him an often controversial man and enabled him to be an observer of and a 
commentator upon the political and the social circumstances of his day. To 
be sure, Parisians and, for that matter, the world as we now know, long 
remembered the glories and the tragedies of the French Revolution of 1789, 
which has irreversibly impressed its ideals and images in posterity's minds. 
Equally, on the eve of the French Revolution's bicentennial, one partici-
pant, the politicized playwright, Marie-Joseph Blaise Chenier (1764-1811), 
revolutionary martyr or monster, has not been forgotten. 
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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND DECHRISTIANIZATION, 
1789 to L 'AN II 
Fred Hembree 
The men of 1789 shared with the philosophes the same developing 
religious and intellectual currents, but the French Revolution accelerated 
these still indentifiable currents to such a degree that it is possible to 
recognize a birthing ideology unique to the Revolution. This ideology, while 
holding many attitudes in common with the Enlightenment, reached a new 
plane when political action was no longer the ideal of the thinker, but the 
duty of le legislateur. The ideas of the Enlightenment and the ideology of 
the French Revolution both '' arose out of the conflict with the existing 
order,'' and both sought ''to overthrow the clerical-theological view of the 
world." 1 The influence of the eighteenth-century deistic and rationalistic 
cults; as well as atheism and anti-clericalism, are evident in the development 
of a _new revolutionary religion which, nevertheless, was characterized by 
the worship of la patrie more than any other factor because the revolution 
had drastically changed "the existing order" and therefore the field of con-
flict. Reason, nature, virtue, the Supreme Being, were definitely concerns of 
the revolutionaries, arid these conceptual symbols (rather than concepts, 
because the words were used as a call to action, not cognition)2 outwardly 
clothed the Revolution's ideological evolution. The "progress of man" by 
means of raison, however, was supplanted as the primary goal by the desire 
to ensure the "progres de la Revolution" by destroying perceived enemies . 
of the Revolution. The thought of the Enlightenment, which after all simply 
identified existing social, economic, and political problems and alternatives, 
provided a sufficient supply of ene~ies with which to begin, but successive 
journees of the Revolution brought more single-minded objectives and 
greatly expanded the supply of conceivable counterrevolutionaries. 
This steady radicalization of the Revolution victimized the Church and 
Christianity in much the same way as other ancien institutions and beliefs 
came under condemantion. There is nothing aberrational in the course of 
Church/State relations during the French Revolution. Nationalization of 
church property, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, persecution of refrac-
tories, the dechristianization of Ian II -- each may be explained in the con-
text of the French Revolution if the Revolution is considered in its overlap-
ping stibjectiye and objective aspects. An analysis of public events, such as 
fetes and persecutions, and of political actions and writings from 1789 to 
September 1793, should rev(al recognizable evolutionary developments 
which render the dechristianization movement of Ian II, if not unavoidable, 
at least understandable. 
It is not meant to deny here John McManners' observation that the 
dechristianization of the Y: ear II was "qualitatively as well as quantitatively 
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different from what had gone before,'' although differences in extremes are 
more easily demonstrable tha_n differences in essential characteristics. 3 Just 
as there is a qualitative difference between a constitutional monarchy and a 
Republic, especially a nascent Republic with an emergency executive, so is a 
Catholicism limited by the State distinguishable from a civic religion which 
openly purports to replace Christianity. Nevertheless, if qualitative distinc-
tions can be made, so can qualitative similarities, particularly with regard to 
the French Revolution which brought so many "qualities" to the fore in 
such a brief period of time. In a sense, the rapidly changing Revolution 
developed its own unique Oberqualitllt. The Revolution's transitions were 
so swiftly and confusedly negotiated that they lost their normally perceived 
singularities, and the process of transition itself has become an object of 
study. The period of the Terror, for example, was in many ways different 
from what had gone before, but it has no real meaning if enclosed in the 
years 1793-1794. Jacobin ideology, as Jack Richard Censer has admirably 
demonstrated, was not so much a sharp break as a continuation of develop-
1ng ideological courses. 4 Dechristianization, which was an external 
manifestation of the same revolutionary trends_ which radicalized the 
government and the nation, may l_ikewise be traced to events and attitudes 
unfolding in the earlier years of the Revolution. 
The pronounced mania for solidarity was a characteristic of the revolu-
tionary ·mentality which may allow us to distinguish revolutionary ideology 
from the diverse thought of the Enlightenment. The philosophes, in their 
relatively calm world, wrote down their thoughts under no pressure to con-
form to any imperative model and with no authority to create an imperative 
model. They disagreed with one another, and each writer frequently con-
tradicted himself. Rouss~au, for instance, has-been intelligently evoked by 
the anarchist and by the dictator, by the mystic and by the rationalist. 
Whether Jean-Jacques was none or all of these things, his attractive 
writings, taken as a whole or individually, did not present a sufficiently 
unambiguous objective which could sustain an ideology. The French 
Revolution ·was much more concrete, and it acquired immediate recognition 
and singleminded devotion. The philosophes received proper tribute5 and 
maintained the allegiance and close attention of their readers, but it was the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man which replaced the Decalogue in the 
hearts of le people. 
Long before France was seriously threatened by foreign invasion or civil 
war, the Revolution spontaneously began developing means to distinguish 
itself from counterrevolution. An early patriot might publicly sport his 
tricolor cocarde or his bonnet rouge while striking a meditative pose under 
the nearest "arbre de la liberte," perhaps recuperating from the preceeding 
night's "banquet civic. " 6 Revolutionary symbolism was taken very serious-
ly. Liberty trees, upon their untimely deaths, were on occasion given 
elaborate funerals. 7 When it proved difficult to persuade all the 
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women of Paris to wear the cockade, the Commune on 13 September 1793 
and the Convention on 21 September decreed that all citoyennes must wear 
the "signe venerable de la liberte." Punishments were severe for non-
compliance. 8 Also in September 1793, two cures were condemned to death 
for having, it was charged, "arrache et foule aux pieds la cocarde 
nationale. '' 9 
A humorous contemporary account of republican manners and dress 
may be .found in a letter written in September 1792 by the English visitor 
John Moore, who was amused to find the newspapers condemning the cus-
tom of taking off one's hat and bowing as a sign of greeting because this in-
dicated the pernicious influence of their former slavery and was ''unbecom-
ing the independent spirit of free men." 10 The revolutionary journals pro-
posed that to place the right hand to the heart would be a more befitting 
gesture of heartfelt salutation. Moore discusses the republican clothing, 
which had been designed by Jacques-Louis David and which had "already 
been adopted by many." The Englishman, who must have felt like a man 
from another world, describes one fashion-conscious republican who was 
equiped with complete regalia: 
His appearance was rather fantastical. His jacket and 
trousers were blue; his coat, through which the blue 
sleeves appeared, was white with a scarlet cape; his 
round hat was amply supplied with plumage; he had two 
pistols stuck in his belt, and a very formidable sabre at 
his side: he is a tall man, and of a very warlike figure; I 
took him for a Major of Dragoons at least: on enquiry I 
find he is a miniature painter. 
Christian names, for streets, buildings, geographical areas, cities and 
people, were often replaced by republican and deistic appelations. An early 
patriot named Jean Chretien might change his name to Grave Plebeien, or 
carry his infant child to a civic baptism to be washed in the glory of la patrie 
and dubbed Plebe Plebeien. 12 Some unwisely chose less humble names 
such as Brutus Gracchus, thereby arousing the jealous suspicion of their 
neighbors and resulting in charges of "aristocratie!" A well-meaning 
citoyen guilty of this faux pas, or perhaps some other error such as using the 
aristocratic vous form of address rather than the egalitarian tutoiement, 
could redeem himself by selecting a more sober sobriquet like Legume Ver-
tueux, taking himself to the local "autel de la patrie," and swearing the 
customary oath to the Revolution. 13 Considering that oath-taking was com-
mon, it is understandable that the non-juring clergy would come under 
suspicion for their refusal to take a seemingly innocuous oath "d'etre fideles 
h la nation, a la loi et au roi, et de maintenir de tout leur pouvoir la Con-
stitution decretee par I' Assemblee nationale et acceptee par le roi." 14 If the 
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clergy would not give up the old and accept the new, they would perish with 
the old. All social activity, including and especially religious activity, was 
obliged to conform to revolutionary ideology. 
the mania for solidarity also displayed a tendency to exaggerate the 
dangers posed by aristocrats and conspirators. "Durable villians" such as 
nobles, royal ministers, and ecclesiastics need not commit an act of treason; 
it was only necessary to be a noble, a royal minister, or an ecclesiastic to 
provoke the loud hatred of patriots. Jack Censer has pointed out that the 
revolutionaries "drew heavily from the stereotypes provided by their 
ideology. In fact, the effect. .. was as much a reemphasis of their ideology 
as it was an accurate characterization of a certain group or individual." 15 It 
is true that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was not popular in the 
Vendee16 and that Pius VI and emigre bishops favored the enemies of 
France in the war, but it is likely that animosity towards the clergy sprang 
more from the revolutionaries ideological hatred of tradition than from any 
real acts of treason committed by the clergy. 11 As early as 1790, after the 
clergy~ s resistance to the Civil Constitution had ended the democratic 
honeymoon between the cures and the laity, the "brigands d'eglise" were 
being described as "an evil race" determined to halt the Revolution and to 
maintain the Church's arrogant prodigaiity. 18 The clergy's "treason" was 
that of promoting "superstition" and "ignorance" in order to spread 
unrest by undermining the new ''philosophie du peuple'' 19 
Anticlericalism was also in evidence in the Parisian Jacobin Club. On 1 
July 1793, Jean-Marie Collot D'Herbois praise for Jacques-Rene Hebert 
brought the applause of his fellow Jacobins: "Vous auriez vu Hebert pro-
mener le flam beau de la verite sur la tite du pretre hypocrite, et faire fondre 
son masque, comme un limon ~pur qui couvrait sa tete .... Les republi-
cains revolutionnaires ont concouru au triomphe de la raison et de la 
verite. " 20 On 4 August 1793, in the Jacobin Club, Fran~ois Chabot declared 
that France should "deporter tous les pretres." 21 On 16 August another 
Jacobin asserted that two-thirds of the constitutional clergy 
sont opposes par leurs principes aux principes republi-
cains; ii s' en trouve meme dans Paris qui ont fabrique 
des brochures contre-revolutionnaires, ou ils attaquent 
overtement les autorites constituees. . . . 11 est grand 
temps de purger la Republique de ces hommes qui 
veulent encore alimenter, au mepris des· lois, la supersti-
tion et le fanatisme. 22 
All this was not mere rhetoric; action was being taken. Silvain-Phalier 
Lejeune, who along with Collot d'Herbois, Joseph-Marie Lequinio and 
Jacques Isore had been en mission in l' Aisne and l'Oise, reported to the 
Jacobin Club in Paris on 6 September 1793 that they had "destitue les 
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nobles, les pr@'tres, les gens suspects; ils les ont fait mettre en etat d'arresta-
tion. " 23 In the summer of 1793, the agents secrets of the Ministry of the In-
terior placed a close surveillance on Parisian priests who misled the 
populace by daring "encore chercher des proselytes," and maneuvering 
"pour fanatiser le peuple et le remettre sous le joug de la superstition." 24 
One police agent; who on 15 September reported hearing a long sermon at 
the church of Saint-Roche on the virtues of the sign of the cross, was indig-
nant that such "contre-revolution" was still allowed by the law. "Bons 
republicains" could not be formed amid such "riaiseries ultramontaines. " 25 
As for the laity, they would do best not to be found engaging· in Christian 
worship, but rather attending an anti-clerical play such as Marie-Joseph 
Chenier's Charles IX, or perhaps passing their time at a public place 
"remplis de citoyens qui jouaient, buvaient et chantaient des chansons . 
patriotiques et des hymnes en l'honneur de la Republique, de la Liberte et 
de. l'Egalite. " 26 Anticlericalism and a superseding patriotic ideology, those 
two principal traits of.dechristianization, were developing side by side in the 
first four. years of the ·French Revolution. 
Other:traits· of the deehristianization movement of the Year II may be 
detected'in earlier periods of the Revolution: The validity of ·Christianity's 
doctrines were denied;27 before Hebert used the fashionable term, sans-
culotte, to describe Jesus Christ, Jesus was being portrayed as a 
"proletaire"; 21 stress was laid on the morality, virtue, and fraternity of the 
Revolution, and the immorality, vice, and "egotisme" of the 
"aristocratie"";29 puritanical attitudes concerning gambling, sex, and the 
like, were displayed; 30 and-"everything" was explained in gross terms of 
"plots and conspiracies." As one radical journalist put it: "Partout ou se 
trament des complots contre la patrie ou contre la raison, soyez sur qu'il ya 
des pretres." 31 The early revolutionaries, like those of the Terror, wor-
shiped Reason irrationally and Nature unnaturally. Before the Year II, a 
sweeping aristocratie had been created which was "no less than than the 
most goulish ogre of a childhood fantasy." 32 
The mania for fraternity and solidarity also led to the emergence of 
revolutionary fetes and to a cult of revolutionary martyrs. Communes 
throughout France united to form district federations, which in turn came 
together to form a national federation on the first anniversary of Bastille 
Day. The revolutionary pageantry which unfolded on the Champ de Mars 
in Paris and in similar open-air sites in other cities on 14 July 1790 was 
marked by patriotism. Frenchmen took their oaths before the altar of the 
fatherland and offered homage to the "philosophie" which had brought 
France to such a glorious status. In the period 1790-1793 other fetes, which 
"annoncent et preparent le culte de la Raison," 33 arose in commemoration 
of "les grandes dates revolutionnaires" such as 20 June 1789 (Tennis Court 
Oath), 4 August 1789 (renunciation of privilege, and 10 August 1792 (fall 
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of the monarchy). 34 In addition, festivals and "funerailles" associated with 
the "culte des martyrs de la liberte" honored such philosophes and early 
Republicans as Voltaire ar:id Brutus and such revolutionaries and patriot 
saints as Honore Mirabeau, Jean-Paul Marat, Michel Lepeletier, 35 and the 
victims of the 1791 massacre on the Champ de Mars. 36 Virtually every 
characteristic of the fetes of the Year II may be found in these earlier 
festivals. Many major participants and designers of the pre-Terror 
fetes-Mathieu, Charles-Gilbert Romme, Jacques-Louis David, Jean-
Baptiste Gobel, J .-J. Chenier, Charles-Philippe Ronsin-are familiar to the 
student of the dechristianization campaign of the Year II. One finds the 
same symbolism, 37 and the same emphasis on the Enlightenment and on an-
tiquity. 38 The same terms are bandied about: liberte, raison, nature, nation 
and patrie,39 unite, ~re supr~me, regeneration. The secularization process 
was also manifested as legislators and other civic officials steadily replaced 
clerics in performing what became strictly civic ceremonies. 
The "fete de l'Unite" on 10 August 1793 may serve as an illustration. 
This festival for the new constitution was designed by David and celebrated 
on the site of the Bastille, where a strinkingly feminine statue of Nature, 
with the inscription, "NOUS SO MMES TOUS SES ENFANTS," was 
erected. "De ses mamelles, qu'elle pressait de ses mains," said the proces-
verbal, "s'epanchaient dans un vaste bassin deux sources d'une eau pure et 
abondante ... " Marie-Jean Herault de Sechelles, a member of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety and at that time president of the Convention, 
delivered a speech before the statue: 
Souveraine du Sauvage et des nations eclairees, o 
Nature! Ce peuple immense, rassemble aux premiers 
rayons de l'astre du jour devant ton image, est digne de 
toi. 11 est libre! C'est dan ton sein, c'est dan tes ~ources 
sacrees qu'il a recouvre ses droits, qu'il s'est 
regenere .... o Nature! recois l'expression de l'attache-
ment eternel des Francais pour tes lois et que ces eaux 
fecondes qui jaillissent de tes mamelles, consacrent dans 
cette coupe de la fraternite et de l'egalite les sermens que 
te fait la France .... 40 
Herault then stretched forth his cup to catch a drink of the sacred water 
flowing from the breasts of Nature. Six days later the Convention decreed 
that this "coupe d'agate," from which the president had drunk water from 
"la fontaine de la Regeneration," be deposited in the Museum National 
with an inscription which would recall "l'usage touchant et sublime auquel 
elle a servi. " 41 The revolutionary religion was creating its relics. 
It thus seems evident that a revolutionary religion arose simultaneously 
with the persecution of the Catholic Church and threatened to replace Chris-
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tianity prior to the outbreak of the dechristianization movement of the Year 
II. On 26 June 1793 the Committee of Public Instruction proposed that a 
series of national festivals replace religious festivals, and even earlier, in 
December 1792, Jean-Paul Rabaut de Saint-Etienne had urged that a 
uniform enthusiasm for "liberte, egalite, et fraternite" be fostered among 
Frenchmen. Rabaut suggested that each canton have a "temple national" 
to serve as a school building and as a meeting place for citizens where the 
people could receive lessons in ethics, listen to readings by lecteurs patriotes 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and sing hymns in honor of the 
fatherland. 42 Even this was not new in December 1792. The "titre premier" 
of the Constitution of 1791, prepared by the Constituent Assembly, con-
tained the following article: "II sera etabli des f€tes nationales pour con-
server le souvenir de la Revolution francais, entretenir la fraternite entre lcs 
citoyens, et les attacher a la constitution, h la patrie, et aux lois. "H The 
Legislative Assembly accelerated the propaganda effort in November 1791 
when it instructed the Committee of Public Instruction to solicit and 
distribute patriotic pamphlets, and in August 1792 the Assembly ap-
propriated 100,000 livres to finance the efforts of the Ministry of the In-
terior's "bureau d'esprit public" to get out "la bonne parole philosophi-
que. " 44 The Jacobin Club urged affiliate societies to spread pat riot ic 
literature and to exhort the people at popular meetings, meetings often held 
in former churches. A circular of 27 February 1792 from the mother society 
adviseq_ the provincial clubs: 
Comment s'est etabli la religion chretienne? Par les mis-
sions des apotres de' l'Evangile. Comment pouvons 
nous etablir solidement la Constitution? Par les apotres 
de la liberte et de l 'egalite. 45 
The revolutionary calendar had even earlier be~innings. In 1788 the 
atheist Sylvain Marechal published an Almanach des honn@tes gens which 
was dated "the first year of the reign of Reason." Marechal's calendar , like 
that created in the Year II, had twelve months thirty days in length, and 
three decades per month. Marechal replaced the patron saints with an 
assorted and somewhat incongruous array of honn@tes gens such as 
Voltaire, Hobbes, Dante, Heloise, and Jesus. 46 In J 792 the Convention un-
successfully attempted to abolish the observance of Sundays and all 
religious festivals, and the Committee of Public Instruction commissioned 
Romme and others to plan a reform of the Gregorian calendar. 4 7 Rom me 
on 20 September 1793 submitted his plan for a republican cakndar which 
was adopted by the Convention on 5 October. 48 The decrees establishing the 
republican calendar, which replaced Sundays with decadi49 and saints days 
with "fruits and vegetables" days, were introduced and debated within the 
Convention along with philosophic attacks against Christianity. The 
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WORLD HUNGER AND AFRICAN 
DEVELOPEMENT POLICIES 
Ken Mufuka 
One cannot begin to appreciate the present predicament of Sub-Saharan 
Africa until one casts his mind back to the early 1960's. At that time, I was a 
student in the Universaity of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The whole of Africa 
was beginning to awake from its slumber. Idioms and phrases used at the 
time reflect the great enthusiasm with which we faced the future. 
It was proposed at the United Nations, that 1960 be named "Africa's 
year". Mr. Harold Macmillan, then British Prime Minister, gave a stirring 
speech to a joint session of South African Houses of Parliament at the Cape 
entitled, "The Winds of Change". W .E.B. Dubois, the great Ame:dcan 
scholar, said that the remainder of the centry will be known as "Africa's 
century". He, himself, gave up his United States citizenship and 
"returned" to Ghana, a place he considered his homeland. 1 To us, sitting in 
the University corridors, seeing white colonials giving up power all around 
us and that same power falling like ripened fruit into the hands of native 
African sons, we knew that, this indeed was our century. It is difficult now 
to appreciate the goodwill and enthusiasm we had for ourselves and from 
our friends. 
My contention is that the political-economy of most Sub-Saharan states 
is actually more severe than the general world overview would have us 
believe. To illustrate this point, I will use the facts and figures from East 
Africa, which fall among the better managed states to show that even better 
managed countries are retrogressing and have not even started to tackle the 
major issue of unemployment. I also write from my experience in Zim-
babwe, during my sojourn in 1982-1984. · 
OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Enthusiasm for the future has now been replaced by a feeling of 
unrelieved gloom. Our hopes of building a free and prosperous Africa have 
not been realized. The drought and famines which enveloped all tl;ie fifty 
countries in Africa between 1980-1985 were only symptoms of a deeper 
malaise, the inherent insecurity and corruption of African regimes which 
made even the distribution of food impossible. An American visitor to the 
Sudan in 1984 found that twenty years after the British left, the roads and 
railways they left were still the only ones available except that they were now 
unusable. 2 
I will argue that even elected governments in Africa have not developed 
a sense of legitimacy, let alone a sense of security. Nepotism and corruption 
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are a natural growth from a desire to strengthen the power base and build 
obligatory systems among party or tribal supporters of the ruling party. The 
tendency towards socialist industry arises from the same desire by govern-
ment to use these industries as a hunting ground for party stalwarts. Any 
large scale organization or industry, which remains independent of govern-
ment, is seen as capable of giving rewards and sinecures and therefore an 
alternative source of power to the government. In the long run, because of 
the inefficiency resulting from the system, significant economic progress is 
impossible. Indeed, the system created within itself a monster, a gotter-
damarang, that feeds on its tail in order to survive. 
My own impressions lead me to the view that economic progress will de-
pend on whether African leaders can be made accountable to the people 
they lead. Until then, the situation cannot be reversed. The organization of 
African Unity usually takes an optimistic attitude about African problems. 
In one of their rare moments of introspection, they confessed that: 
"drought, famine, dropping farm output now below the 1965 level creates 
huge expanses of poverty. Factory production in (most of Africa) is lower 
than in 1970. Many plants run at twenty-five percent of capacity". The 
organization noted ruefully that the basic problems are "incompetence, 
corruption, falling commodity prices .... at best the slide can be slowed, 
but not stopped". Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director of the 
Economic Commission for Africa, suggests that only gross negligence could 
have destroyed the hopes of a continent which once held so much promise. ·' 
There is a growing consensus in the academic world that the drought and 
famine of 1980-1985 are only symptoms of a long term deterioration in the 
political economy of Africa as a whole. The World Bank ( 1984), points out 
that with an ever increasing population on one hand and agricultural output 
declining on the other, imports of food which now provide about a fifth of 
the region's requirements cannot long provide the solution. The seeds for a 
political and economic nightmare are already in place. The World Bank 
Report calls this a "deepening crisis" .4 
We should place emphasis on the population growth relative to the ex-
pansion of the economies in question. The magnitude of the population ex-
plosion does seem to strengthen the theory proposed by the Reverend 
Thomas Matthus in 1799. Population grows in a geometrical pattern while 
food production increases in small percentages if at all. ~ The population 
figures of any selected Sub-Saharan state seems to indicate a doubling of 
population in less than one generation. A table provided by the World Bank 
illustrates the point. 6 
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Country 1980 2000 Population 
Millions 
Zimbabwe 7 15 31 
Cameroons 8 14 25 
Ivory Coast 9 16 -31 
Ghana 12 23 45 
Kenya 16 37 81 
Tanzania 19 37 72 
Zaire 28 52 95 
The average growth of population was two percent per annum, the 
highest in the world. An expanding population pushed more and more peo-
ple into the cities but the industrial base all over Sub-Saharan Africa was 
eroding at the same time that the agricultural base was failing. The growth 
of African cities is even faster than the rate of population growth as a 
whole. Of the thirty-five cities selected for study by the World Bank in 1980, 
the average growth was eight to nine percent per year. At that rate, the cities 
double in population every ten years. 1 
We still mention in passing a few reasons why the hunger drives families 
to have larger families. In 1980, the average fertility rate per each Kenyan 
woman was eight live births. Generally, the women interviewed wanted 
more children than they already had. A curious but significant fact was that 
the poorer the women, the more children they wanted. 8 The argument 
behind that is that every African woman hopes that at least one of her 
children will one day be a "big chief" in the government. Through 
nepotism, the big chief will raise the economic status of his brothers and 
sisters. To put it bluntly, a starving family sees an increase in the number of 
children as a guarantee for survival. Since, virtually none of the East 
African countries have any social security to take care of old age, 
children are still the only means of insuring an income in old age. 
The fact that government is the only industry that has shown consistent 
growth since 1960 is very important if we are to sustain the general thesis of 
this paper. Government employment is predicated upon the needs of the 
ruling party to reward its supporters. Secondly, within that framework the 
party ''chiefs" are allowed to reward their personal or tribal followers. 
Compared to colonial public services, the post-independence services are er-
nomous. The combined results of all these factors are that by far the 
governments are the major employers. Since, they cannot stand competi-
tion, the private economies have been in decline vis-a-vis the parastatals. 
The table below will illustrate the point.9 
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Public Employment as 
percentage of total 
Country Year formal employment 
Ghana 1957 51.4 
1972 73.9 
Tanzania 1962 27.0 
.1974 66.0 
Zambia 1976 71.5 
Kenya 1963 29.6 
1977 41.7 
Uganda 1962 41.8 
1970 42.2 
To support these bureaucracies, African governments have become in-
geneous in creating new taxes. An example from Zimbabwe will suffice. In-
come tax deducted at source for all earnings of 15,000 p.a. and over in 1980 
was thrity-three percent. We need to emphasize this point. This means that 
the actual take home pay was 10,000 p.a. Income tax for married women 
whose husbands were also income earners was forty percent per anum. 
General sales tax in 1980 was twenty percent. A hunger tax of three percent 
of total income was imposed in 1984. When all the sundry taxes were added, 
seventy-two percent of income was gone. The heavy taxes alone are a 
definite drag on the economy. Secondly, it drives many activities 
underground. In order to make ends meet, many middle-class families in 
Zimbabwe had developed extensive networks of informal trade. A farmer 
would deliver meat and mealie-meal to customers in their homes, thus 
avoiding for himself the Grain Marketing Board levies and for his 
customers the heavy sales taxes. This informal network was so extensive 
that even cars were repaired at home, dresses anq men's outfits were 
delivered clandenstively to the homes of customers and many began to grow 
their own food in their backyards. 
The result is that the governement is forced to introduce new oppressive 
taxes which in turn force the people to· hide their incomes. The private in-
dustry, cannot, in the long run, succeed, because African governments con-
trol prices or imports and exports. The revenue generated from that angle in 
Zimbabwe has been steadily declining since 1960. 
The conclusion is inescapable. "Without policy (changes) there is insuf-
ficient structural adjustment to get the economy back onto a faster growth 
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track. Domestic savings stagnate. All that higher aid can do is help to sus-
tain the level of imports and also that of investment. " 10 
A brief survey of seven countries will show that while their population is 
poised to double every twenty years, their food production has generally 
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The desire to reward family members and political supports is distorted 
by the · fact that in most African countries the major industry · is that of 
government. Therefore, there are no significant opportunities outside the 
political arena. Even private industries find that their major clients are 
governmental groups or affiliates and they can lose business if they are not 
seen as supporters of government. 
Without any · sense of legitimacy at all, most African governments are 
pre-occupied with sheer survival, hence, the tremendous growth of police 
and defence apparatus. Within these security apparatus, the tribal sup-
porters of the ruler form the first line of defence, or put simply, a~ informa-
tion service. Thus otherwise innocent organizations such as the Societe 
Generated' Alimentation, a general grocery chain in Zaire loses its obvious 
purpose of securing and selling groceries in competition with the Belgian 
companies. With his brother, Mr. Mabuto as head· of that trading group, 
and other members of his family in strategic positions, President Sese Seko 
Mobutu of Zaire demands tribute from a population of over thirty million. 
To refuse to do business with Societe is viewed as a political protest and 
therefore treasonable. 11 
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In order to strengthen his influence, President Mobuto has surrounded 
himself with two hundred families. The government regularly flies fresh 
fruit and vegetables from Kivu province, over a thousand miles from Kin-
shasha the capital for the enjoyment of these privileged families. Members 
of the Central Committee are paid up to 9,000 in United States dollars per 
month in order to enable them to procure luxuries of life which they cannot 
purchase at home. 12 Examples abound all over Africa. In the midst of a 
devastating famine in Ethiopia, in 1982, the government continued to order 
cases of whiskey for a celebration for the revolution. The cost of the 
celebrations was estimated at 200 million dollars, an amount which would 
have more than paid for all the relief aid. But more important was the con-
tinued military build up and expenditures of 2,500 million dollars of equip-
ment. The total expenditure on security for that year was forty-six percent 
of the national budget. 13 Paradoxically food production for that year was 
eighty-one percent of what it was in 1970. 14 
It is my contention that whatever the immediate causes of African pro-
blems and world hunger are, the main _cause is the lack of acountability by 
politicians to their constituencies. All the .factors that go wrong can be trac-
ed to that one basic fact of African life. We. shall list a number of factors 
that contributed to food sp.ortages in East Africa. In Kenya, for many years 
agricultural extension workers have been employed in the cities and not in 
the rural areas. Consequently, they need automobiles to travel to the pea-
sant farms. These vehicles are simply not available. Politicians have been 
happy to receive American wheat which is less trouble than growing their 
own. In any case, American wheat serves only the towns, or more specifical-
ly, the civil servants whose loyalty the politicians cultivate. 1 ' 
The most controversial issue relates to agncultural programs that are 
supported by international financial organizations or by African govern-
ments themselves. In this paper my contention is that these programmers 
fail to improve food production because their raison detre was never food 
production but political rewards for government supporters. This later aim 
has definitely bee~ achieve. Two examples will suffice. 
In 1970 to 1980, well over 2,500 local co-operatives were formed in Tan-
.zania. These co-operatives became the main channel through which all 
government aid to peasants was to flow. Those who refused to join the co-
operatives did not receive government aid. This meant that no schools, 
health clinics and market facilities for their coffee and sisal would be pro-
vided. Naturally, these co-operatives were headed by party political 
stalwarts. They did their politicization so well that by 1976 the Tanzanian 
villagers had learnt their political lessons well but did little farming. In fact, 
their production was lower than in the previous years. "In 1976, President 
Julius Nyerere abolished the country's 2,500 local co-operative unions, 
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arguing that they were corrupt, inefficient and politically uncontrollable." 
In their place he appointed government parastatals to manage agricultural 
production. These parastatals could buy seed, fertilizers, give credit, buy 
tools and store food crops as well. These parastatals proved to be more 
mismanaged than the co-operatives. In 1974 and in 1982 the World Bank 
provided support totalling 174 million dollars to Tanzania. The Bank 
reported that ''due to overwhelming problems both internal and external to 
the parastatals, the assistance had Ii ttle effect." 16 
The mistakes were classical. The government of Canada was prevailed 
upon to establish a 70,000 acre wheat farm. The workers employed were 
taken from their nine acre peasant farms to manage the conglomerate. The 
World Bank gave a loan of 10 million dollars for six cashew nut plants. 
There are not enough cashew nuts to occupy the plants for more than six 
months of the year. The Canadian bakery which makes 100,000 loaves a 
day in Dar-es-Soloam cannot sell more than half of its supply so it works 
every other day, or every other week, if at all. The same World Bank 
reported confidentially that of the tractors it had helped to buy, 2,663 of 
them were idle in 1981 for lack of spare parts or know how. They were sup-
posed to help peasants revolutionize agriculture. 11 
Our second example comes from Zambia. In 1965, President Kenneth 
Kaunda in his wisdom, against the advice of his party and experts, issued 
the CHIFUBU DECLARATION. This was to be the basis on which Zam-
bia was to def eat their corn shortages once and for all. Since the white civil 
servants in the ministry of Agriculture had recently left for Rhodesia with 
the break-up of the Rhodesian Federation, he did not get nay technical sup-
port from that department. In fact farmers could not get their letters replied 
to and had to come into town if they had any inquiries. 
The Department of Co-operatives was forced to register all who applied, 
especially if they were members of the ruling party. The money for this 
scheme was handled by the Credit Organization of Zambia, an affiliate of 
the ruling party. This organization was so awash with money that it paid fif-
teen English pounds per acre for land clearing when commercial farmers 
paid only five. The co-operative farmers were given loans and grants accor-
ding to the size of their farms. They claimed vast amounts of lands, paid 
five pounds per acre for clearing and pocketed the difference which they at-
tributed to "supervision expenses". To say that most of the land remained 
fallow is to say the obvious. To say that the Zambian government agency 
which gave these loans soon found itself broke is also an obvious deduction. 
The system was abolished in 1970 when the Zambian treasury had suffered 
an overall deficit. 11 
We should not lose sight of the fact that both the Tanzanian and the 
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Zambian schemes were primarily political instruments aimed at con-
solidating support for the ruling party. This aim was definitely achieved in 
both cases. The improvement of food production was a by-product and if it 
had been achieved, the governments concerned, would have been happier. 
But the fact that loans were not given to proven farmers but to political sup-
porters explains the inevitable failure of these schemes. 
The general tendency by African countries to nationalize industry or to 
use parastatal organizations to carry on business on behalf of the govern-
ments concerned should be seen in the wider context of African politics. 
The government itself -is the largest paymaster and supporters of the ruling 
party expect to be appointed to lucrative jobs, whether they are qualified 
for them or not. Any· African government therefore sees large independent 
companies as direct competitors for patronage and support. It is because 
these companies have the ability to offer patronage irt direct competition 
with government that they are considered undesirable: This also explains 
why companies are formed which have no business to transact. An example 
from Zambia will suffice. The Zambia Transport Services Company was 
formed to haul goods from Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka by road. The road 
itself was unusable for half a year and the government gave away the con-
tract to Beira-Harare-Lusaka railway line. Since the Zambian governnt had 
political obligations to the men working at Zambia Transport Services, 
these workers were paid for four years after their company had become 
redundant. In 1984, the National Milling Company was closed while its 
chairman, Mr. Adrian Kalimina, and the chairman of SUGARLOAF, Mr. 
Mestone Nsensema, were in the United States looking for wheat. It does not 
matter whether these two companies make bread or not because they were 
formed primarily to reward men who had served the party or the 
president. 19 
African leaders seem to he pre-occupied with the idea that no group in 
the economy should be allowed to produce anything unless they are 
politically supportive of the ruling party. Thus economics are subordinated 
to politics. It is the classical story of a Chinese communist who would not 
allow a capitalist cat to catch rats in the area under his jurisdiction. While 
the Zambian government has gone out to recruit white farmers from South 
Africa to occupy the farms abandoned at independence, it has meanwhile 
expelled 70,000 efficient Zimbabwe farmers of the Apostolic Faith Church. 
Their faith does not allow them to actively participate in pro-government 
politics. Faced by all these contradictions, the Zambian Economic Report 
makes the obvious observation that Zambian parastatal organizations have 
been operating "their government metal mines despite persistent 
unremunerative world metal prices for nearly a decade now". The report 
advises that "an effective structural change is the crying need of the Zam-
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·bian situation. The country has to mobilize adequate resources both 
domestic and foreign to restructure effectively the economy into agriculture 
and local based manufacturing industries both large and small'\ 20 
. The words "restructure", "mobilize", and "adequate resources", have 
become standard vocabulary in East and Central Africa. What the Zambian 
government report fails to accept is the fact that adequate resources were 
available during the CHIFUBU agricultural scheme but were squandered 
for political reason. Unless the restructuring is done in such a way as to 
make politicians accountable on a regular basis, no amount of resources 
will be adequate. 
ZIMBABWE 
I shall now briefly allude to the development policies of Zimbabwe since 
1980! When the Zimbabwe African National Union came to power in April 
1980, it had emerged from a bitter war with the colonial government of Mr. 
Ian Smith. During that war, the colonial government had received private 
and public support from South Africa, Britian and the United States. There 
was definite evidence to show that the British government was in collusion 
with British Petroleum and Shell Oil to undermine the oil sanctions imposed 
by the United Nations. 21 By contrast, the two natinalist parties fighting for 
independence received generous training and material support from the 
Soviet Union and China. Twelve years of such close working relationships 
left them somewhat sympathetic to communism and socialist management · 
policies. There is a widely-held belief among African nationalists that 
racism and capitalism are bed-fellows. These two factors are important to 
the understanding of African politics. 
On coming to power, the Zimbabwe government issued a document en-
titled, GROWTH AND EQUITY (1982). I shall confine myself to those 
policies which relate to economic ~evelopment and hunger. The pamphlet 
alluded to above on growth was a polemical treatise to the effect that unless 
investors share their wealth with the proletariat, economic growth without 
this promise would be avoided. Various strategies were found to implement 
this policy. 
The Zimbabwe government, using emergency powers, set a new 
minimum wage o(sixty-five dollars per month for domestic workers and 
110 dollars for industrial and commercial workers. In effect, the govern-
ment assumed sweeping powers over all prices and commodities, electricity, 
water, bread, wages~ beer, etc., thus making everyday management plann-
ing for private industry difficult. Workers could not be dismissed without 
government permission. In 1985, agro-industrial wages were doubled from 
75 dollars per month to 143. 75 dollars per month by government decree. 22 
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Secondly, the governemnt hoped to attract multi-nationals on a co-
operative basis with itself. During the last six years, only three companies 
have entered into such arrangements, Holiday Inn, Sheraton Hotels and 
Heinz. The combined total of employment involved in these three com-
panies is not significant. The Zimbabwe government however, is aware of 
the reluctance of multi-nationals. The Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, 
believes that: "Foreign investment is a very sensititve thing, extremely sen-
sitive. Even if we were to declare ourselves capitalists as Zaire (sic), you see 
there is not much investment there. Look at developing countries which are 
capitalists and you will see that over the five years or so very little invest-
ment has gone to those countries. " 23 The solution was to create 
government owned companie~. The umbrella Industrial Development Cor-
poration, formed in 1965 as a joint venture with private enterprise became 
wholly government owned. The Zimbabwe National Oil Company will 
eventually replace LONRHO, a British Company, the Zimbabwe Tourist 
Company will compete with the private hotel industry, the National Hous-
ing Corporation uses communi"st style building brigades to provide cheap 
housing and Hwange Colliery is managed .by a joint company with Anglo-
American Corporation. This is only an example of the direction in which 
the Zimbabwe government has taken. 24 
Even within the short span of life these corporations have had, the ex-
pected results have not been forthcoming. The universal problem of all 
government owned companies has always been that even though the 
managers are instructed to make profit, they are appointed to the positions 
because of political loyalty. it is the classical case of a cat which catches 
mice and a communist cat which is ideologically preferable. The govern-
ment rhetoric could not be aimed at encouraging free enterprise. Zimbab-
wean socialism is described by the Prime Minister thus: " ... our socialism 
is scientific and recognizes that it~ course will be through a class 
struggle ... ~based on Marxist-Leninist principles. The socialist sta~e will 
have been placed in possession of the means of production and capitalism 
will have been completely transformed. 25 
Government owned companies are faced by two major serious problems 
in Africa. We have mentioned the fact that government must find secure 
jobs for its supporters and these supporters in turn must provide secure jobs 
for. their tribal relatives. The whole principle of allowing civil servants · to 
manage commercial enterprises is self-defeating. As soon as the nationalists 
took over the management of Iron and Steel works in 1981, (ZISCO) there 
was a scramble to find jobs for party stalwarts and tribal followers. 
Whereas the steel mills were losing 20 million dollars per annum in 1983, by 
1984, they were losing over 100 million dollars per annum. There was 
serious "over employment". The government minister responsible for 
ZISCO confessed to parliament that: "For instance, one of the things that 
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will have to be done at ZISCO is to share surplus labor and make a review 
of all unnecessary engagements .... one also gets the impression that there 
is a very severe overmanning of this organization. " 26 
Air Rhodesia, now AIR ZIMABA WE, and AFRET AIR were two of the 
few national airlines on the African continent which were profitable. The na-
tionalists combined the two companies into one national airline AIR ZIM-
BABWE after independence. From a surplus of twelve million dollars a 
year; by 1985 the airline was facin~ overdrafts of 100 million dollars. A 
Zimbabwe government report said that there had been severe overmanning, 
gross mismanagement and theft of company monies. 21 
The report issued by the Minister of Transport on the mismanagement 
at AIR ZIMBABWE should be followed in some detail at the risk of 
superfluity because it offers an authoritative summary of the classical pro-
plems facing an African government. Because. employment is predicated 
upon political and tribal loyalty, the temptation to overemploy is 
unavoidable. As a result, overdrafts and subsidies quadruple overnight. The 
report says that: 




abandoned and the general manager (i.e. the big 
man) made his own appointments . ... There was 
over-employment. 
(Overdrafts) rose from 18.2 million dollars in 
1983 to 45. 7 million in 1984 and later to almost 84 
million in 1985. There were a lot of people hired who 
had no specific functions. 
Other staff had been moved from the places they 
were trained for to make room for friends of the big 
man. The staff thus employed showed no discipline 
at all. They were safe under the protection of the 
"big man". The report says that: 
Staff morale had plummented .... employees ar-
riving late and leaving early. Staff did not care about 
the public which paid for the service. 
Oral evidence not found in tqe rport indicated that passengers were 
sometimes thrown out in order to give way for political "big men" who had 
not booked for flights. A most damning practice found in the report is that 
the manager was reluctant to employ qualified blacks. 
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It says that: 
(Col. 4) There was fear of competition from qualified 
blacks and a desire to use (retired) whites who were 
believed to be prevented by political considerations 
to take over the highest post. (sic). 
The privileged few demanded that the government pay for their pro-
miscuous pleasures while on leave. The report says that: 
(Col. 4) Captains on overseas duty took their wives or 
girlfriends with them and wanted hotel accomoda-
tions upgraded ... by the airline (sic). 
The only redeeming feature is that some members of government are 
honest enough to confess the inherent weaknesses of the system. However, 
as in the case of· Ghana, under Dr. K wame Nkurumah, it can be foreseen 
that by the time the whole government becomes aware of these inherent 
weaknesses, the financial backbone of the state will have been irreversibly 
destroyed. This is not an exaggeration at all. 
Oral evidence seems to indicate that in the railways; as many as three 
people were employed for one job. The result has been disastrous for the 
Zimbabwean treasury. Within two years of the nationalist takeover, sub-
sidies to parastatals became a major drain on the·Zimbabwe treasury. From 
less than one hundred million 1980, they exceeded 600 million in 1985. In 
1985, about twenty-five percent of total government revenues went to sub-
sidies for parastatals. The significance of this is that some of the parastatals 
were revenue generating companies before government takeover. The pro-
lif era ti on of government companies therefore creates a gottadamarang, a 
monster that consumes its tial in or4er to sustain itself. The minister of 
finance reported in 1985 that: "Last year, I expressed strong concern about 
the large amounts of funds being allocated as subsidies to finance losses in-
curred by parastatals. The position continues to give cause for concern. 
This situation is unsatisfactory. " 28 
Clearly, the methods used to create employment in Zimbabwe are insuf-
ficient to meet the challenge. The official account is that since 1982, Zim-
babwe produced 80,000 school leavers per annum. Of these, less than forty-
two percent passed their high school examinations. In the private sector, on-
ly 7,000 new jobs were created between 1980-1985. Taking into account the 
closure o'r IT1any private industries during the same period, the private sector 
has shrunk from its 1980 position. The government has in the meantime ex-
panded and may soon employ sixty-seven of the total in the formal sector. 
Given the proviso that the expansion of government employment creates 
unemployment in the private sector. In any case, the total employment is 
not anywhere near what is required. The minister of finance confessed: "In-
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deed the employment trends which I referred to earlier gave cause for 
alar~. They constitute a development which cannot be viewed with any 
degree of complacency and which calls for redoubled efforts. . . to favor the 
growth with employment lest the nation finds itself. . . with increasing 
thousands of educated jobless in our streets. " 29 
The question of foreign engagements is seen by the government as 
unavoidable. In this article we are only interested in as far as it puts severe 
strains on the national treasury. It is suggested that 7,000 troops are engag-
ed in Mozambique in order to protect the railway line. The situation is 
disastrous no matter what action is taken by government. The South 
African alternative is humiliating politically, yet the Mozambican alter-
native must in the long run be disastrous to the treasury. 30 
I have left the external factors to the end. African politicians say that 
they are not to blame for droughts, the declining purchasing power of their 
currencies and worst of the disadvantages terms of trade for their sugar, 
coffee, tobacco, and minerals. I shall dispose of these arguments briefly. 
Generally, it is not the lack of rainfall per se that has caused the drought. 
For instance, the state of Texas in the United States receives less rainfall 
than Zimbabwe (32 inches per annum). Since independence., however, 
because the nationalists believe that they owe a special debt for their success 
to the support given them by peasants. They have therefore allowed the 
peasants, without any planning to occupy virgin lands and to clear them of 
vegetation. This author was a member of the Great Zimbabwe-Lake Kyle 
committee which presented a confidential report to the Governor of Masv-
ingo Province on the destruction of vegetation. Within two years of uncon-
trolled peasant occupation of the area; the committee feared that Lake 
Kyle, the second largest water system in the country, would be silted up 
within five years. Without ground cover rainfall which had once been ade-
quate, is not washed away within minutes. Sometimes an area experiences a 
"dry spell" two days after a thunderstorm. It would seem that the greater 
danger to African environment comes from deforestation which in turn ex-
aggerates fluctuations in rainfall. 
Nationalists cannot be blamed for the decline in the terms of trade. But 
the nationalists are definitely to blame for inability to plan for fluctuations 
in the terms of trade. During the Rhodesian Federation, the colonial 
government c~lc~lated its copper revenues on the lowest possible price for 
that year: In the United States, many state governments save five percent of 
their annual revenues as a safety net against revenue fluctuations. 
The problems of employment, world hunger, and general development 
in Africa are merely ..symptoms of a severe disease of mismanagement that 
underlies most African governments. Paradoxically, the mismanagement 
itself appears to be mandated by the circumstances in which they achieved 
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independence and the lack of legitimacy and accountability. Until these fac-
tors are overcome, I see no light at the end of the tunnel in the forceable 
future. 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON 
April Gordon 
Introduction 
Although independent since 1960, the nation of Cameroon is the result 
of the unification of formerly French East and British West Cameroon in 
1972. In comparison with many other African countries, Cameroon has em-
joyed healthy economic growth in a climate of political stability. Western 
development and lending agencies consider the Cameroon economy to be 
well managed. As an indicator of this, between 1970 and 1982 the economy 
grew at an average rate of 7% in real terms (World Bank, 1984: 58) and pro-
duction was relatively well diversified. Largely due to the cushion provided 
by oil exports, Cameroon has in recent years enjoyed a positive balance of 
trade, and Cameroon's debt service ratio of 12% is low in Africa. To its 
credit, the government has also, for the most part, avoided expensive, non-
productive showcase projects and has followed a "conservative public in-
vestment policy." (Ndongko, 1984: 1-2) The overarching development 
strategy of "planned liberalism" has been a fairly open-door invitation to 
foreign investors. (See Gordon and Gordon, 1983) 
It is generally acknowledged that agriculture has been the dynamic force 
behind the economy's growth. (DeLancey, 1984) The production of export 
crops provided foreign exchange to finance the import of capital goods and 
services for the development of the economy as a whole. Moreover, 
Cameroon has been one of the few countries in Africa to remain largely 
self-sufficient in food production, thus further saving foreign exchange. As 
DeLancey reports (1984) total agricultural production has been growing at 
an annual average of 3.90/o. 
Although Cameroon has been fortunate compared to many of its 
neighbors, underlying the overall appearance of progress are numerous con-
tradictions and problems similar to those besetting other African nations. 
Despite its avowed dedication to "balanced development," i.e. rural and 
regional equity; an examination of the policies and social forces in opera-
tion in Cameroon, reveal that profound inequities exist which are slowly 
strangling "the goose that lays the golden eggs," that is the agricultural sec-
tor of the economy. 
The following discussion will be a highlighting and brief analysis of the 
main influences on agricultural development in Cameroon. This will in-
volve, first of all a look at Cameroon's 5-year development plans since in-
dependence and the impact of government policies on agricultural develop-
ment. Overall, my conclusion is that agriculture and rural areas have been 
consistently shortchanged. Next, I will discuss why and how this has occur-
red. Last, the problems of the rural-agricultural sector will be outlined as 
well as some prospects for the near future. 
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Cameroon's Development Policies 
Since independence, Cameroon's development goals have been laid out 
in a series of 5-year plans which include proposed expenditures for different 
items in the plan. As is true throughout Africa, many sections of the -plan 
are not fully funded or may receive no funds at all. Although each plan is 
different in its priorities, there are some unifying threads in the first' five 
plans. To "benefit the country as a whole and each Cameroonian," the 
government espouses planned liberalism, self-reliant development, balanc-
ed development, and social justice. (Ndongko, 1984: 4) 
Although promoting industry has been the number one priority, 
agriculture figures prominently in all five development plans. The first plan, 
1962-1966, emphasized cash crop agriculture, infrastructure, import 
substitution industry, and an extremely generous investment code to lure 
foreign capital. The second plan, 1966-1970, concentrated heavily on diver-
sification of industry, processing of local products, employment, _and 
regionally oriented industrialization. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 21-27) 
While recognizing the need to supply the farmers with credit and fertilizers, 
both the first and second plans virtually ignored food crop agriculture. 
(Ntangsi, 1983) However, the second plan recognized several growing pro-
blems in the rural areas: outmigration to increasingly overcrowded cities, 
population pressures in the highly productive Bamileke areas in West 
Cameroon, low rural incomes., and inappropriate educational programs to 
help promote farming. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1966: 
27-29) 
Only in the third plan, 1971-1976, was there a real attempt to bring 
mostly agricultural West Cameroon into the national development scheme. 
(Ministry of Economic A ff airs and Planning, 1971: 72-76) Ndongko ( 1984: 
7-8) sees a new emphasis on -self-reliant development, e.g., a movement 
away from import industries. Promoting food crops was accorded more im-
portance - although actual investment proved to be quite small compared to 
investment in industry and cash crops. The overall budget for all types of 
agriculture was 25 billion CFA compared to 70.3 billion CFA for industry. 
(Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: 22) During the fourth plan, 1976-1981, large-
scale development projects to promote production of new cash crops - rice, 
cotton, and wheat - were funded. (Ntangsi , 1983) Overall, the greatest at-
tention to agriculture occurred during the fifth plan, 1981-1986. The 
plan committed 23.7% of the investment budget to the agricultural sector 
-more than twice that of the fourth plan. (DeLancey, 1984: 16) Emphasis is 
still focused, however, on promoting industry. But in line with the goal of 
self-reliance, Cameroon hopes to move away from "foreign oriented in-
dustry.'' (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, 1981) 
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Agricultural Policies 
In its efforts to develop its economy, Cameroon, as well as other 
African nations, has had to rely on two main sources of financing: 1) 
foreign capital since few sources of indigenous capital were possible during 
the colonial period; and earnings from exports. While oil is becoming a 
more important soun:e of capital, most government revenues depend on the 
profits from a,.gricultural exports such as cocoa, palm oil, and coffee. These 
are produced privately, often by small-holders, and by government 
parastatals such as the CDC (Cameroon Development Corporation). 
In the process of extracting the rural surplus to finance the national 
budget, government policies toward agriculture are making it increasingly 
difficult to make a living in rural areas. Despite its official commitments to 
agriculture, actual policies have an overwhelming "urban bias" which is 
having dramatic negative repercussions, to be discussed more fully below. 
Indeed, Schiavo-Campo et al. (1983: 34-35) in their detailed examination of 
the plans conclude that agricultural policies actually amount to a "neglect" 
of agricultural needs. In the last three plans, for instance, actual investment 
fell far short of the amounts stipulated in the plan. From 1971-1980 (3rd 
and 4th Plans) investment was only 11 and 13.50/o of the total investment 
budget. DeLancey (1984: 32) adds that the actual investment during the 
Fourth Plan was only 510/o of the proposed amount. Unfortunately, many 
objectives from the Fifth Plan are also falling short. 
The deficiencies in Cameroon's agricultrual policies are similar to those 
facing other African states. (See World Bank, 1981; Picard, 1984; Bates, 
1983) At root, policies fail to provide adequate incentives to farmers to pro-
duce or even to stay in rural areas. They favor urbanites at the expense of 
the rural majority. 
Most of Cameroon's agricultural production has come from 
smallholders (900/o in the l 960's) with the remainder from plantations and 
parastatals producing primarily for export. Government investment and 
other policies have overwhelmingly favored export crops in an effort to earn 
foreign exchange and to fund government operations and development 
~chemes. Thus, one of Cameroon's major policies has been to control the 
marketing of export crops and set prices paid to farmers. Ostensibly to off-
set fluctuations in world prices, the cocoa stabilization fund was established 
for_ export producers. Throughout the l 970's the government consistently 
paid farmers much less than the world market price for their crops. The 
surplus went for administration, the stabilization fund, infrastructure, 
research, grants to credit unions, etc. Large amounts went to the national 
budget as a "contribution" (almost 250/o in 1981). (Schiavo-Campo et al., 
1983) Although some of the stabilization fund went to agricultural develop-
ment, most went to general development. (DeLancey, 1984: 14) 
132 The South Carolina Historical Association 
The result for farmers is a disincentive to produce export crops, which -in 
the 1970's actually declined. (World Bank, 1981: 167) This decline in pro-
duction occurred despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of pro-
grams to promote agriculture have been directed towards cash crops. 
Credit, the extension system, agricultural education programs, price sup-
ports, cooperative ventures and input subsidies all favored export farmers. 
Food crop producers, most of whom are women, have been largely ig-
nored. (See Delancey, 1984; Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983; Nelson et al., 
1974) Of the relatively small amount of investment made overall in 
agriculture between 1971-1980, only 250/o has gone for food crops - and 
over 2/J of that for rice, and another 160/o for wheat. Only .50/o of the total 
public investment budget went to basic food crops. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 
1983: 34-35) Rice and wheat, by contrast, are primarily mainstays in the diet 
of more affluent urban dwellers, often to the detriment of producers of 
locally grown, traditional grains. (See World Bank, 1981) 
Recently, prices for export crops are being raised, but this is arousing 
concern that food crop production will suffer. This concern is well-
founded, since food crop production in Cameroon is from latest reports 
falling behind population growth-per capita food production at-.90/o from 
1970-1982. (World Bank, 1984: 77) 
Government attempts to regulate food prices, keeping prices lower for 
consumers, are another disincentive to farmers as well as an opportunity for 
abuse by officials. "La mercuriale" (maximum prices set for foodstuffs and 
merchandise) is set at the prefect level. Official prices are much too low and, 
according to Lippens and Joseph (1978: 120-122) mainly subsidize con-
sumption of the civil servants setting prices. In reality, prices are often en-
forced by other officials and gendarmes arbitrarily, a situation ripe for cor-
ruption. 
Government efforts to promote rural development are also inadequate 
and suffer from bureaucratic inefficiencies. Government-assisted regional 
cooperatives have not been successful except for UCCAO (Union des 
Cooperatives de Cafe Arabica de l'Ouest), a West Cameroon coffee coop. 
Joseph (1978: 151-153) attributes the failure of coops to the domination of 
government officials and local leaders as well as to exorbitant charges of 
middle men. (See also Trouve and Bessat, 1980: 49) Similar problems of 
bureaucratic domination are also mentioned in reference to the ambitious 
ZAPI (Zones d' Actions prioritaires integrees) integrated rural development 
program, a French-inspired program. In his appraisal of the program, 
Sobgui (1976: 116-123) notes that ZAPI has not resulted in upgrading 
agriculture or rural conditions. Policymakers and administrators didn't 
take into account local conditions or views of the rural participants. (See 
also Belloncle, 1979) 
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The government's wage policies also discriminate against rural workers. 
Urban workers, especially those in Douala, Yaounde, and Edca, are in the 
top wage zone. Lowest wages are set for those in agrirnlturc. (Nelson et al., 
1974: 196) And the wage gap widened in the 1970's, partly because the 
minimum wage in the countryside was poorly enforced. Purchasing power, 
hence real income, was also reduced by the high prices charged for 
manufactured goods. (Gwan, 1976: 19-20; see also Trouve ct Bcssat, 1980: 
49) 
Government investment has done little to upgrade rural infrastructure 
and services compared to urban centers. In areas of housing, water, elec-
tricity, roads, health, recreation, and other measures of living standards, 
regional and especially rural-urban disparities are striking. For instance, the 
1976 census reports that only 23% of all urban dewellers have electricity, 
but 36.2% of those in Douala and 42.9% of those in Yaounde do. The rural 
rate is only .50Jo. Even in the Central South district in which Yaounde is 
located, only . 70Jo of rural dwellers have electrici_ty, I. 90/o in the Littoral 
region where Douala is located. Over 63% of Douala's residents have piped 
water; 53.5% have water in Yaounde. Only 40/o of rural dwellers have ac-
cess to such water; 3.4% in the Central South, 7% in the Littoral. In the 
underdeveloped North, even urbanities find few amenities: 9.4% have elec-
tricity; 28.4% have piped water. The North's rural dwellers are the most 
underserviced group: .20Jo have electricity; .90Jo have water. (Trouve et 
Bessat, 1980: 52-58; Bureau Central du Recensement, 1977) 
Access to education is also variable for regions and rural-urban groups. 
Although 68% of eligible students are in primary school in Cameroon, 
(Central Bureau of the Census, 1977: 16) a notable achievement in Africa, 
almost 100% of those in Douala an_d Yaounde are enrolled. At the other ex-
treme, only 18% of the eligible rural population in the North have access to 
schools; (The Futures Group, 1983: 20) most of the students above 
theprimary level are in the major cities. Increasingly, education appears to 
be a selection tool for upward mobility in Cameroon society which will 
restrict access to good jobs to a privileged few. Most manual workers' 
children fail the primary school exams. Most rural · children, unless they 
send their children to Yaounde have little chance for secondary education. 
(Peil, 1981: 275) Whereas secondary schools enroll 19% of the eligible 
population, universary education is rare: only 20Jo of the population 20-24 is 
receiving higher education. (World Bank, 1984: 87) According to Ngango et 
al., (1983: 87-88) for the average citizen, the educational system is actually a 
detriment in solving rural or urban umemployment. It does not increase the 
number of qualified workers or promote development. Not only do most 
drop out or fail, but the level of instruction and student achievement is so 
low as to be maladaptive to the needs of the society and a threat to the 
growth of the economy. 
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In the mid-1960-s IPAR (Institute of Rural Applied Pedagogy) was one 
strategy employed to promote rural education. IPAR was a response to the 
fact that education in rural areas was a major factor promoting urban 
migration. The hope was that if rural educatin could be geared to mass, 
rural needs rather than to urban, white collar applications, the rural exodus 
might be slowed. (Gwan, 1976; Kale and Yembe, 1980: 316-317) !PAR is to 
date a failure. For one, the urban elites opposed the program. They were 
products of modern education and didn't want their own children back on 
the farm. Teachers opposed the idea that they would be agricultural exten-
sion workers. Even the rural people themselves saw !PAR as a government 
effort to keep their children in rural hardship rather than to provide educa-
tion for social mobility - that is, salaried jobs in the city. (Kale and Yembe, 
1980: 318, 322) 
"Revitalization" -providing the social services of urban areas to the 
countryside and promoting rural industries is another possibility mentioned 
in the Fifth Plan. (DeLancey, 1984: 27-28) More investment in infrastruc-
ture, transport, communication, and distributional activities to enhance 
regional growth are also proposed. (Schiavo-Campo et al., 1983: C-3 - C-4) 
Perhaps more to the heart of rural probleJt}s, increasing incomes of farmers 
is recognized as important. (Ngango et al., 1983: 34-36) But it is still too ear-
ly to tell how ·many of these objectives are being met or what commitment 
there is among Cameroon's elite to actually foot the bil required to meet 
them. 
Why Policies Shortchange Agriculture 
Although the issues are more complex than I can do justice to in this 
brief paper, some general explanation for the often counter-productive 
agricultural policies pursued by the Cameroon government is in order. That 
explanation is best found in a modified version of dependency theory that 
takes into account both external and internal constraints on Cameroon 
development. (See Frank, 1969; Amin, 1976; Leys, 1975; Hermassi, 1978; 
and others) As is true of much of the African continent, Cameroon must re-
ly on Western sources of development aid and investment. Until very 
recently in Cameroon, this has meant overwhelming reliance on the French. 
To mention a few sources of this dependency: Cameroon's currency is back-
ed by the French, its development plans were largely drawn up by or highly 
influenced by the French, investment and external trade are dependent on 
the French and other Western nations, top industrial managers and con-
sultants are French or other Westerners, and so on. In essence, for 
Cameroon to get the capital it needs, it has had to cater to the needs of 
foreign interests often to the detriment of its own professed goals and in-
terests. This has meant concentration of investment in the Douala-Yaounde 
areas and in production of export crops to foot the bill, also the promotion 
of large, capital-intensive foreign firms to the disadvantage of indigenous 
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businessmen and most workers. 
The reliance on foreigners, however, is not simply economic. 
Cameroon's elite - its national and local political leaders, the swollen 
government bureaucracy, favored economic groups linked to foreign 
capital (e.g. some workers, businessmen, farmers)-also benefit from the 
dependence on foreigners. Their wages, profits, emulation of the Western 
lifestyle, and power all depend on the continuation of current inequities. 
That is, the urban bias in living standards, wages, and investment is a major 
means by which a small proportion of Cameroon's population, i.e., its 
elites, promote and maintain their interests by exploiting the laboring rural 
and urban masses. For a more complete discussion of these issues, read 
Gordon and Gordon (1985). 
Consequences of Cameroon's Policies 
The distortions and imbalances inherent in Cameroon's neglect of rural 
interests are manifold. A major consequence is rapid population growth 
and the deluge of rural migrants to Cameroon's two major cities as well as 
to other regional urban centers. The total population of Cameroon increas-
ed from 4.1 million in 1950 to 7.6 million in 1976 (Central Bureau of the 
Census, 1977: 1) and is currently estimated at between 9.6 million (the 
Futures Group, 1983: 4,4a) and 9.8 million (Ngango, 1983: 1-2), an increase 
of approximately 240%. If current patterns remain, The Futures Group ex-
pects the national population to be over 16 million by 2000, while the World 
Bank expects 17 million (1984: 82). The latest estimates and projectins by 
the World Bank (1984: 82) are that Cameroon's population will grow at an 
average rate of 3.5% between 1980 and 2000, and that it had been growing 
at an average of 3.0% between 1972 and 1980! A growth rate of 3.5% 
means that a country's population will double every 20 years. 
The percentage of people living in urban areas increased from 5.8% in 
1950 (The Futures Group, 1983: 4) to 28% in 1976 (Central Bureau of the 
Census, 1977). Ngango (1983: 2) estimates that 38.6% of Cameroonians 
will be urban by 1986, and urban-rural parity is expected by 1990. (The 
Futures Group, 1983:18). In stark contrast to the overall urban area rate of 
growth of over 6% is the 1 OJo rate of growth of rural areas. (Ngango, 1983: 
34) 
Truly phenomenal population increases have been experienced by 
Douala and Yaounde. Since independence these cities have had growth rates 
of 7 to 10% per yhear, well above the extraordinary Third World average of 
5-6% per year. Douala's population is expected to reach 1. 7 million in 1990 
(The Futures Group, 1983: 2), and Yaounde's growth rate since in-
dependence is believed to have been even higher than that of Douala, rang-
ing from 8.5% to a current 10% per year. From 54,000 in 1957 the city grew 
to 313,000 at the 1976 census. Estimates for 1990 by Gerull and Schmitter 
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( 1979: 18) and The Futures Group (1983: 2) range from 800,000 to 1.2 
million. 
Migration studies repeatedly show tha,t trrban migrants seek economic 
opportunities in the city but often because they have few or no oppor-
tunities back in the rural areas or smaller towns. (See Marguerat, 1975; 
Aignet, 1976; Fraqueville, 1971; Barbier, 1978) The absence of dynamic 
villages or village centers blocks any alternative to migration to large cities 
and also blocks improvement in 'the satisfaction of rural needs or standards 
of living. Yet the problems of small towns are ignored in Cameroon's in-
dustrial or agricultural policies. (Trouve et Bessat, 1980) 
As population gravitates toward the large cities, Cameroon's population 
becomes increasingly distorted in both rural and urban areas, a condition 
further exacerbating economic and equity problems in the society. For as 
regions and rural areas lose their young and more educated workers to the 
major cities, the population left behind is aging and increasingly female. 
This trend is most pronounced in the Central South, West, and Littoral 
where more than 500Jo of the male labor force is over 40. More female 
dominance in traditional agriculture, where investment and capitalization is 
lowest, is occurring. (Trouve et Bessat, 1980; Bureau Central du Recense-
mcnt, 1977: 18-19) 
On the other hand, urban migrants are finding that good jobs are scarce 
and competition keen. Services and housing, although superior to the coun-
tryside, are crowded, dilapidated, and overextended. Employment is often 
marginal; informal sector jobs, unemployment, crime, or - for females -
prostitution become the avenues to advancement for the overwhelming ma-
jority. (Sec Barbier ct al., 1978; Ministere de l'Urbanisme et l'Habitat, 
1981; Gwan, 1976) 
Cameroon's leaders are not oblivious to many of the problems outlined 
above. Some level of commitment to balanced development and to suppor-
ting the rural as wdl as urban living standards have been part of every Five 
Year Plan. Yet urbanization shows no signs of abating and the rural-urban 
income gap widens. At the same time the living conditions and employment 
prospects for both the urban and rural masses are not promising. (Schiavo-
Campo et al., 1983: 9) 
In 1980, before the launching of the latest 5-Year Plan, various govern-
ment ministries met to discuss Cameroon's development needs. Urban pro-
blems were central concerns. The Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a 
report on perspectives on development to the year 2000. In this report, 
unemployment accompanying rapid urbanization was listed as one of 
Cameroon's most crucial national problems. The MINEP report blamed 
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failures in the agricultural sector for having worsened . the employment 
situation and accelerating the outmigration of rural youth. The Technology 
and Employment Development Commission for the year 2000 recommend-
ed the creation of local technology rather than dependence on the transfer 
of outside technology to provide employment. This would require more 
scientific and technical research and financial support. (Ngango et al., 1983: 
104).Also.in 1980, the Ministry of Urbanism and Housing sponsored a con-
ference to revise Yaounde's plan for the next 10 years. With Yaounde pro-
jected to grow by an ~stronomical 9% in 1985, long term planning would be 
increasingly necessary to cope - including zoning and land use policies. 
(Ministere de l'Urbanisme et !'Habitat, 1981) 
Prospects for Cameroon 
The long term consequences of distorted development in Cameroon arc 
at this point speculative to be sure. Nontheless, continued unemployment, 
poor living conditions, and inequality in the midst of rising popular expec-
tations raise the question of whether the economy can expand rapidly 
enough to ameliorate, if not solve, these problems. The risks of political in-
stability are a foremost consideration. 
As Sandbrook (1982: 81-82) points out, the development strategy pur-
sued by Cameroon (and several other African states), promotes mass pover-
ty and eventually class formation. Unemployment and gross inequalities 
between elites and masses, adds Hance (1970: 275-276), is a situation ripe 
for discontent. At this point in time, evidence of class formation and class 
consciousness among the masses in Cameroon is mixed. (See Kofele-Kale, 
1984; Peil, 1981: 114-121) However, Forje's (1977: IOI) contends that the 
creation of a privileged elite in the towns alongside rural and urban mass 
poverty is producing the "beginnings of a class structure which was not 
previously noticeable in Cameroon." A trend toward class formation would 
eventually result in more attempts at collective solutions to inequality and 
limited opportunity and could well sharpen demands for more radical struc-
tural changes in the society. 
As for the rural masses in the near future, many will continue to use ur-
ban migration as the road to improving their lot, thus alleviating some of 
the pressure on rural resources. The better off farmers, who receive more 
benefits from rural development policies and projects, will most likely ally 
themselves with the political system. The remaining rural masses will simply 
cope as best they can. (See Bates, 1983: 131-133) But for both the rural 
masses and more prosperous rural elements, economic stagnation could 
undermine their support for the system. 
In the rural sector there are already ominous signs that such stagnation 
is taking place. Stagnation and, for some commodities, decline in produc-
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tion is a reality. Currently, the export crops which provide most of 
Cameroon's foreign exchange have declined the most. (DeLancey, 1984: 
10-12) Even more ominous, in their report on Cameroon's economy, 
Schiavo-Campo et al. (1983: 34) predict that the country will no longer be 
able to feed itself over the next 15 years unless productions grows faster, a 
distinct possibility given current declines in food crop production. (World 
Bank 1984: 77) If the rural economy declines, the industrial economy will 
not be far behind. Continued urban migration, high birth rates, disparities 
in rural-urban and regional incomes and living standards, inequality bet-
ween elites and masses, and inappropriate government development policies 
which contribute to these problems must be altered soon. 
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